Wednesday, January 21, 2015


Indo – China Strategic Rivalry

(By Dr. Nand Kishor Kumar)

 Introduction

     Richard Nixon in 1994 stated that “China’s economic power makes US lecture about human rights imprudent. Within a decade, it will make them irrelevant. Within two decades, it will make them laughable. By then the Chinese may threaten to withhold MFN status from the US unless we do more to improve living conditions in Detroit, Harlem and South Central LA.”[i]

     Looking at today’s Chinese strategic stature in 2014, the aforesaid prophesy made by Richard Nixon about China seems to be appropriate.  

      However, despite the fact that no such eminent prophecy was made for future growth of India, the significant status occupied by India over the last 65 years, ever since her independence in 1947, is not the product of strategic mercy by any super power, as USA did for China, but by virtue of its own efforts, that too, in unfavorable scenario inside and outside India. It is, therefore, the fact that China has undoubtedly grown tremendously in all aspects of national power, but India is also not very far behind. In this background Indo – China relation needs to be analyzed and examined in the present context without being prejudiced, biased and influenced by anti-India so-called western/Indian scholars who have the tendency to underrate India in relation to China. Yes, India’s strategic face is not as bright as that of China, but overall India’s position is also not as grim and pessimist looking as such authors attempt to paint it        

      This paper attempts to focus the framework of strategic background of both India and China in context with their relationship and also to highlight the impact of their strategic rivalry on the vital national, regional and global interest.

 

 Strategic Perception

Strategy has been defined as a Plan designed to achieve a particular long term aim. It is also an art of planning and directing military activity in a war or battle. According to Stuart Poore, “…the term strategy has tradionally been used to refer to the way that the military power is used by government in the pursuit of their interest. How are theses interest shaped? A strategic culture approach tackles this question by considering the relevance of cultural context in influencing strategic preferences.”(Neorealism vs. Strategic Culture, in the book – Strategic Culture- by John Glenn and Stuart Poore, p. 47).

          Colin S. Gray in his ‘Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice’, P. 162 has pointed out six principles of strategic culture:

1.      Strategic behavior cannot be beyond culture

2.      Adversity cannot cancel culture

3.      Strategic culture is a guide to action

4.      Strategic culture expresses comparative advantage

5.      Strategic culture can be dysfunctional

6.      Strategic culture can be variously categorized, such as nationality, geography, weapons and functions, simplicity and complexity, generation and grand strategy.

                     As regards Chinese strategic culture in terms of aforesaid six principles, the general impression about China begins with Sun Tzu of China, authored the ‘ Art of War’, sometime between the 8th and 5th century BC, 3-4 centuries earlier than our own Kautilya, who wrote the ‘Arthshastra’ during 4th - 3th century BC. Both wrote broadly about strategy. They discussed statecraft, diplomacy, relationship with other nations and a host of other topics in their respective books. The prevalence of ‘strategic culture’ in the two countries can be gleaned from the fact that Sun Tzu’s strategic principles were continuously updated by subsequent Chinese strategists over the centuries to keep them relevant to the changing technologies and environment. Kautilya’s Arthshastra has become the object of historical studies and no serious attempts were made either by the military analysts or other strategists to evaluate its practical applicability and pertinent to developmental changes in India. Basically a moderate strategic culture has been followed in India throughout its history unlike China.

      The near absence of an aggressive strategic culture in India is further driven home if one scrolls down any listing of military strategists/writers over time. While Chinese names are like Jiao Yu, Shen Kuo, Sun Bin, Sun Tzu, Wu Qi, Liu Zi, Wang Xiangsui, Zhuge Liang and Mao Zedong, where as the only Indian in this list is Kautilya. China’s push to become a global power is based on modern interpretation of Sun Tzu’s classic and Chinese scholars rely on historical strategic lessons and ‘Art of War’ to develop strategy of the Chinese state and its leaders. In contrast, the strategic lessons India has learnt from its previous wars or international engagements.

         The contrasting strategic cultures of China and India have strongly influenced bilateral relations in the past. The relations between the two countries will always have elements of competition and contest. Many international relations always maintain that given their geographical proximity and sheer sizes, China and India are natural rivals. Nancy Jetley, in her analysis of Sino-Indian relations, in an article written in 1992 stated that, “It needs to be clearly recognized that China’s claims to vast territory of India are related in the main to ideological intent. The Chinese strategy, as it unfolded after 1959 was designed not so much to gain possession of a few thousand square miles of mountainous territory – not all of which are strategically vital to China – as to eliminate India as a power of consequence from the Asian scene. China’s policy in South Asia – imposing deep national humiliation on India by exposing its strategic shortcomings in 1962, tarnishing its image as a great Asian country, systematically eroding its special ties with its Himalayan neighbors, exploiting sub-continental dissensions by embarking on a deliberate poly of collusion with Pakistan and above all weakening the political stability of India through its clandestine support to Mizo and Naga insurgents – has been essentially an exercise in isolating India and eroding its influence in the region.” India regained some of its stature displaying superior military strategy in 1971.[ii]

       Following aggressive strategy by China and a moderate strategy of Five Principles – policy of peaceful co-existence and others (Panchshee) – followed by India, is a subject of serious analysis separately. What is gain/loss of such strategies of China and India is a matter of perception and national objectives as well as strategic goal. Hence India’s strategic perception cannot be undermined without doing proper analytical study by unbiased strategists.

            The western author like George Tanham stated that “India has not had a tradition of strategic thinking …..”.[iii] Further he said “Indiams seem to arrive at strategic concept and decision rather than by thinking about them and then making a conscious decision.”[iv] Tanham is perhaps not familiar with complexities inherent to the Indian culture. Hence it is harder to trace out for him that there is a systematic strategic thought propounded by Manu (700 BC),Kautilya (300-400 BC), Ved Vyas and epics like Ramayan, Geeta, Mahabharata, Purans, Vedas etc in the past and subsequently Gandhiji, Subhash Bose, Ambedkar, Nehru, Indira, Rajeev, Bajpai, Savarkar, Shivaji etc. Unfortunately, many numbers of Indian authors, without applying their own reliable resources, blindly follow Tanham. Whatever is said by western scholar, we have the habit of saying yes without verifying the fact. Tanhanm, if he is not known to the Indian culture, it could be understood as he is outsider, but how can we do it while living all the time in this culture.

         Scholars like Francine R. Frankel, Harry Harding, Susan L. Shirk, Stephen Cohen etc. argue that China hardly bothers for India. For China, India merits little attention and, even after India’s May 1998 nuclear test, is not taken seriously as a security threat. China does not even consider India as one of the significant power in the world. India is simply not on China’s “radar screen”.[v] China’s smug attitude toward India is not just a pose adopted in official statements for international purpose; it is reflected domestically as well. India has many more experts on China than China has experts on India. Indian policy toward China are broadly debated and handled at the highest level of political leadership, in contrast to Chinese policy toward India, which are ignored by the public and managed by the diplomats and bureaucrats. China’s indifference to India and its disdainful, patronizing attitude toward India, infuriate the Indians.

         Steven A. Hoffmann has highlighted India’s view on China.[vi] For India, China looms large as an economic and political rival and also as a security threat. However, India is self confident that it has potential to grow as a world power by means of its territorial/population size, economic strength, information technology, nuclear power, military muscels, skillful diplomacy, balance of defence and development, independent foreign policy, active participation in global affairs – UNO, WTO etc., democracy and Rule of Law, Independent judiciary, qualified man power with command of English language etc.    

         Therefore, this is an illogical/mythical perception that India stands nowhere before China in term of strategic culture. The fact, as described above, that both China and India are very rich in strategic culture since last almost 3000 years. A part from it both shares a number of attributes. Exceptionally large population, sharing a 4,700 km long border, huge continental size, old civilization, culture and a history of invasions, internal turmoil and foreign exploitation are some of the major similarities. Even in their post – II World War history, both suffered from widespread poverty, dependence on agriculture, natural calamities, social and financial inequalities and a myriad other impediments to national development.

          Their approaches to national security, however, are completely different. China chose to send its armies to ‘liberate’ Tibet, and entered the Korean war in support of North Korea, which was clearly the aggressor, India chose to go to the UNO when it was attacked by Pakistan in J & K. [vii] China possessed nuclear weapon in 1964 despite Soviet Union’s Security umbrella over China, when India felt that possession of nuclear weapon was immoral and asserted for total disarmament. Even if India tested nuclear capability in 1974 for peaceful purpose, it did not produce weapon. Besides, Chinese solders frequently violating LOC with India and objecting/humiliating Indians from Arunachal and J and K to visit China on normal visa. Chinese aggressive approach and India’s moderate outlook, based on their respective cultures being followed for centuries, is the main point of difference in terms of strategic culture between the two.

            In 1931 during Manchurian crisis, Indian National Congress (INC) supported China. In 1937 when Japan attacked main land of China, not only INC accused Japan, but also sent medical mission to China as a token of good gesture. Moreover, India is the second non-communist country in the world which recognized communist China as a legitimate representative of China despite the fact that entire western countries recognized Taiwan instead of Communist China. Taiwan was not only an ordinary member of UNO but also the permanent member of Security Council of the UNO till 197o when it was replaced by communist China with the western support. India, despite 1962 humiliation, kept raising Chinese (PLC) issue in UNO so that it could become the member of UNO before 1970.

           China has been using Pakistan to contain India. India, following tit for tat, could have also easily taken support of Taiwan, South Korea and Japan against China; it did not do it keeping in mind its standard of diplomacy. However, India, despite being moralist, is conscious of national security and other vital national interest.  ‘ Look east’ policy brings India closure to Japan, South Korea, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Vietnam and other member of ASEAN as wll as other countries in Asia Pacific, South East Asia and South Asia to counter China at its door.

               Hence, the views of anti-India scholars are not at all updated in terms of strategic tradition. If India is as weak as they claim it would have been collapsed as a nation immediately after partisan of Pakistan, Pak attack in 1948, 1965 and Chinese attack in 1962. The fact is that India now is one of the 6 most significant nations in the world in terms of national power. Along with India, almost 2/3 countries of the world got independence after II World War and many of them subsequently collapsed or lost independence for one or the other reasons. Besides, only a very few of such survived countries now stand with true democracy like India. However, it is not a miracle or someone’s unethical blessings behind the growth of India but by dint of its relevant strategy, policy and planning to operate state machinery, will to survive in the critical juncture of domestic and external hindrances, consensus approach in the diversity of culture and the art of management of coalition governance at the centre, and above all, a consistent self confidence, tolerance and a dynamic foreign and security policy.

             What views China has about India, it is concerned to China as it is entitled to have it, but as scholars look that, it does not bother India despite the fact that India has respect for China that it is a great nation during past and present too. India is aware of its destination and the means to achieve it and it does not care what others think about it.

 

Strategic Framework

           India

             The strategy of China that Susan L. Shirk and Frankel talk about is not suited to Indian Strategic culture. China follows strategy of war, aggression, intervention, attack, occupation, belligerence, offence, invasion etc. Such concept of strategy is almost similar to the western one, imperialist, expansionist etc. India is very much clear about it. It has no intention of attacking others by initiating war, aggression or intervention or even proxy war as it respects the sovereignty of others. That is why it carries out Panchshil – the Five Principles-, Peaceful co-existence, non-aggression, non-intervention, non-alignment, non-apartheid, anti-colonialism, anti-racialism, anti-imperialism etc.  Basically India is defensive in approach as regards its security policy is concerned.

               But it does not mean that it would not retaliate in case it is attacked. It fights out against the aggressor by all means. Initially in the beginning of its independence it continued her faith on the goodness of Pakistan, China and others. India being a newly independent country followed the priority of ‘development over defence’. As a result it suffered due to attack by Pakistan and China in 1948 and 1962 respectfully. Taking lesions from it, immediately after 62 debacles India by adopting a new strategy of ‘the balance of defence and development,’ it reorganized her new face that the world had seen absolutely a different India in 1965 and 1971 wars. Subsequently the nuclear test in 1974 and 98, IPKF involvement in Sri Lanka, Army operation in Maldives, annexation of Sikkim, kargill conflict etc. are the instances of India’s strategic strength. Watching a tough face of India, her enemies understood the strategic reality of a strong nation. Now they do not dare to repeat the history of 1948 or 1962. Is it a weak India or is it the absence of strategic culture?

              India follows the strategy of the ‘balance of armed forces and diplomacy’. These two elements of national power - a strong military forces and the skillful diplomacy - are cleverly utilized by India to protect her border and to promote her external national interest respectfully. ‘Dynamism and flexibility’ as an approach of her strategic outlook and its emphasis on ‘humanity and morality’ based on India’s centuries old strategic culture ensure her solid road towards strategic success.

            No First Attack’ in conventional warfare and ‘No First Use of Nuclear Weapon’ are the policy of long term strategic framework of India, that is seriously carried out in practice, and it is not merely a show-piece of strategic face, nor it is a sign of weakness of her strategy. India is a land of Mahatma Gandhi who believed that the ‘peace and non-violence are an arms of braves, not of cowardice’. Gandhi’s concept of peace and non-violence is not negative in approach as in case of Mahbeer Jain’s thought. This is a dynamic strategy propounded by Gandhi that is followed by India during freedom struggle and also after independence. The peace based strategy is a long term means of national outlook depending upon the situation and circumstances. When Pakistan attacked on Kashmir, India sent armed forces to save Kashmir with Gandhi’s blessings/support. It is, therefore, pacific means – negotiation, conciliation, third-party approach, judicial/arbitration/tribunal means etc. is followed till it is succeeding to achieve strategic goal. If it fails to realize national strategic target, India does not hesitate to shift to another option like muscles power/offensive means etc. depending upon the situation.

              The Geeta, Mahabharat, Ramayan etc. - the great centuries old Indian epics- teach an art of war and the principles of strategy. Lord Krishna, the great architect of war theory, encouraged Arjun in Geeta that attack the enemy vigorously in the battle field, whoever be the enemy, and forget about the result of war (karmanye wadhikaraste ma falesu kadachanam) However, he stressed upon the war for justice, not the war for unjust and immoral aspirations. Perhaps, this teaching of Geeta had motivated Indira Gandh to go for the most difficult war in 1971, despite a clear US nuclear threat on India, which finally ensured unprecedented victory in the world history.  While fighting this war India still maintained her commitment for ‘no first attack’ and ‘non-intervention’. The fact remains in this context that first Pakistan initiated war on western frontier of India and entered into Indian territory, which led Indian armed forces to retaliate in the eastern frontier on East Pakistan. Hence Indian retaliation was fully justified even from the views and norms of international law - Right to Preservation- apart from following India’s own commitment for war strategy.

               Nehru’s style of security and foreign policy has been the subject of criticism – particularly his policy on Kashmir and China. Most of such critics are either politically motivated or biased or ill-informed. Some other critics, in this context, blame him for being idealist, as a result India suffered. However, this fact is ignored by such critics that both Pakistan and China directly and the western powers indirectly were aware that if India goes uninterrupted even for 10 – 15 years in the beginning of independence, it would be impossible for them to prevent it from growing as regional and global power. Nehru was not unaware of their intentions. Hence, he preferred small sacrifice for the sake of national and political stability and sovereignty. And he succeeded in facing initial storm and saved the nation from well architected conspiracy made by them jointly or separately. Nehru’s decision to put up Kashmir problem to UNO, his acceptance of Tibet as part of China and following non-alignment is said to be his tactical move to keep up Indian flag flying at a critical juncture. It is argued that had he not succeeded in plying his shrewd move at that stage of strategically adverse situation, India could have paid very heavy price. Yes, Nehru’s move seems to be following idealism but sometimes such approach of idealism is more suitable for the protection of national interest rather than realism propounded by Morgenthau. A nation like India that believes in dynamism in application of suitable policy, has faith in such a ideology which insists on balancing idealism and realism in the area of security and foreign policy. Extreme of either of the two is sometime disastrous for the nation. Nehru was well known and versatile master in dealing with such affairs, and hence he succeeded in leading the nation by defusing the crisis tactfully and took India out of the critical phase. Hence such argument looks a complete picture from untraditional angle and concludes that Nehru was not at all at the extreme of idealism but was a practical one in his approach in dealing with his assignment that the nation had entrusted on him.

              Indira Gandhi’s style of strategy is widely considered as realist one due to her strong approach in 1971 war and successful handling of the most dangerous phase of the nation when she had to confront the most powerful triangle of Pakistan, China and USA. Her daring instance comes into mind in this context when she suddenly arrived at Masco airport on the verge of 1971 war without any diplomatic formalities, that too diplomat of both India and USSR were unaware of her Soviet visit. She called Mr. Brezhnev, the President of USSR with whom she wanted to meet on the airport. But instead of the president, Prime Minister, Mr. Kosygin, arrived to meet her at the airport with whom she refused to talk as he was a no. 2 boss. Finally President Brezhnev himself came and succeeded to convince her and fully confirmed Soviet support in context with US nuclear threat on India. No such daring instance other than this one is available in the cotemporary world. Let us see another instance of Chinese President Mao’s visit to Masco in 1953 at the time of Stalin’s death. Despite staying there unusually for almost 45 days and kept on convincing new Soviet leadership to accept him being a senior most leader in the communist world as well as Chinese style of ideology, he failed to do it and finally came back empty-handed. This is the difference of leadership role between Indira Gandhi and Mao-tse-Tung. One can easily conclude the value of leadership factor in term of strategic considerations of India and China.

               India’s present status is the result of its own consistent efforts rather than due to any special strategic support from imperialist nation as China got from USA in terms of economic(MFN and heavy investment) and political (for membership of nuclear club and the Security Council of the UNO etc.) since 1970s. Such kind of support is in fact a very big one for a developing country. USA had given heavy economic support to Europe, Germany and Japan during post-war period but the way political support was given to China, it was unprecedented in the recent history of world. It is argued that had India got even the half of such support, it would have gone much a head of China in all aspect, although India is still not far behind China. This is the instance of main difference in strategic approach of China and India. India has committed and carried out in practice the moral value in international politics unlike China. The best way of long term strategy, according to Indian strategic culture, is to carry out ethical value and realistic base of national power together as India has been following the same  uninterrupted since freedom struggle and also from the beginning of independence.

 

China

                 Unlike India China adopts a western style of realistic strategy minus ethical element of idealism. It has been following almost all the six principles of realism propounded by Morgenthau, having its advantage and disadvantage in the contemporary strategic scenario, China looks as mostly gainer at least for a short term national interest.   

              Grand strategy’ of China is widely talked in the academic circle. Let me focus the same here to understand Chinese strategy based on its cultural tradition in the historical perspective.

              The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) came into being in the culmination of a nearly 150 years long period of continuous turmoil and struggle against exploitation by foreign powers, domestic disruptions and factional fighting between different political forces. By the beginning of 19th century, the Qing Dynasty had already showing signs of moral decay. Historically the Chinese society has been kept together only when a strong central power ruled the county. In the Sinic system the emperor was seen as having the mandate of heaven to rule the so-called ‘Middle Kingdom’. However, once he had exhausted this heavenly mandate, the people were theoretically free to search for an alternative.[viii]

          The idea and concept of the Middle Kingdom comprising what is now east-central China, surrounded by barbarians along its vast frontiers and periphery meant that the emperor could effectively ignore the activities in the outlying area so long as these did not directly impinge on the security of the Middle Kingdom and consequently that of the emperor himself. Throughout its long history, however, China was subjected to a series of invasions mostly from the north and the northeast, which every Chinese emperor had to fight or at least resist. Some of the emperors were themselves invaders like the Mongols and Manchu. Resisting invasions, however, was a costly drain on imperial resources and usually, it was the cost of these wars that weakened the empire and made it susceptible to the next invasion.

            Some of the Middle Kingdom was surrounded by ‘barbarians’ the Sinic hierarchical order did not recognize sovereign equality between the empire and the surrounding states or kingdom and thus only a tributary relationship existed in which the smaller states were considered inferior. In fact, until about 19th century barbarians were managing foreign affairs and interaction between people and the states was often based on Confucianism with its high ethical principles of justice, fair play and general preference of non-violent means for conflict resolution. Despite this, the Chinese did not desist from the use of military force but justified it as self-defence.[ix]

             The 1901 Box Rebellion staged by the local people opposed the exploitation made by foreign powers with support of the officialdom. Continuous internal disruptions and foreign interference, the Qing dynasty finally collapsed in 1911 and Dr. Sun Yat Sen established a new Republic. However, with the birth of communism in 1922, the internal turmoil stayed which led to the 40 years long civil war under Mao. After the death of Sun Yat Sen in 1927 and regime of Kuomintang Republic came into the hands of Chaing- Kai- Shek who also could not check the decaying of the regime. This nationalist regime was finally replaced by the communists under Mao in 1949. Although, the nationalist was defeated but not eliminated as they fled to Formosa (Taiwan) just across the Taiwan Strait and continued armed attack against mainland-PRC with US backing. The PRC leadership, it looks, develop a xenophobia, and remained a paranoid power ever since.[x]

              In course of building up, reorganization and reconstruction of internal and external resources, PRC concentrated on various fronts. Keeping in view American supporting Taiwan and the threat of war looming large on the Korean peninsula, Mao’s first major strategic move was to find a dependable friend. He tried to build a strategic and ideologically strengthen relations with Soviet Union and he succeeded to do it without much effort in view of cold war between the two super powers. USSR, with the signing of the ‘Treaty of Friendship’ on 14 Feb 1950, provided China all the possible economic, technological, industrial, financial, military hardware and various other assistance required for developing an underdeveloped country.

            In 1937, even 12 years before his regime was resumed in 1949, Mao had planned to incorporate Tibet, the Buddhist dominated region and Xinjiang, the Muslim majority as autonomous provinces of the PRC. Immediately after taking over the charge of PRC in 1950 he sent the PLA to ‘liberate’ Xinjiang and Tibet ‘from the oppression of feudal orthodox and blind faith’. Both the provinces had been historically the home of anti-Chinese revolt and never accepted Chinese sovereignty. He intended to consolidate/ensure border security by incorporating Tibet against newly independent democratic India, and Xinjiang against the world leader of communism, Russia, despite the fact that there was no sign of threat at all either from Delhi or Masco at that point of time. This is an instance of Mao’s style of strategy of realism based on the old saying of ‘no one is permanent friend or enemy in international politics’.

           Taking into account the US support to Taiwan, Japan and its involvement on Korean issue, PRC joined Korean conflict with Soviet support to protect it from American intention of imposing imperialism in the region and China as well.  

             By the end of 1950s China started giving indications of a possible conflict against  India and the USSR in the near future  on the pretext of imaginary border issue with India and the supply of a small nuclear bomb and ideological issue after the death of Stalin with Soviet Union. The war designed strategy of Mao came true in 1962 against India and in 1965 against USSR when PLA directly confronted against Indian and Soviet forces respectively. Being a true follower of Morgenthau, Mao believed in the promotion of national interest at any cost – even at the cost of India and Soviet Union, the most reliable friend in the region and the world as well. This strategy was a well thought planning in advance to shake hands with USA in the near future. PRC had already enjoyed all the possible maximum support from India (on Tibet and recognition of PRC) and the USSR (building up PLA, technology etc), now Mao wanted to focus on USA for political (for UNO) and economic support irrespective of ideological issue – capitalism vs. communism. And he achieved this goal in 1970 with Nixon – Kissinger regime of USA. Not the end of strategic aspiration here, China now dreams of pushing USA behind existing global status.

 

   Chinese strategy towards India and the strategic rivalry between the two in the given situation are focused below:

 

1.      Golden period from 1949 to 1958 : The policy of ‘China and India as brothers’ (Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai) followed between 1949 to 1958. During this period India, being the second non –communist country after Burma, recognized PRC against the desire of entire western powers. Besides, Prime Ministers of both the countries visited each other and agreed to follow the policy of Panchsheel. Moreover, India accepted Tibet as part of Chinese sovereignty during this time. And they also attended Bandung conference together during this period. That is why this period is known as golden period in the modern history of China and India.

2.       Chinese policy of containment from 1959 to 78 : China raised border issue during this phase of relationship. This new face of China was not at all a surprise move. Border demarcation issue was taken up between British-India and Sun-Yat-Sen regime of China in Shimla in 1914. Both accepted Mc Mohn Line in principle only, not in practice. Communist party of China opposed it from the very beginning of its foundation in 1922. The same party came into power in 1949 in the name of PRC and it raised this issue subsequently in a tactical move after 1956, by that time China had already taken all possible support from India during the aforesaid previous phase. However, in view of the above, it cannot be said that PRC’s policy of raising border issue at this stage was the new one or it was a surprise move. Before India could prepare her military muscle, China attacked India in Oct. 1962. It resulted into the beginning of dark period almost for two decades in the history of centuries old relationship between the two great civilizations.  After 1962 war Sino-India relations were cold and hostile. In John Garver’s view, this hostility reflected an underlying geopolitical rivalry between the two, both nations seeking to restore their traditional great-power status and with overlapping traditional spheres of influence. Garver sees rivalry and mutual perceptions of military threat as constant features of Sino-Indian relations.[xi] China made all possible strategic efforts during this period to contain India and prevent it from dominating the subcontinent including its support to Pakistan during 1965 war and also supported Pakistan policy on Kashmir.

3.       Strategy of Rapprochement from 1979 to 1997: In 1976 Mao Zedong died, and in 1979 Deng Xiaoping initiated an ambitious new policy of economic reform. Deng recognized that to concentrate on economic modernization, china needed a peaceful and stable environment, which in turn would require a reorientation of China’s foreign policies. For the first time in Chinese modern history, the country developed a coherent, integrated Asia regional policy, consisting of pragmatic relations with the two superpowers and improved ties with all the countries on its periphery.[xii] In 1979 and 1981, the Chinese and Indian foreign ministers exchanged visits, though during Indian foreign minister, Atal Behari Bajpayee’s Feb. 1979 visit, he was embarrassed by Chinese poorly timed or deliberately done invasion of Vietnam. However, he succeeded to bring home Chinese commitment to cease support for insurgency in northeast region of India. Between 1981 and 1987 China and India held eight rounds of negotiations on their boundary but failed to produce a solution. Yet during 1988 visit of Indian PM, Rajeev Gandhi, Deng told him “ Let both sides forget the unpleasant period in our past relations, and let us treat everything with an eye on the future.”[xiii]  During Narsimha Rao’s visit to China in 1093, both the countries signed the agreement on the ‘Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the line of actual control.’ Moreover, in 1996 Chinese president Jiang Zemin visited New Delhi and signed yet another agreement-‘Confidence Building Measures’ in the military field and along the LAC’ to solidify the relationship between the two. In its most significant gesture to promote rapprochement during this period, China, shifting from her earlier approach, unilaterally declared that Kashmir is a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan and hence both should resolve it peacefully.

4.      Strategic Setting in1998 : Chinese senior General Fu Quanyou’s    Visit to India from 27-30 April 1998, first by a PLA chief of general staff, was scheduled, Mr. George Fernandes,  then defence minister of India, publicly alleged,  ten days before General’s visit, that China was continuing to carry out border incursions. Even during visit of the General, Fernandes once again lambasted China publicly, accusing it of being the number one threat to Indian security, even greater than Pakistan. The May 11 and 13, 1998 Indian nuclear test followed, occurring even before General returned Beijing on May 18, 1998. Was the timing of nuclear test deliberately scheduled to humiliate China to pay back the  Chinese for   embarrassment they had caused then foreign minister  Vajpayee when they had attacked Vietnam, a friendly country of India, during his 1979 visit to China, forcing him to cut his trip short? This is a matter of speculation. The Chinese official response to Indian nuclear test was reflected in People’s Daily on 15 May 1998 that “The Indian govt. has disregarded the fundamental interest of the vast number of its people and desperately developed nuclear weapon in defiance of world opinion. The reason for this is nothing less than a desire to threaten neighboring countries and dominate South Asia.”[xiv] On 13 May, The New York Times published a letter from PM Vajpayee to president Bill Clinton, leaked in the USA, which blamed China for India’s nuclear test, saying that “I have been deeply concerned at the deteriorating security environment, especially the nuclear environment, faced by India for some years past. We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that country improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To add to the distrust that country has materially helped another neighbor of ours to become a covert nuclear weapon state. At the hands of this bitter neighbor we have suffered three aggressions in the last 50 years.”[xv] In reaction to this letter, the 19 May People’s Daily further condemned Indian nuclear test more strongly, that “…nobody believe such preposterous logic and the so-called ‘China threat’ lies.[xvi] However, immediately after India, Pakistan’s test for nuclear weapon on 28 and 30 May 1998, might cautioned  Chinese President for toning down the tamper, who subsequently said “…no matter whether India or Pakistan, conducting nuclear test, is against world trend,” and he urged both countries to “keep calm, show restraint, and reopen dialogue,” and to sign unconditionally NPT and CTBT.[xvii]

5.      Strategy of Engagement: Anyway, only a few months after the nuclear test, China resumed its efforts to engage India diplomatically both on political and Joint Working Group level. Initial setback and bettering due to nuclear test could not stop China and India to normalize relations and to proceed ahead. During Vajpayee’s visit (being the PM) to China in June 2003 both sides finally agreed for further discussions on border delimitation. The most important thing had happened at this occasion was Chinese recognition to Sikkim as part of India and to reopen trade route through Chumbi Vally. Both the countries are developing in a remarkable phase of bilateral relationship in the area of economic, trade, information technology etc. for the first time in last 66 years. Their mutual trade and commerce has almost touched 70 billion dollars - India’s highest bilateral trade with any one country - and they are targeting at 100 billion dollars by 2020.A part from it, their understanding and  co-operation in the World Trade Organization is also a matter of appreciation.

6.      Strategic Encirclement: However, it is argued that China’s hostile acts as well as friendly gesture, both are unpredictable, unreliable and mysterious. India is well experienced of Chinese such behavior in the past. It is said that China, unfortunately, understands only the language of muscles power, nothing else. Despite a very close economic tie with India, it is reluctant to settle border issue, the root cause of all the problems, even after consistent efforts at the level of JWG and political leadership since 1980. Besides, military modernization, unlawful demand of access to sea and land towards China Sea and Island of Japan etc., continuous incursions on LOC with India, encircling India from all directions by gaining strategic access to Maldives, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Southeast Asia, Asia Pacific, Central Asia and Middle East etc. speak the truth. Knowing intentions of China, India is getting prepared accordingly. Now one thing appears to clear that China cannot afford to take India for granted as it did in 1962.

Strategic Triangles:

The concept of a strategic triangle has become familiar to analysts of international affairs. It refers to a situation in which three major powers are sufficiently important to each other that a change in the relationship between any two of them has a significant impact on the interest of the third. The greater that impact, actual or potential, the greater is the significant of the triangular relationship.[xviii]  The most familiar strategic triangles in the contemporary era have been Sino-Soviet-American during the cold war and now China –India- America. Although, Harry Harding also includes Sino-Japan-America during the cold war period   in the list of strategic triangle, but many other scholars argues that all the three partners in this case do not have equal elements for being a global power or at least the capability of growing as world power in future. Japan in particular appears to be weak element due to its dependence for her security on USA under Japan-US treaty of 1953. As regards Sino-Indian-American triangle is concerned, its features are appended as under:

1.      These three partners have formed triangle ever since India got independence, China became communist and USA became a permanent player in Asia.

2.      India despite gaining all essential elements of a world power, it is taken as a weaker partner, hence both China and USA attempt to use India to contain each other. In view of standing in the centre, India is taking advantage from both of them. Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal of 2008 and having a highest trade relation with China in the world are obviously the instances of India’s strategic advantage of being a partner of this triangle.

3.      Although, India is also in the triangle like group comprising Sino-Russia-India that is called as nexus. But it cannot be conceptualized as triangle like that of Sino-India-America, because Russia is no longer an active player in world. However, Russian position in this case of nexus is strategically better due to its military arms and equipments required for both India and China and in this situation Russians are gainer in term of bargaining with both of them on its supply.

Assessment

In view of the above the assessment in nutshell are as under: 

1.      Both China and India are growing as active players in the multi-polar global strategic scenario in future.

2.      Whether China likes or not, India is presently a joint regional power in Asia along with China. Japan is not in the race due to its dependence on USA for national security.

3.      Both China and India produce such a heavy share of global GDP that rest of the world cannot afford to ignore them particularly in the WTO.

4.      Instead of merely accusing China on border issue, India thinks positively and taking advantage of China’s fast economic growth it has developed tremendous bilateral trade relations which is at present is of 42 bn dollars, that is even higher than Indo - US bilateral trade.

5.      Chinese use of Pakistan to contain India has not produced any substantive strategic gain for China, despite Chinese unlawful supply of missiles and nuclear material to it for which China has been condemned worldwide. Sooner or later, China would prefer to alter this policy in view of growing Indian strategic statures as well as growing terror act in China for which Indian co-operation would be required for joint strategy against terrorism.

6.      Unsettled border dispute is a long term part of Chinese strategy against India. It serves two vital Chinese strategic interests – 1. India’s limited resources are diverted to defence budget for keeping a big army for caring a long boundary and 2. The development suffers due to this unproductive expenditure. It helps China as it prevents India to counter China in term of economic growth. Hence China would prefer unsettled border in future too. To counter such Chinese strategy India is taking Japan and other countries of Asia Pacific and South East Asia with its side and   encircles China, so as to keep it under limit.

7.      India is fully aware that both China and USA are most unreliable and hence as far as possible it would take advantage of being a partner of the strategic triangle and in the meanwhile it would strengthen her status.

8.      Strategic pressure on China from all sides in the region and India/ USA as well, might force it to collapse like USSR.

Conclusion

 

Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehu said in Lok Sabha on Nov. 25, 1959 that “From fairly early in history, they (China) have had a sensation of greatness. They call themselves the ‘Middle Kingdom’, and it seemed natural to them that other countries should pay tribute to them. Their thinking was that the rest of the world occupied a lower grade. That has made it difficult for us to understand the working of their mind, and what is more to the point, for them to understand the working of our mind.”[xix] This statement of Pt. Nehru is still relevant even after four decades. His statement is a suitable conclusion of Indo-China strategic rivalry.

 

Reference                    

 



[i]  Phadke Ramesh, China‘s Power Projection, Manas Pub. New Delhi, 2005, p.186.
[ii] Menon Narayan, India –China Border Isses:Strategic Implications and Impact of Air Power, presented in YC-NISDA, University of Pune in 1911.
[iii] Indian Strategic Culture, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1992, P. 129.
[iv] Ibid, p. 130.
[v] Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power, Washington CD, Brookings Institution Press, 2001, p.126.
[vi] Susan L. Shirk, One side Rivalry: China’s Perceptions  and Policies toward India, The India – China Relationship, Rivalry and Engagement, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 75
[vii] Phadke Ramesh, p. 141
[viii] Phadke Ramesh, p. 19-21.
[ix] Ibid.
[x] Ibid., p. 22
[xi] Susan L.Shirk, P. 77
[xii] Ibid, p.80
[xiii] Ibid, p.81
[xiv] Ibid, p. 86
[xv] Ibid,.p. 83
[xvi] Ibid,p. 87
[xvii] Ibit, p.84
[xviii] Hardug Harry,The evolution of the strategic triangle: China , India  and the United States, The India –China Relationship: Rivalry and Engagement,  Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 321.
[xix] Menon Narayan, India-China Border Issues Strategic Implications and Impact of Air Power, the Paper presented in YC-NISDA, University of Pune in 1991