Tuesday, October 6, 2009
Monday, October 5, 2009
Wednesday, September 2, 2009
Indian Strategic Culture: Myth or Reality
(Dr. Nand Kishor Kumar)
Introduction
Three generations of scholars in rapid succession have addressed the concept of strategic culture. Each one of them has dealt with the issues concerning almost all aspects of strategic culture in general. As regards national level study of strategic culture with reference to each particular country having or growing significant global status, it is yet to establish a balance/comprehensive view of strategic culture of a large of number of countries including India except European, USA, and a few more. In this context as regards India is concerned, George Tanham sparked the debate, having said that India has not had strategic thinker nor has the tradition of strategic thinking. Others can argue that India possesses strategic culture, though it is inconsistent, diverse, complex and irrelevant. In yet another view, it is too defensive to use for a nation of India’s stature. The list of views may further increase to a large extent. This paper aims at analysing all these views and focus on comprehensive picture of Indian strategic culture.
Stuart Poore says that “the term strategy has traditionally been used to refer to the way that military power is used by government in the pursuit of their interests. How are these interests shaped? A strategic culture approach tackles this question by considering the relevance of cultural context in influencing strategic preferences”. Moreover, strategic culture does not merely deal with the traditions of using military power but also diplomacy, foreign policy, internal/external threats and International relations so as to protect and promote national interest in terms of achieving political, economic, national and international goals. Scholars disagree over what culture is, how it can be identified and what it does. This has obvious implications for any attempt to develop the concept of strategic culture. Moreover, they also disagree over the amount of significance of culture in shaping the concept of strategic.
However, the fact remains that the culture is an inherent strong factor to influences policy-makers in shaping their national strategy accordingly, though its effectiveness may differ nations to nation and situations to situation depending upon strategic environment. Citing example, Stuart Poore, quoting David Jones’s analysis of Soviet strategic culture, says that “There were three levels to a state’s strategic culture: a macro-environmental level involving geography, history and ethno-cultural characteristics; a societal level, referring to the socio-economic and political structure of society; and a micro-level consisting of military institutions and the nature of civil-military relations.”2 American or Anglo-American cultural base may differ from that of the Soviets due to different perceptions and situations pertain to strategic environment. The same may be true with India or any other nations. Further, the task of a devising workable method for identifying the existence and possible influence of a strategic culture in effecting strategic outcome is not simple. It requires methodology, which may rescue strategic culture from its traditional status and support the same in getting shaped into a workable and updated strategy .The nature of methodology may also vary time-to-time and nation-to-nation. The grand strategy, military strategy, operation, tactics etc can be workable if a suitable methodology in terms of strategic culture is applied to ensure that the outcome of strategy is achieved. The purpose of military strategy is to link military means with political aim in pursuit of a continuing advantage. This can happen only when a useful methodology is applied to make a workable and updated strategy based on dynamic strategic culture .The same is opined by Everett Carl Dolman3 in other words.
The subject of strategic culture matters deeply because it raises core questions about the roots of, and influences upon, strategic behavior. The strategy is universal in general term but it has to be cultural. Colin S. Gray4, in this context has pointed out six general points which serves to help advance understanding of the nature and working of strategic culture:
Strategic behavior can not be beyond culture
Adversity can not cancel culture
Strategic culture is a guide to action
Strategic culture expresses comparative advantage
Strategic culture can be dysfunctional
Strategic culture can be variously categorized, such as nationality, geography, weapons and functions, simplicity and complexity, generation and grand strategy.
In this background an attempt is made here to focus strategic culture in the Indian context.
Foundations of Indian Strategic Culture
George Tanham has provoked in his Paper- ‘Indian Strategic Culture’ (1992) that “India has not had a tradition of strategic thinking; no great strategic thinker appears in Indian history and most modern strategics such as Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, who usually couched their theories in general terms based on their own perceptions of the outer world and on their own predictions. Parts of British strategy have been borrowed and adapted, and other strategies have evolved as reactions to situations confronting India5.”George Tanham may not be familiar with complexities inherent to the Indian culture. Hence it is difficult for him to define and its interpretation into strategic culture of India. It is harder to trace out for him that there is a systematic strategic thought propounded by Kautilya during ancient history (300-400 BCE ). Even before Kautilya, it was Manu(700 BCE) who composed strategic thought of Dandaniti in Manu Samriti. The same is also described in Mahabharata authored by Vyas and Arthasastra by Kautilya. The Hindu law being administered today by the Indian courts is based upon the principles laid down by Manu.
George Tanham further provokes that “Indians seem to arrive at strategic concepts and decisions rather than by thinking about them and then making a conscious decision6.” According to him, the reason is that India has been independent only since 1947, having been ruled for the previous 200 years by the British who decided defence policy and strategy without any Indian involvement.
Tanham needs to verify Indian history that even during British rule, leave aside independent India, the Indian National Congress, comprised of great Indian leaders, was actively involved in making strategic and foreign policy and attempted to influence the British policy makers to inculcate the Indian’s opinion into final form of strategy for India. Issues like the involvement of Indian soldiers in the World War, India’s policy during Manchurian crisis 1931 as well as Japan’s attack on China 1937, India’s policy towards her neighbors etc. are some of the examples in this context on which resolutions were passed by the Congress during British rule.
Besides Tanham, Indian scholars like Kanti Bajpai, Amitabh Matto etc. also have almost the same opinion about Indian strategic culture in comparison with that of European, as reflected in a volume published in 1996, co-edited by Tanham along with Bajpai and Matto in which Tanham’s essay-‘Indian Strategic Thought,’ is also included. Some other scholars like Marcus, Lawrence Sondhaus, etc have balanced views about Indian culture unlike Tanham and others, although it is not enough comprehensive. In this context Dr.Shrikant Paranjpe’s stand is important. Pananjpe says in his Paper- Locating Africa in India’s Strategic Perspectives: Limitations and Opportunities, presented before First South African Conference on11-12 June 2009, that “Indian security thinking has long been criticized for being abstract, not concrete. There has been a distinct reluctance on the part of India to present a clear-cut strategic doctrine and articulate the same in terms of policy. This stems from her belief in the realistic utilities of a deliberate ambiguity and not from a lack of strategic culture, as George Tanham1 would have us believe.”
However, BK Khnna has brought out undisputable fact that India has a rich heritage acquired from its glorious past, dating back to the Indus Valley Civilization, 2300 to 1700 BCE in his Paper-‘Ancient Military Heritage in India and Current Relevance’-referred in Strategic Analysis, IDSA, Aug,1995.The great epics of the Ramayana, Mahabharata and the Puranas give details of the advancements in science and technology and military strategy prevailing at that time. The Rigveda gives us interesting details of political life and military thoughts during the Vedic period. Accounts of battles show that the strategy of war was given a high priority in all matters of the state. The great epics have been characterized as the first foundation upon which the Indian military system was based. The military doctrines, strategies, concepts, procedures and customs of that time are still relevant to a large extent. The implementation scenarios may have changed but underlying theme, i.e. ‘ to achieve the aim’, remains the same.
Indians have not taken to the science of warfare recently. Their fighting traditions go back to 2500 BC. War as a means of maintaining society was accepted as a necessity. When all possible avenues of settlements had been explored and exhausted, war was resorted to. The laws of war were framed on the lines of the present day ingredients of military planning, e.g. principles of war, strategy and tactics. There are glorious examples of large-scale operations undertaken in ancient times, backed by definite military concepts. The strategy of war was practiced in its purest form and its conduct was designed to bring out the best and not the worst of the human traits. Another basic factor, which stands out, is the high standard of ethical code and the constant emphasis on upholding of dharma, all through the ages. Man has fought man since time immemorial for the establishment of ‘good over evil’. Even during the ancient period when dharma played such a dominating role in men’s daily routine, wars had to be undertaken frequently. The epitome of dharma yudha, as it was called then is to be found in good measure in the Ramayana and Mahabharata epics. Kautilya, a contemporary of Aristotle and sun Tzu in the 4th century BC was amongst the greatest and widest exponents of the Indian strategy, art and science of warfare.
Dandaniti or the concept of Danda, aimed at arresting the anarchical conditions in a nation state, thereby ensuring smooth functioning of the administration. It was based on the maxim ‘ No Danda-No state’. The rationale of this concept (Dandaniti) was that evil is inherent in man and only Danda can bring him to see the path of righteousness. This policy has been in vogue in different measures in various periods of Indian history.
Some of the tenets of strategy that were followed included three types of war, namely Dharma Vijay- the righteous war, Lobha Vijay- on account of greed, and Asura Vijay- the devil’s war. Strategic surprise was one of the key principles of waging wars. Similarly, intelligence was considered the single major war-winning factor. In the Rigveda, there are many references to use envoys for civil espionage. Ramayana has referred that Hanuman went to Ravana’s Sri Lanka as doot of Lord Rama and got confirmation of all the information required for envisaged war. The person of envoys was considered sacred. Mahabharta also has referred that Lord Krishna went Kaurba as an envoys of Pandwa with a proposal of peace. Spying was a very perfect strategy in ancient times. Disruption of lines of communication and capturing or harassing the near forces were some of the time tested injunctions in strategy. Shivaji exploited this strategy against the Mughal Army. The principle of maintenance of momentum was prevalent in great measure in medieval and British times. Some of the strategies of ancient India have now become the principles of war, such as surprise, intelligence, maintenance of momentum and administration. These principles, other strategies and military policies are still relevant.
To gain time, for rallying levies and for causing maximum attrition on the enemy, kings started making forts. The Rigveda testifies to their existence in the prehistoric era, when fortified cities were common. In the post-Epic period, fortified cities abounded. Alexander in the 4th century BC came across fortifications. Kautilya and Bhoja have referred to four kinds of fortresses: hill, forest, island and desert forts.
Apart from strategic culture prevailed in ancient India including Kautilya’s strategic thought, even during modern time, Mahatma Gandhi, the great thinker, has said in detail about strategy, war, armed forces, weapons, disarmament, foreign policy, international relations etc. During early modern history, Shivaji, the great Maratha war-thinker, war campaigner and warrior, had also contributed with both of his thoughts as well as actions to the strategic culture of India. Apart from guerrilla warfare adopted against Mughal emperor, Shivaji actually commanded regular formations of infantry and artillery. He even had a navy operating in the Arabian Sea. Therefore, not only India has maintained its own continuous and uninterrupted flow of strategic thinking right from ancient to the modern time but also influenced many other thinkers/strategists word wide.
Manu Samriti and Kautilya’s Arthasastra became paramount to understand the origins of Indian political culture, which further gained considerable influence during Mahatma Gandhi’s struggle for freedom of India. Hence, here we discuss in detail about two great Indian strategic thinkers -Kautilya and Mahatma Gandhi.
Kautilya:
Kautilya, also known as Chanakya and Vishnugupta, was the Guru (mentor) of Chandragupta, the king of Mauryan Empire as well as the minister under Chandragupta. Kautilya’s famous work, Arthasastra was written between forth and third century BCE, although it was discovered and translated only in 1904 by Dr R Shamsastry. It has brought a new insight into the political thought of ancient India. It touches on several aspects of national and international strategy and domestic politics based on practical reality. It has confirmed the belief that there could be a theory of governance based, not only on a pragmatic, but also on a strategic attitude in the context of ancient India.
However, there has been much debate over the issues generated by Kautilya’s Arthasastra.There are two schools of thought in this regard. The first school is represented by J.Jolly,M.Winternitz,R.Thapar and S.R. Goyal who doubt the authenticity of authorship of this book. Scholars like R.Shamasastry, Ganapathi shastry and N.P.Unni belong to the other school who believe that Arthsastra is the work of Kautilya. Both the schools have their own arguments in support of their views. However, according to Marcus Kim, the arguments of the second school of thought is more convincing that Kautilya is actually the author of Arthsastra.7 The debate over the originality and authenticity of the Arthasastra is, in deed. a complex one, yet the book, undoubtedly has had considerable impact on the formation of Indian identity in the area of strategic culture.The term Artha+sastra literally means the science of wealth. The broad meaning of Arthasastra is a treatise on governance and government which appears to be similar to the concept of Mahabharata’s reference to Dandaniti(the science of polity) contained in Dharmasastra written by Manu during seventh century BCE. The Dandaniti’s strategy is an older system of strategy than Kautilya’s thought and his strategy contained in Arthasastra.Therefore, the tradition of Indian strategic thought does not begin with Kautilya but it is as old as Vedic civilization of India which is one of the oldest civilizations of the world, although Kautilya is the one who for the first time in the history of India has systematically framed a complete paradigm of Indian strategy. He compiled and systematized the idea derived from the tradition. Kautilya himself agreed that his work is based on the works of earlier Indian thinkers who are actually the founders of the science of polity as traced by S.Vijayaraghavan and R.Jayaram8. Marcus Kim has compared Arthasastra to Machiavelli’s ‘The Prince’. The theme of strategic thought of Kautilya in short is appended below:
Kautilya deliberately freed politics from the influence of religion and morality like Machiavelli to achieve political/strategic objectives. In the history of political/strategic thought Kautilya is the first thinker who secularized politics and infused tricks and deceitful methods into science of policy and strategy to gain victory in critical wars.
The most important aspect of Kautily’s strategic thought is his conception of elements of state( Mandala), such as the king, the minister, the country, the fort, the treasury, the army and the friend. According to him, power lies in the use and application of these elements by the conqueror effectively. The Mandala concept is a strategic reality perceived by kautilya consisted of eleven kingdoms and conqueror which are strategically situated/located/arranged in order to win war.
Kautilya formulated six-fold foreign policy, such as, making peace, policy of hostility, policy of neutrality, show of force for war purpose to the enemy, seeking refuge with another king, and dual policy of making peace with one king and the policy of hostility with another.
He instructed the use of any means for security of the king and the country including the use of spying against ministers and enemies, use of treacherous fighting, employment of secret weapons and even the use of chemical weapons in warfare.
Whether Kautilya maintained an ethical dimension to the Arthasastra in terms of diplomacy, it is a debatable issue amongst the scholars. However, following Vedic moral principles, he regards the state as a moral institution but in terms of international relations he emphasized on separation of politics from theology and morality.
He maintains both the interacting dimensions: a political rationalism based on pragmatic outlook, and another form of rationalism based on traditional Vedic Dharma.
Lawrence Sondhaus has attempted to clarify the realistic cleverness of Kautilya by citing an instance of his strategic tricks. He says that “Specific action attributed to Kautilya’s advice include deterring Alexander from following up on his initial success in Punjab in 327 BCE by playing the Greek army’s fear of war elephants, exaggerating the number in the elephant corps of the Magadha forces in a clever disinformation campaign that compelled Alexander to withdraw his war-weary army from India before it fought another major action.”9
Mahatma Gandhi:
According to Marcus Kim “If Kautilya contributed the bases of political rationalism to the dynamics of modern Indian politics and strategy, Gandhiji has reinforced the moral logic that has existed for centuries via his life-long accomplishments. Gandhi’s ideas cover almost all issues in contemporary politics-from individual to global ideals.”10 However, it appears that both Kautilya and Gandhi stand at two different extremes of realism and idealism. Kautilya stands at the extreme of realism where as Gandhi at the other extreme of idealism.
Moreover, the scholar like Bharat Karnad has different view about Gandhi. To him, Gandhi was a confused strategic thinker. In his words “…his (Gandhi) confused and confusing legacy have had much to do with this state of affairs (strategy followed by India since independence). The policy - wise vague ideas and values he propagated influenced the initial attitude of the Indian government towards the military and the utilisation of force, and continue till this day…”11However, this is not universally acceptable opinion about Gandhi’s strategic thought. Many scholars belonging to other school of thought have entirely different view. To them, Gandhi’s thought is the most pragmatic and dynamic based on concrete reality. Thus, views about Gandhian strategy differ from scholar to scholar, mainly due to his various statements given altogether in a different context about non-violence, armed forces, arms, war, military training, duty of army personnel, foreign policy, international relations etc which need to be examined.
The first Indian to speak for India’s armed forces in the recent history was not Gandhiji but Raja Ram Mohan Roy who advocated the indianisation of army in 1833. Indian National Congress picked up the lead given by Roy in 1885. It was in Feb-March 1921 that defence was for the first time discussed openly in the Central Legislative Assembly. Towards the end of the same year an important Congress resolution of foreign policy was moved by Gandhiji on Nov.4, 1921 at Delhi. Indian leaders had till then taken little interest in the Indian Army. Moving resolution Gandhi said “The Congress should let it be known to the neighbouring and other non-Indian states that India, as a self –governing country can have nothing to fear from neighbouring states or any states as her people have no designs upon any of them, and hence no intention of establishing any trade relations, hostile to or not desired by the people of such states.”12
Gandhiji did not believe that there was any threat to India from any neighbours. The British had invariably held up the bogey of Russian expansionism and played upon the fear of Russian bear hug . The obsession was manifest in their imperial policy throughout the 19th century. However, in independent India, Gandhi emphasized that “…the soldiers will form the national militia for defence and protective purpose.”13 When Gandhi was asked whether he envisaged the possibility of doing away with a national army in independent India, he answered, “as a visionary, yes. But I do not think it is possible for me to see it during my lifetime.It may take ages before the Indian nation can accommodate itself to having no army at all.”14As regards the use of army, Gandhi believes in rare deployment of forces as an instrument of state against the enemy. Gandhi said, “Nations will rely more and more on consultations and arbitration, and progressively less and less on army”.15Gandhi also stressed to use economic-boycott as a form of non-co-operation against aggressor. In answer to a question by some Chinese visitors as to what the prospects of a boycott of Japanese goods by India were, Gandhiji replied, “I wish I could say that there was any great hope. Our sympathies are with you, but they have not stirred us to our depth or else we should have boycotted all Japanese goods, specially Japanese cloth…Japan is not only conquering you but is trying to conquer us too by its cheap flimsy machine made good…we too are a big nation like you. If we told the Japanese we are not going to import a single yard of your Calico nor export any of our cotton to you. Japan would think twice before proceeding with its aggression.”16
The most debatable aspect of Gandhian strategy is his view on non- violent resistance (Satyagraha) .The critics of Gandhian strategy conclude that Gandhi’s non-violence is an impractical/utopian concept without perhaps going through his following statement: “I do believe that, where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence…I would rather have India resort to arms in order to defend her honour than that she should, in a cowardly manner, become or remain a helpless witness to her dishonour.”17
In short, Gandhi’s views about strategic culture are as under-
1.Gandhi was apostle of peace and non-violence, peace not of graveyard and non- violence not of the weak, with the possibility of a nuclear holocaust as well as low intensive conflict threatening to destroy the nation and humanity, the significance of Gandhian strategic thought is even greater today then ever before.
2. For Gandhi peace and non-violence is the means to achieve an end of ideal society in India and the world. Although he believes in equality and purity of means and the end but he does not wish to sacrifice end for the sake of means. In case peace and non- violence is not workable, he does not hesitate even to adopt violent means to achieve justice.
3. During the time of Gandhi Indian army was an imperial force which had to serve the purpose of empire, not the service to the Indian people. Indian looked at army as a cruel instrument to exploit them and hence hated British army. In this situation Gandhi was giving his statements about army. If Gandhi visualized the role of today’s army, his opinion about soldier would have been different. The same is the case with non-violence also. Violent resistance might have not been workable to fight against British empire backed by its military might. Therefore, Gandhi’s statements about army and non- violence are strategically crafted in the given situation. After the independence situation was entirely different. True to the philosophy of Geeta, Gandhiji blessed the dispatch of Indian army in October. 1947 to defend the people of Kashmir against Pakistani invaders ( like Lord Krishna’s blessings to Arjuna ).18When Bhagat Singh and B.K. Dutt dropped a bomb in the Central Legislative Assembly in 1929, Gandhi said, “Violence is bad but slavery is worse.”19
4. Gandhism is not a doctrinaire or dogmatic creed but a dynamic philosophy that can be applied to complex and concrete problems including -national defence, security and warfare. Gandhi said, “…religion of non-violence is not meant merely for Rishies and saints but is relevant to common people as well.” He was not “pleading for India to practice non-violence because she is weak” but to practice it “being conscious for her strength and power.”20
Strategic thought began with Manu and associated teachers during 700 BCE in India does not end with Kautilya or Gandhi. Jawaharlal Nehru. Dr. Ambedkar, Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee,Aurobindo Ghosh, V.K Krishna Menon, Sardar Patel,Indira Gandhi, Atal Bihari Bajpayee etc are not merely the political leaders but also the great political/strategic thinkers in broad sense of politico-strategic thinking. We wish, we could convince Tanham and associates about India’s contributions to the strategic thinking.
Dimensions:-
This paper examines certain dimensions in terms of India’s strategic culture influencing and shaping Indian strategy being followed since independence-
1.Socio-cultural –Amartya Sen says that “ India is immensely diverse with many distinct pursuits, vastly disparate convictions, widely divergent customs and a veritable feast of viewpoints”.21 India is one of the four oldest civilizations of the word. It is comprised of 31 regions, 1618 languages, 6400 castes, 6 religions, 6 ethnic groups, 29 major festivals 150 languages, 544 dialects and 1 country. It is also the cultural hub of the Indian sub-continent. In all such diversities, India maintains her unity and integrity. Is it not a great challenge for India to maintain an unified political central control keeping all components together? In such a complex reality, what is suitable strategy to counter internal and external threats so as to ensure political stability under unified central control, national unity, national security and defence, political sovereignty and other national interests? Whatever may be the challenges and threats being faced by India, the fact remains that nation is stable. What is secret behind it? Nothing but cultural unity of the people. People may differ from caste, creed, religion, region, language etc but all they belong to one homogeneous culture. More or less same Indian culture is found in all the countries of this sub-continent too. Therefore, the role of the strategic culture, based on common socio-cultural traditions, being played for national security and integrity of India is not only significant but vital too.
2 Historical - India is a nation for centuries. But ,what about India as a nation-state? It needs to be examined from the historical facts as why India could not grow as nation-state in the past before 1947.The first and foremost pre- requisite to ensure a nation to acquire the status of nation-state is the possession of an effective central control. From this point of view let us look at Indian history. We are aware of the fact that taking advantage of lacking central power and warfare among small states inside India, Iranian ruler-Darius and Greek ruler of Macedonia-Alexander invaded India in 516 BCE and 326 BCE respectively. Centrally controlled political organization in the nation of India started getting at grass-root level during Maurian Empire particularly under Chandragupta Maurya and Ashoka between 322 BCE-185BCE. But with the downfall of the Mauryan empire, Indo-Greeks, Sakas, and the Kaushanas , all of whom were foreign tribes invaded India. However, after a break from 185 BCE to 320 AD, the central control started gaining again under the rule of Gupta Empire from 320 AD to 540 AD and subsequently for a brief period under rule of Harsh Vardhan from 606 AD to 647 AD. Once again after a long gap, the central political control came back during foreigner’s rule under Mughal and British empires from 16th century till 1947.
Therefore, during the entire known Indian history of about 4500 years from 2500 BCE (Indus Valley Civilisation) to 1947 AD (end of British rule), India did not have even a loose form of central power for as long as 3711 years. In the real sense of the term, India became nation-state only on 15 Aug1947 under centrally controlled self/independent democratic rule. Having such long period of invasions and continuous serious threats for centuries, both from inside and outside the country, it is amassing as how India survived as a nation-state?
Many great nations in the world, in the lesser challenging situations then India, in the past have lost either their identity or status forever. What is secret about India’s capability of fighting back which is rarely found in the political history of the world? There is no secret as such. India maintains liberal/optimist culture which provides the capacity of taking positive lessons from the mistakes committed in the past, modifying the roadmap and fighting unitedly for national pride. India is the land of Geeta which teaches ‘Karmanye wadhikaraste maa falesu kadachanah’ or ‘nishkama karma’ (work done without seeking any reward). The thought of Sufism teaches about liberal culture. This is a special as well as unique characteristics of India’s strategic culture, unlike the western one, which flows for centuries despite continuous/serious attempts for disruptions as stated above.
3. Legacy of pre-independence era-India fought for independence against British rule under Indian National Congress. The great Indian strategic thinkers, scholars, intellectuals, Lowers, former civil servants etc took active part in the mass movement. They made important commitments in terms of policy and strategy for future independent India. Many such commitments are reflected in the form of resolutions passed by the Congress. Such strategic commitments are the legacies of the pre-independence era for free India to follow in practice while conducting foreign affairs, international relations, international law, international treaty, war, security and defence, disarmament, military/nuclear policy and strategy etc. The Congress passed resolutions in 1921, committed to maintained peaceful and friendly relations with neighbours and others which are seen as principles of foreign policy of free India in the forms of peaceful co-existence, Pnchsheel, non-aggressive, non- intervention, anti-racialism, anti-colonialism, world peace and security, non-alignment etc. The Congress also accused Japan during Manchurian crisis in 1931 and also during its attack on China in1937 and supported China openly by providing medical mission as a token of goodwill. Following the same, the free India adopts the policy of active neutrality or the policy of non-alignment while reacting on world issues rather than keeping quit as silent spectator. Therefore India does not make strategy in haste without ‘thinking’ as some scholars claim.
4. Ideological –
India believes in ‘Vashudhaib kutumbkam’(The whole world is our family) and ‘Atithiyoh debo bhawah’(The guest is the God). India’s Hindu culture has been the source of many ideologies scattered in Vedas, Purans, Upnishadas, Manushmriti, Mahabharata, Geeta, Ramayan etc. Indian ideological culture is basically liberal in approach rather then rigid. It teaches reconciliation in general and tolerance in particular. It encourages even to love enemy-‘Nindak niyare rakhiye’. Moreover, Budhism, Jainism, Sikhism etc have come out of Hinduism as a forms of reform to inculcate liberal principles in place of fanaticism, rigidity etc followed for ages in Hinduism. These religions as forms of reform on the part of Hinduism are the examples of ideological liberalism being followed in Indian culture suggesting to individuals and the state to follow truth, non-violence, tolerance, equality, impartiality, spirituality etc in terms of liberal culture.
Indian liberal culture, irrespective of religion, caste, region, language etc, has ensured national integrity and security of India since the beginning. India has her own experience that as and when rigidity, fanaticism, fundamentalism etc grow for political or whatever reasons, threat on national integrity and security is inevitable. The consequence of which is the invasion or partition of the nation as India has enough experience of invasions and finally Pakistan was created out of India on religious ground and further, Bangladesh on the ground of language out of Pakistan. The two-nations theory has been fizzled out. Therefore, the life- line of Indian strategic culture is the ideological liberalism and the unity in cultural diversity. Leaning lessons from her own past India after independence is following secularism as an internal and similarly anti-racialism as an external policy. India does not hesitate to amend her path in case of strategic requirement for national defence and security.
Moreover, India’s political strategy is also based on democratic ideology. Democracy is, indeed, the most concrete strategic element in India like other democratic systems of the world. Democratic dialogue in practice in India has solved many serious national problems like Mizoram crisis, Khalistan Movement, Assam problem etc during Rajib Gandhi regime. The same is being applied in case of militancy in Kashmir and ULFA and other insurgencies in the North-East region.
In this background one can argue that India does not need to make an arithmetical/ special/ deliberate effort to create the paradigm of a long term strategy for war and national security because the centuries old strategic culture of her own in the forms of ideologies is readily available which automatically guide to shape national strategy in times of requirement.
Styles and Patterns:
Now this Paper would focus on certain general styles of strategic thinking and patterns of strategic culture in practice in various countries and to locate India’s stand in it.
Geo-political- It refers to a line of strategic thinking in terms of geo-political realities in the interest of the nation. Presently the region of Persian Gulf, South-Asia and Asia-Pacific region are geo-politically significant. Hence, each nation of these regions culturally think, more or less, in the same direction and to shape their national strategy in the given situations accordingly.
Ideological- Certain nations strategically think in ideological terms, like the erstwhile USSR’s thinking on Marxian line, USA capitalistic and India non-alignment line (during cold war) and decide their strategy accordingly.
Divertional- Some nations, sometimes as a short term measure, use divertional line of thinking to shape their strategy so that the internal/domestic attention can be diverted towards self created external threats/war to avoid internal instability/ insecurity or threats from inside. China from 1949 to1976 and Pakistan from the beginning till now followed the divertional way of thinking and shape their strategy in the same direction.
Imperialistic- Imperialistic way of thinking in terms of strategic culture is another styles and pattern generally seen with powerful nations/super powers.
Fundamentalistic- Fundamentalism in context with religion, region, ethnic etc as the pattern of thinking is followed by religious and other such countries.
Economic-There are countries whose strategic thinking is based on economic gain. The world is treated by them merely as market for sailing their goods and act with profit motives.Their foreign and difence policy, international relations etc are directed towards business and economic interest.
Expansion- In this model expansion of territory or ideology or culture is the main thought of strategic culture for making national strategy.
Idealistic- Morality based idealism with broad humane outlook is also the line of cultural thinking of some countries like India during Nehru period and before.
Realistic- Hard realities of national interest even with the option of nuclear war and harming others is another pattern of strategic thinking as seen in Germany under Hitler and USA from 1944 to 1972.
Colonial-Colonial model of strategic thinking encourages the policy makers to adopt a strategy to impose foreign rule over poor and developing countries as an instrument of national interest as found with western countries before II world war.
Where does India stand in the above mentioned styles and pattern of strategic culture? India, in deed, does not have any single pattern in her strategic thinking. It depends upon situations and circumstances inside and out side the country. Looking at Indian history from ancient period it is seen that India has gone through a lot of ups and down and the pattern of strategic thinking kept on changing accordingly. From the time of Mahabharta to Arthasastra the main concern of strategic thinking was the formation of political organization of society, nationalism, patriotism, political morality, unity among people, threats from inside and outside, administrative and ruling culture etc. This is the beginning of formation of the Indian strategic culture when society was getting a shape and the culture was being formed. The style of thinking was both realistic and idealistic at this stage. Many nations of today and their cultures were not even borne during those days.
Ever since the ancient times, the rulers of India set before themselves the ideal to become the ‘Chakraverti’ (Ruler of whole country). In the ancient times, Mauryan emperors dominated almost the whole country from Himalayas in the north to the southern part of Deccan and from the Ganges in the east to the Indus in the west. Even the great rulers of Pathan dynasty Ala-ud-din Khalji and Muhammad Tughlaq, Sher Shah Suri and Mughal rulers like Akbar and shah Jahan did not take rest till they had conquered the entire country, although the extensive southern peninsula always remained independent and was governed by her local provincial dynasty. The Indian rulers attempted to introduce a common system of administration in all the territories occupied by them. Later, the British ruler in India introduced a uniform system of administration in a large part of their British Empire in India. India has, thus, enjoyed political unity in different period of its history. Therefore the style of cultural thinking and the pattern of strategic behavior in India was always politically conscious in terms of national unity and integrity even under different foreign rulers from different origins. Flexibility and adaptability in the style of strategic culture was always maintained according to the circumstances.
Christianity and Islam came to India during 1st and 7th century restpectively and got absorbed in the Indian culture. After Gupta dynasty the central political power declined. Many small states emerged during Rajput period. Subsequently Turkish rulers and the reign of Delhi Sultans attempted to reestablish central political control and to a large extent they succeeded also. However, the main development in the Indian culture during medieval period was the secularism based Bhkti reformers and Muslim Sufi saints like Ramnuja, Jaideva, Kabir, Tulsi Das, Chisti, Nizamudin etc. Tusi Das composed Ramcharitra Manas and described in detail about the strategy of warfare between Rama and Ravna. Vilhanana wrote biography of Vikramaditya VI of Chalukya dynasty and Chanderbardai wrote in his Prithviraj Raso about the exploits of Prithvi Raj III of Ajmer and Delhi. In their compositions they have highlighted the significance of their kings in order to focus their strategy and administration. Thus, even when the central power was not in a proper shape, India’s strategic thinking uninterruptedly continued. The positive style of thinking was followed in order to build up a broad based nation.
The pattern of Indian strategic thinking during Afghan Empire was generated by the socio-political and religious situation. However, its pattern of thinking shifted towards geo-political and ideological dimensions. The disruptive forces like religious fundamentalism and fanaticism promoted by a few foreign rulers for their political interest in the one hand and liberal Sufism and Bhakti movement in the other hand was a new cultural scenario. The rule of Afghan Empire came to an end followed by another foreigner’s rule of British Empire.
Thinking pattern of Indian culture during British rule got a new trends, India for the first time came under European rule. In fact, India had never enjoyed a total political and geographical unity till the 19th century, under British rule. The modern administration with Rule of law, separation of powers at legislative, executive and judicial level, national language, hierarchical administration etc was the new experience for Indians. However, British rule aimed at economic, social and political exploitation by adopting the policy of divide and rule in India from beginning till the end. After the first word war they used anti-Soviet strategy in Northern-Western frontier for the security of their regime in India. Indian soldiers were used in the war for her self-interest, ignoring Indian’s desire. Finally India got independence after a constant struggle and suffering. During British rule, the Indian style of strategic culture turned into a realistic- nationalistic pattern in the given situation.
Unlike other countries, India, from the past, has unique styles, outlook, emphasis and patterns of strategic behavior. It is, therefore, does not fit into any one or two above mentioned established styles and patterns due to – (a) diversity of cultures (b) size of area and population(c) geographical location (d) impact of invasions (e) constant threats from both inside and outside and (f) philosophy of life.
Analytical Framework:
As regards the criticism of strategic culture of India, there are a number of critics who have pointed out certain shortcomings. Let us analyse them one by one:
1.Critics say that there has never been a tradition of thinking culture in terms of strategy in India. While putting forward their arguments they point out that there is a misunderstanding about the issue in hand as some scholars of the opposite school do not distinguish the concept of ‘strategic culture’ from that of the term ‘culture’. India undoubtedly is very rich in culture for thousands of years. Yet it has had no strategic culture like many countries in the world. Having culture does not mean having strategic culture also as these two things are different. They may or may not go together. There are many philosophers/thinkers in the western world also but all of them do not think strategically. They have various areas/fields of thought. The Same is the tradition in India. Manu, Kautilya and Gandhi are the strategic thinkers but what about the rest? Even between Manu and Kautilya and then Katilya and Gandhi, there is a long gap/break of about 400 years 1700 years respectively. Hence, even if India thinks strategically, consistency/continuity is not maintained in the Indian tradition of strategic thought. The Indian picture of national strategy being followed in practice after independence is, indeed, no different as India is missing a long term strategy to tackle external or internal threats, diplomatic pressure etc including nuclear doctrine.
Critic’s views in short as shown above, point out two main criticism of the strategic culture of India--(1) India does not have strategic culture at all and (2) Inconsistency in India’s strategic thinking.
However, both the points appear to be contradictory to each other as if there is no such culture in India, the question of inconsistency does not arise. Earlier in this paper as arguments submitted to clarify that India, not only has this culture, but also it is consistently maintained through out its long history. Therefore, this view about strategic culture of India does not have the basis of sound reality and convincing arguments. Indian history also does not support this view.
2. Other critics believe that India is defensive, scared and lake of biting teeth. As a result it is facing plights in Kashmir and border problem with China. It all happened due to Nehru’s style of defensive strategy. Pt. Nehru, the architect of India’s foreign policy had adopted negative approach by following non-alignment, non-aggressive, non- intervention, anti-colonialism and anti-racialism, as the terms - ‘non’ and ‘anti’- are commonly used in the basic principles of his foreign policy. Not only the term but also the conduct which matters in case of India. Hardly there is any positive contribution of Nehru towards India’s strategic thought. Defensive thinking in strategic term in modern India, indeed, begins with Mahatma Gandhi rather then Nehru. Gandhi insisted on non-violence, pacific settlement of disputes, brotherhood, peaceful co-existence etc. Nehru being the disciple and the follower of Gandhi had attempted to materialize Gandhian thought in practice.
In short, the second school of thought accuses India for being unnecessarily defensive, both in strategic thinking as well as strategic behavior.
The opponents of this view have argued that:
Gandhi led India’s struggle for independence against the mightiest colonial power of the word. Had Gandhi used aggressive/offensive policy with violence against Britain he must not have matched the means with that of the British army. Gandhi got lesson from the consequences of using aggressive means during 1857 revolt. Bhagat Singh, Subhash Chndra Bose, Revolutionary Party etc had also attempted aggressive means and the result of which was known to Gandhi. Britain also preferred to fight with a violent Gandhi rather a Satyagrahi one. Hence, British police and the army kept on provoking Indians to be violent which would have been easier for Britain to crush the struggle as they did earlier. In this situation Gandhi had no other suitable means than the non-violent resistance to fight for independence. However, Gandhian way of strategic thinking can not be called as defensive as explained above in this paper. The strategy adopted by Gandhi was the best in the given situation which was proved to be successful also.
India was a newly born baby in 1947 along with 2/3 Asian, African and Latin American countries in the world after the ll world war. Many of such countries adopted aggressive strategy to survive as independent democratic nations. Subsequently what happened to their fate? Many of them either lost their independence or lost democracy or lost integrity/unity. On the other hand India survived as the largest democracy and growing as word power under Nehru or under his strategy followed by India based on Gandhian strategic culture.
Many big and small powers adopted aggressive strategy. USA dropped nuclear weapons on Japan. Result? USA has been providing security to Japan even till now. USA also attacked Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan etc. Result? Even saving face is a big task for this super power, leave aside the gain and credibility. USSR did the same in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979. Result is the disintegration of another super power. China attacked India, Vietnam, Combodia and USSR. Result is unnecessary enmity with the most friendly countries. A number of many more such instances can be traced out from the world history. Should India also have followed the same strategy? Let the critics to decide.
Nehru had to lead a newly emerged nation-state of India. He had to concentrate on economic and social reconstruction. He could not afford to get entangled in the complicated alliance of rival power system and thus get deflected from principal task of socio-economic planning and development. Therefore Nehru preferred development over defence initially in the given situation. However, he was a dynamic strategic thinker and leader who immediately switched over to defence over development in the changing strategic scenario after Chinese attack. This is what Nehru learnt from Indian traditions of strategic culture in general and from Manu, Kautilya and Gandhi in particular. India, indeed, has set an example of conducting both the strategic principles of Defence and Development as well as Diplomacy and Military Power in the best way of balance in practice
Is India still wrong in following the kind of strategy after 1947? Both defence and offence are the styles and the patterns of strategy. Which of the two is to be adopted, it depends upon the situation and circumstances. India adopted defensive strategy in 1947-48 and in 1965 in the given situation. But the changed situation in 1971 enabled India to be offensive/aggressive during Bangladesh liberation. Therefore, India follows dynamism in her strategy based on India’s dynamic tradition of strategic culture. We wish that the critics are satisfied.
References:
Stuart Poore (2004), Strategic Culture, in John Glenn, Darryl and Stuart Poore, (ed), Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture, Ashgate Publishing Co, Burlington, P.47.
2 Ibid. P.53
3 Everett Carl Dolman, Pure Strategy, Frank Cass, London, 2005,P.14
4 Colin S. Gray, “Strategy and History: Essays on theory and practice ”, Routledge, London,2006, p162
5 The Washington Quarterly, Winter, 1992.pp. 129-30
6 Ibid. p.129
7 Marcus Kim (2004), India(The case study), in Strategic Culture, in John Glenn, Darryl and Stuart Poore, (ed), Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture, Ashgate Publishing Co, Burlington, P.90
8 S.Vijayaraghavan and R.Jayaram,Politcal Thought,Sterling Publication Prvt.Ltd.,p305
9 Lawrence Sondhaus,Strategic Culture and Ways of War,Routledge London, 2006,p.92
10 Marcus Kim (2004), India (The case study), in Strategic Culture, in John Glenn, Darryl and Stuart Poore, (ed), Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture, Ashgate Publishing Co, Burlington, P.93
11Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realistic Foundations of Strategy, Macmillan India Ltd., Delhi, 2005,p.2
12V.Longer,The Defence and Foreign Policy pf India, Sterling Pub.p.6
13 Young India, oct.27.1921.
14 Young India, Dec.19, 1929.
15 Ibid.
16 Harijan, Jan.28, 1939.
17 Young India, Aug.11, 1920
18T.N .Kaul,Diplomacy in Peace and War, Vikash pub.Hause.New Delhi, 1979,P. 3
19 Ibid. p.4
20 Young India,Aug.11,192220
21 Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian-Writing on Indian History, Culture and Identity, Penguin, Landon,2005, P. ix (Preface).
(Dr. Nand Kishor Kumar)
Introduction
Three generations of scholars in rapid succession have addressed the concept of strategic culture. Each one of them has dealt with the issues concerning almost all aspects of strategic culture in general. As regards national level study of strategic culture with reference to each particular country having or growing significant global status, it is yet to establish a balance/comprehensive view of strategic culture of a large of number of countries including India except European, USA, and a few more. In this context as regards India is concerned, George Tanham sparked the debate, having said that India has not had strategic thinker nor has the tradition of strategic thinking. Others can argue that India possesses strategic culture, though it is inconsistent, diverse, complex and irrelevant. In yet another view, it is too defensive to use for a nation of India’s stature. The list of views may further increase to a large extent. This paper aims at analysing all these views and focus on comprehensive picture of Indian strategic culture.
Stuart Poore says that “the term strategy has traditionally been used to refer to the way that military power is used by government in the pursuit of their interests. How are these interests shaped? A strategic culture approach tackles this question by considering the relevance of cultural context in influencing strategic preferences”. Moreover, strategic culture does not merely deal with the traditions of using military power but also diplomacy, foreign policy, internal/external threats and International relations so as to protect and promote national interest in terms of achieving political, economic, national and international goals. Scholars disagree over what culture is, how it can be identified and what it does. This has obvious implications for any attempt to develop the concept of strategic culture. Moreover, they also disagree over the amount of significance of culture in shaping the concept of strategic.
However, the fact remains that the culture is an inherent strong factor to influences policy-makers in shaping their national strategy accordingly, though its effectiveness may differ nations to nation and situations to situation depending upon strategic environment. Citing example, Stuart Poore, quoting David Jones’s analysis of Soviet strategic culture, says that “There were three levels to a state’s strategic culture: a macro-environmental level involving geography, history and ethno-cultural characteristics; a societal level, referring to the socio-economic and political structure of society; and a micro-level consisting of military institutions and the nature of civil-military relations.”2 American or Anglo-American cultural base may differ from that of the Soviets due to different perceptions and situations pertain to strategic environment. The same may be true with India or any other nations. Further, the task of a devising workable method for identifying the existence and possible influence of a strategic culture in effecting strategic outcome is not simple. It requires methodology, which may rescue strategic culture from its traditional status and support the same in getting shaped into a workable and updated strategy .The nature of methodology may also vary time-to-time and nation-to-nation. The grand strategy, military strategy, operation, tactics etc can be workable if a suitable methodology in terms of strategic culture is applied to ensure that the outcome of strategy is achieved. The purpose of military strategy is to link military means with political aim in pursuit of a continuing advantage. This can happen only when a useful methodology is applied to make a workable and updated strategy based on dynamic strategic culture .The same is opined by Everett Carl Dolman3 in other words.
The subject of strategic culture matters deeply because it raises core questions about the roots of, and influences upon, strategic behavior. The strategy is universal in general term but it has to be cultural. Colin S. Gray4, in this context has pointed out six general points which serves to help advance understanding of the nature and working of strategic culture:
Strategic behavior can not be beyond culture
Adversity can not cancel culture
Strategic culture is a guide to action
Strategic culture expresses comparative advantage
Strategic culture can be dysfunctional
Strategic culture can be variously categorized, such as nationality, geography, weapons and functions, simplicity and complexity, generation and grand strategy.
In this background an attempt is made here to focus strategic culture in the Indian context.
Foundations of Indian Strategic Culture
George Tanham has provoked in his Paper- ‘Indian Strategic Culture’ (1992) that “India has not had a tradition of strategic thinking; no great strategic thinker appears in Indian history and most modern strategics such as Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, who usually couched their theories in general terms based on their own perceptions of the outer world and on their own predictions. Parts of British strategy have been borrowed and adapted, and other strategies have evolved as reactions to situations confronting India5.”George Tanham may not be familiar with complexities inherent to the Indian culture. Hence it is difficult for him to define and its interpretation into strategic culture of India. It is harder to trace out for him that there is a systematic strategic thought propounded by Kautilya during ancient history (300-400 BCE ). Even before Kautilya, it was Manu(700 BCE) who composed strategic thought of Dandaniti in Manu Samriti. The same is also described in Mahabharata authored by Vyas and Arthasastra by Kautilya. The Hindu law being administered today by the Indian courts is based upon the principles laid down by Manu.
George Tanham further provokes that “Indians seem to arrive at strategic concepts and decisions rather than by thinking about them and then making a conscious decision6.” According to him, the reason is that India has been independent only since 1947, having been ruled for the previous 200 years by the British who decided defence policy and strategy without any Indian involvement.
Tanham needs to verify Indian history that even during British rule, leave aside independent India, the Indian National Congress, comprised of great Indian leaders, was actively involved in making strategic and foreign policy and attempted to influence the British policy makers to inculcate the Indian’s opinion into final form of strategy for India. Issues like the involvement of Indian soldiers in the World War, India’s policy during Manchurian crisis 1931 as well as Japan’s attack on China 1937, India’s policy towards her neighbors etc. are some of the examples in this context on which resolutions were passed by the Congress during British rule.
Besides Tanham, Indian scholars like Kanti Bajpai, Amitabh Matto etc. also have almost the same opinion about Indian strategic culture in comparison with that of European, as reflected in a volume published in 1996, co-edited by Tanham along with Bajpai and Matto in which Tanham’s essay-‘Indian Strategic Thought,’ is also included. Some other scholars like Marcus, Lawrence Sondhaus, etc have balanced views about Indian culture unlike Tanham and others, although it is not enough comprehensive. In this context Dr.Shrikant Paranjpe’s stand is important. Pananjpe says in his Paper- Locating Africa in India’s Strategic Perspectives: Limitations and Opportunities, presented before First South African Conference on11-12 June 2009, that “Indian security thinking has long been criticized for being abstract, not concrete. There has been a distinct reluctance on the part of India to present a clear-cut strategic doctrine and articulate the same in terms of policy. This stems from her belief in the realistic utilities of a deliberate ambiguity and not from a lack of strategic culture, as George Tanham1 would have us believe.”
However, BK Khnna has brought out undisputable fact that India has a rich heritage acquired from its glorious past, dating back to the Indus Valley Civilization, 2300 to 1700 BCE in his Paper-‘Ancient Military Heritage in India and Current Relevance’-referred in Strategic Analysis, IDSA, Aug,1995.The great epics of the Ramayana, Mahabharata and the Puranas give details of the advancements in science and technology and military strategy prevailing at that time. The Rigveda gives us interesting details of political life and military thoughts during the Vedic period. Accounts of battles show that the strategy of war was given a high priority in all matters of the state. The great epics have been characterized as the first foundation upon which the Indian military system was based. The military doctrines, strategies, concepts, procedures and customs of that time are still relevant to a large extent. The implementation scenarios may have changed but underlying theme, i.e. ‘ to achieve the aim’, remains the same.
Indians have not taken to the science of warfare recently. Their fighting traditions go back to 2500 BC. War as a means of maintaining society was accepted as a necessity. When all possible avenues of settlements had been explored and exhausted, war was resorted to. The laws of war were framed on the lines of the present day ingredients of military planning, e.g. principles of war, strategy and tactics. There are glorious examples of large-scale operations undertaken in ancient times, backed by definite military concepts. The strategy of war was practiced in its purest form and its conduct was designed to bring out the best and not the worst of the human traits. Another basic factor, which stands out, is the high standard of ethical code and the constant emphasis on upholding of dharma, all through the ages. Man has fought man since time immemorial for the establishment of ‘good over evil’. Even during the ancient period when dharma played such a dominating role in men’s daily routine, wars had to be undertaken frequently. The epitome of dharma yudha, as it was called then is to be found in good measure in the Ramayana and Mahabharata epics. Kautilya, a contemporary of Aristotle and sun Tzu in the 4th century BC was amongst the greatest and widest exponents of the Indian strategy, art and science of warfare.
Dandaniti or the concept of Danda, aimed at arresting the anarchical conditions in a nation state, thereby ensuring smooth functioning of the administration. It was based on the maxim ‘ No Danda-No state’. The rationale of this concept (Dandaniti) was that evil is inherent in man and only Danda can bring him to see the path of righteousness. This policy has been in vogue in different measures in various periods of Indian history.
Some of the tenets of strategy that were followed included three types of war, namely Dharma Vijay- the righteous war, Lobha Vijay- on account of greed, and Asura Vijay- the devil’s war. Strategic surprise was one of the key principles of waging wars. Similarly, intelligence was considered the single major war-winning factor. In the Rigveda, there are many references to use envoys for civil espionage. Ramayana has referred that Hanuman went to Ravana’s Sri Lanka as doot of Lord Rama and got confirmation of all the information required for envisaged war. The person of envoys was considered sacred. Mahabharta also has referred that Lord Krishna went Kaurba as an envoys of Pandwa with a proposal of peace. Spying was a very perfect strategy in ancient times. Disruption of lines of communication and capturing or harassing the near forces were some of the time tested injunctions in strategy. Shivaji exploited this strategy against the Mughal Army. The principle of maintenance of momentum was prevalent in great measure in medieval and British times. Some of the strategies of ancient India have now become the principles of war, such as surprise, intelligence, maintenance of momentum and administration. These principles, other strategies and military policies are still relevant.
To gain time, for rallying levies and for causing maximum attrition on the enemy, kings started making forts. The Rigveda testifies to their existence in the prehistoric era, when fortified cities were common. In the post-Epic period, fortified cities abounded. Alexander in the 4th century BC came across fortifications. Kautilya and Bhoja have referred to four kinds of fortresses: hill, forest, island and desert forts.
Apart from strategic culture prevailed in ancient India including Kautilya’s strategic thought, even during modern time, Mahatma Gandhi, the great thinker, has said in detail about strategy, war, armed forces, weapons, disarmament, foreign policy, international relations etc. During early modern history, Shivaji, the great Maratha war-thinker, war campaigner and warrior, had also contributed with both of his thoughts as well as actions to the strategic culture of India. Apart from guerrilla warfare adopted against Mughal emperor, Shivaji actually commanded regular formations of infantry and artillery. He even had a navy operating in the Arabian Sea. Therefore, not only India has maintained its own continuous and uninterrupted flow of strategic thinking right from ancient to the modern time but also influenced many other thinkers/strategists word wide.
Manu Samriti and Kautilya’s Arthasastra became paramount to understand the origins of Indian political culture, which further gained considerable influence during Mahatma Gandhi’s struggle for freedom of India. Hence, here we discuss in detail about two great Indian strategic thinkers -Kautilya and Mahatma Gandhi.
Kautilya:
Kautilya, also known as Chanakya and Vishnugupta, was the Guru (mentor) of Chandragupta, the king of Mauryan Empire as well as the minister under Chandragupta. Kautilya’s famous work, Arthasastra was written between forth and third century BCE, although it was discovered and translated only in 1904 by Dr R Shamsastry. It has brought a new insight into the political thought of ancient India. It touches on several aspects of national and international strategy and domestic politics based on practical reality. It has confirmed the belief that there could be a theory of governance based, not only on a pragmatic, but also on a strategic attitude in the context of ancient India.
However, there has been much debate over the issues generated by Kautilya’s Arthasastra.There are two schools of thought in this regard. The first school is represented by J.Jolly,M.Winternitz,R.Thapar and S.R. Goyal who doubt the authenticity of authorship of this book. Scholars like R.Shamasastry, Ganapathi shastry and N.P.Unni belong to the other school who believe that Arthsastra is the work of Kautilya. Both the schools have their own arguments in support of their views. However, according to Marcus Kim, the arguments of the second school of thought is more convincing that Kautilya is actually the author of Arthsastra.7 The debate over the originality and authenticity of the Arthasastra is, in deed. a complex one, yet the book, undoubtedly has had considerable impact on the formation of Indian identity in the area of strategic culture.The term Artha+sastra literally means the science of wealth. The broad meaning of Arthasastra is a treatise on governance and government which appears to be similar to the concept of Mahabharata’s reference to Dandaniti(the science of polity) contained in Dharmasastra written by Manu during seventh century BCE. The Dandaniti’s strategy is an older system of strategy than Kautilya’s thought and his strategy contained in Arthasastra.Therefore, the tradition of Indian strategic thought does not begin with Kautilya but it is as old as Vedic civilization of India which is one of the oldest civilizations of the world, although Kautilya is the one who for the first time in the history of India has systematically framed a complete paradigm of Indian strategy. He compiled and systematized the idea derived from the tradition. Kautilya himself agreed that his work is based on the works of earlier Indian thinkers who are actually the founders of the science of polity as traced by S.Vijayaraghavan and R.Jayaram8. Marcus Kim has compared Arthasastra to Machiavelli’s ‘The Prince’. The theme of strategic thought of Kautilya in short is appended below:
Kautilya deliberately freed politics from the influence of religion and morality like Machiavelli to achieve political/strategic objectives. In the history of political/strategic thought Kautilya is the first thinker who secularized politics and infused tricks and deceitful methods into science of policy and strategy to gain victory in critical wars.
The most important aspect of Kautily’s strategic thought is his conception of elements of state( Mandala), such as the king, the minister, the country, the fort, the treasury, the army and the friend. According to him, power lies in the use and application of these elements by the conqueror effectively. The Mandala concept is a strategic reality perceived by kautilya consisted of eleven kingdoms and conqueror which are strategically situated/located/arranged in order to win war.
Kautilya formulated six-fold foreign policy, such as, making peace, policy of hostility, policy of neutrality, show of force for war purpose to the enemy, seeking refuge with another king, and dual policy of making peace with one king and the policy of hostility with another.
He instructed the use of any means for security of the king and the country including the use of spying against ministers and enemies, use of treacherous fighting, employment of secret weapons and even the use of chemical weapons in warfare.
Whether Kautilya maintained an ethical dimension to the Arthasastra in terms of diplomacy, it is a debatable issue amongst the scholars. However, following Vedic moral principles, he regards the state as a moral institution but in terms of international relations he emphasized on separation of politics from theology and morality.
He maintains both the interacting dimensions: a political rationalism based on pragmatic outlook, and another form of rationalism based on traditional Vedic Dharma.
Lawrence Sondhaus has attempted to clarify the realistic cleverness of Kautilya by citing an instance of his strategic tricks. He says that “Specific action attributed to Kautilya’s advice include deterring Alexander from following up on his initial success in Punjab in 327 BCE by playing the Greek army’s fear of war elephants, exaggerating the number in the elephant corps of the Magadha forces in a clever disinformation campaign that compelled Alexander to withdraw his war-weary army from India before it fought another major action.”9
Mahatma Gandhi:
According to Marcus Kim “If Kautilya contributed the bases of political rationalism to the dynamics of modern Indian politics and strategy, Gandhiji has reinforced the moral logic that has existed for centuries via his life-long accomplishments. Gandhi’s ideas cover almost all issues in contemporary politics-from individual to global ideals.”10 However, it appears that both Kautilya and Gandhi stand at two different extremes of realism and idealism. Kautilya stands at the extreme of realism where as Gandhi at the other extreme of idealism.
Moreover, the scholar like Bharat Karnad has different view about Gandhi. To him, Gandhi was a confused strategic thinker. In his words “…his (Gandhi) confused and confusing legacy have had much to do with this state of affairs (strategy followed by India since independence). The policy - wise vague ideas and values he propagated influenced the initial attitude of the Indian government towards the military and the utilisation of force, and continue till this day…”11However, this is not universally acceptable opinion about Gandhi’s strategic thought. Many scholars belonging to other school of thought have entirely different view. To them, Gandhi’s thought is the most pragmatic and dynamic based on concrete reality. Thus, views about Gandhian strategy differ from scholar to scholar, mainly due to his various statements given altogether in a different context about non-violence, armed forces, arms, war, military training, duty of army personnel, foreign policy, international relations etc which need to be examined.
The first Indian to speak for India’s armed forces in the recent history was not Gandhiji but Raja Ram Mohan Roy who advocated the indianisation of army in 1833. Indian National Congress picked up the lead given by Roy in 1885. It was in Feb-March 1921 that defence was for the first time discussed openly in the Central Legislative Assembly. Towards the end of the same year an important Congress resolution of foreign policy was moved by Gandhiji on Nov.4, 1921 at Delhi. Indian leaders had till then taken little interest in the Indian Army. Moving resolution Gandhi said “The Congress should let it be known to the neighbouring and other non-Indian states that India, as a self –governing country can have nothing to fear from neighbouring states or any states as her people have no designs upon any of them, and hence no intention of establishing any trade relations, hostile to or not desired by the people of such states.”12
Gandhiji did not believe that there was any threat to India from any neighbours. The British had invariably held up the bogey of Russian expansionism and played upon the fear of Russian bear hug . The obsession was manifest in their imperial policy throughout the 19th century. However, in independent India, Gandhi emphasized that “…the soldiers will form the national militia for defence and protective purpose.”13 When Gandhi was asked whether he envisaged the possibility of doing away with a national army in independent India, he answered, “as a visionary, yes. But I do not think it is possible for me to see it during my lifetime.It may take ages before the Indian nation can accommodate itself to having no army at all.”14As regards the use of army, Gandhi believes in rare deployment of forces as an instrument of state against the enemy. Gandhi said, “Nations will rely more and more on consultations and arbitration, and progressively less and less on army”.15Gandhi also stressed to use economic-boycott as a form of non-co-operation against aggressor. In answer to a question by some Chinese visitors as to what the prospects of a boycott of Japanese goods by India were, Gandhiji replied, “I wish I could say that there was any great hope. Our sympathies are with you, but they have not stirred us to our depth or else we should have boycotted all Japanese goods, specially Japanese cloth…Japan is not only conquering you but is trying to conquer us too by its cheap flimsy machine made good…we too are a big nation like you. If we told the Japanese we are not going to import a single yard of your Calico nor export any of our cotton to you. Japan would think twice before proceeding with its aggression.”16
The most debatable aspect of Gandhian strategy is his view on non- violent resistance (Satyagraha) .The critics of Gandhian strategy conclude that Gandhi’s non-violence is an impractical/utopian concept without perhaps going through his following statement: “I do believe that, where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence…I would rather have India resort to arms in order to defend her honour than that she should, in a cowardly manner, become or remain a helpless witness to her dishonour.”17
In short, Gandhi’s views about strategic culture are as under-
1.Gandhi was apostle of peace and non-violence, peace not of graveyard and non- violence not of the weak, with the possibility of a nuclear holocaust as well as low intensive conflict threatening to destroy the nation and humanity, the significance of Gandhian strategic thought is even greater today then ever before.
2. For Gandhi peace and non-violence is the means to achieve an end of ideal society in India and the world. Although he believes in equality and purity of means and the end but he does not wish to sacrifice end for the sake of means. In case peace and non- violence is not workable, he does not hesitate even to adopt violent means to achieve justice.
3. During the time of Gandhi Indian army was an imperial force which had to serve the purpose of empire, not the service to the Indian people. Indian looked at army as a cruel instrument to exploit them and hence hated British army. In this situation Gandhi was giving his statements about army. If Gandhi visualized the role of today’s army, his opinion about soldier would have been different. The same is the case with non-violence also. Violent resistance might have not been workable to fight against British empire backed by its military might. Therefore, Gandhi’s statements about army and non- violence are strategically crafted in the given situation. After the independence situation was entirely different. True to the philosophy of Geeta, Gandhiji blessed the dispatch of Indian army in October. 1947 to defend the people of Kashmir against Pakistani invaders ( like Lord Krishna’s blessings to Arjuna ).18When Bhagat Singh and B.K. Dutt dropped a bomb in the Central Legislative Assembly in 1929, Gandhi said, “Violence is bad but slavery is worse.”19
4. Gandhism is not a doctrinaire or dogmatic creed but a dynamic philosophy that can be applied to complex and concrete problems including -national defence, security and warfare. Gandhi said, “…religion of non-violence is not meant merely for Rishies and saints but is relevant to common people as well.” He was not “pleading for India to practice non-violence because she is weak” but to practice it “being conscious for her strength and power.”20
Strategic thought began with Manu and associated teachers during 700 BCE in India does not end with Kautilya or Gandhi. Jawaharlal Nehru. Dr. Ambedkar, Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee,Aurobindo Ghosh, V.K Krishna Menon, Sardar Patel,Indira Gandhi, Atal Bihari Bajpayee etc are not merely the political leaders but also the great political/strategic thinkers in broad sense of politico-strategic thinking. We wish, we could convince Tanham and associates about India’s contributions to the strategic thinking.
Dimensions:-
This paper examines certain dimensions in terms of India’s strategic culture influencing and shaping Indian strategy being followed since independence-
1.Socio-cultural –Amartya Sen says that “ India is immensely diverse with many distinct pursuits, vastly disparate convictions, widely divergent customs and a veritable feast of viewpoints”.21 India is one of the four oldest civilizations of the word. It is comprised of 31 regions, 1618 languages, 6400 castes, 6 religions, 6 ethnic groups, 29 major festivals 150 languages, 544 dialects and 1 country. It is also the cultural hub of the Indian sub-continent. In all such diversities, India maintains her unity and integrity. Is it not a great challenge for India to maintain an unified political central control keeping all components together? In such a complex reality, what is suitable strategy to counter internal and external threats so as to ensure political stability under unified central control, national unity, national security and defence, political sovereignty and other national interests? Whatever may be the challenges and threats being faced by India, the fact remains that nation is stable. What is secret behind it? Nothing but cultural unity of the people. People may differ from caste, creed, religion, region, language etc but all they belong to one homogeneous culture. More or less same Indian culture is found in all the countries of this sub-continent too. Therefore, the role of the strategic culture, based on common socio-cultural traditions, being played for national security and integrity of India is not only significant but vital too.
2 Historical - India is a nation for centuries. But ,what about India as a nation-state? It needs to be examined from the historical facts as why India could not grow as nation-state in the past before 1947.The first and foremost pre- requisite to ensure a nation to acquire the status of nation-state is the possession of an effective central control. From this point of view let us look at Indian history. We are aware of the fact that taking advantage of lacking central power and warfare among small states inside India, Iranian ruler-Darius and Greek ruler of Macedonia-Alexander invaded India in 516 BCE and 326 BCE respectively. Centrally controlled political organization in the nation of India started getting at grass-root level during Maurian Empire particularly under Chandragupta Maurya and Ashoka between 322 BCE-185BCE. But with the downfall of the Mauryan empire, Indo-Greeks, Sakas, and the Kaushanas , all of whom were foreign tribes invaded India. However, after a break from 185 BCE to 320 AD, the central control started gaining again under the rule of Gupta Empire from 320 AD to 540 AD and subsequently for a brief period under rule of Harsh Vardhan from 606 AD to 647 AD. Once again after a long gap, the central political control came back during foreigner’s rule under Mughal and British empires from 16th century till 1947.
Therefore, during the entire known Indian history of about 4500 years from 2500 BCE (Indus Valley Civilisation) to 1947 AD (end of British rule), India did not have even a loose form of central power for as long as 3711 years. In the real sense of the term, India became nation-state only on 15 Aug1947 under centrally controlled self/independent democratic rule. Having such long period of invasions and continuous serious threats for centuries, both from inside and outside the country, it is amassing as how India survived as a nation-state?
Many great nations in the world, in the lesser challenging situations then India, in the past have lost either their identity or status forever. What is secret about India’s capability of fighting back which is rarely found in the political history of the world? There is no secret as such. India maintains liberal/optimist culture which provides the capacity of taking positive lessons from the mistakes committed in the past, modifying the roadmap and fighting unitedly for national pride. India is the land of Geeta which teaches ‘Karmanye wadhikaraste maa falesu kadachanah’ or ‘nishkama karma’ (work done without seeking any reward). The thought of Sufism teaches about liberal culture. This is a special as well as unique characteristics of India’s strategic culture, unlike the western one, which flows for centuries despite continuous/serious attempts for disruptions as stated above.
3. Legacy of pre-independence era-India fought for independence against British rule under Indian National Congress. The great Indian strategic thinkers, scholars, intellectuals, Lowers, former civil servants etc took active part in the mass movement. They made important commitments in terms of policy and strategy for future independent India. Many such commitments are reflected in the form of resolutions passed by the Congress. Such strategic commitments are the legacies of the pre-independence era for free India to follow in practice while conducting foreign affairs, international relations, international law, international treaty, war, security and defence, disarmament, military/nuclear policy and strategy etc. The Congress passed resolutions in 1921, committed to maintained peaceful and friendly relations with neighbours and others which are seen as principles of foreign policy of free India in the forms of peaceful co-existence, Pnchsheel, non-aggressive, non- intervention, anti-racialism, anti-colonialism, world peace and security, non-alignment etc. The Congress also accused Japan during Manchurian crisis in 1931 and also during its attack on China in1937 and supported China openly by providing medical mission as a token of goodwill. Following the same, the free India adopts the policy of active neutrality or the policy of non-alignment while reacting on world issues rather than keeping quit as silent spectator. Therefore India does not make strategy in haste without ‘thinking’ as some scholars claim.
4. Ideological –
India believes in ‘Vashudhaib kutumbkam’(The whole world is our family) and ‘Atithiyoh debo bhawah’(The guest is the God). India’s Hindu culture has been the source of many ideologies scattered in Vedas, Purans, Upnishadas, Manushmriti, Mahabharata, Geeta, Ramayan etc. Indian ideological culture is basically liberal in approach rather then rigid. It teaches reconciliation in general and tolerance in particular. It encourages even to love enemy-‘Nindak niyare rakhiye’. Moreover, Budhism, Jainism, Sikhism etc have come out of Hinduism as a forms of reform to inculcate liberal principles in place of fanaticism, rigidity etc followed for ages in Hinduism. These religions as forms of reform on the part of Hinduism are the examples of ideological liberalism being followed in Indian culture suggesting to individuals and the state to follow truth, non-violence, tolerance, equality, impartiality, spirituality etc in terms of liberal culture.
Indian liberal culture, irrespective of religion, caste, region, language etc, has ensured national integrity and security of India since the beginning. India has her own experience that as and when rigidity, fanaticism, fundamentalism etc grow for political or whatever reasons, threat on national integrity and security is inevitable. The consequence of which is the invasion or partition of the nation as India has enough experience of invasions and finally Pakistan was created out of India on religious ground and further, Bangladesh on the ground of language out of Pakistan. The two-nations theory has been fizzled out. Therefore, the life- line of Indian strategic culture is the ideological liberalism and the unity in cultural diversity. Leaning lessons from her own past India after independence is following secularism as an internal and similarly anti-racialism as an external policy. India does not hesitate to amend her path in case of strategic requirement for national defence and security.
Moreover, India’s political strategy is also based on democratic ideology. Democracy is, indeed, the most concrete strategic element in India like other democratic systems of the world. Democratic dialogue in practice in India has solved many serious national problems like Mizoram crisis, Khalistan Movement, Assam problem etc during Rajib Gandhi regime. The same is being applied in case of militancy in Kashmir and ULFA and other insurgencies in the North-East region.
In this background one can argue that India does not need to make an arithmetical/ special/ deliberate effort to create the paradigm of a long term strategy for war and national security because the centuries old strategic culture of her own in the forms of ideologies is readily available which automatically guide to shape national strategy in times of requirement.
Styles and Patterns:
Now this Paper would focus on certain general styles of strategic thinking and patterns of strategic culture in practice in various countries and to locate India’s stand in it.
Geo-political- It refers to a line of strategic thinking in terms of geo-political realities in the interest of the nation. Presently the region of Persian Gulf, South-Asia and Asia-Pacific region are geo-politically significant. Hence, each nation of these regions culturally think, more or less, in the same direction and to shape their national strategy in the given situations accordingly.
Ideological- Certain nations strategically think in ideological terms, like the erstwhile USSR’s thinking on Marxian line, USA capitalistic and India non-alignment line (during cold war) and decide their strategy accordingly.
Divertional- Some nations, sometimes as a short term measure, use divertional line of thinking to shape their strategy so that the internal/domestic attention can be diverted towards self created external threats/war to avoid internal instability/ insecurity or threats from inside. China from 1949 to1976 and Pakistan from the beginning till now followed the divertional way of thinking and shape their strategy in the same direction.
Imperialistic- Imperialistic way of thinking in terms of strategic culture is another styles and pattern generally seen with powerful nations/super powers.
Fundamentalistic- Fundamentalism in context with religion, region, ethnic etc as the pattern of thinking is followed by religious and other such countries.
Economic-There are countries whose strategic thinking is based on economic gain. The world is treated by them merely as market for sailing their goods and act with profit motives.Their foreign and difence policy, international relations etc are directed towards business and economic interest.
Expansion- In this model expansion of territory or ideology or culture is the main thought of strategic culture for making national strategy.
Idealistic- Morality based idealism with broad humane outlook is also the line of cultural thinking of some countries like India during Nehru period and before.
Realistic- Hard realities of national interest even with the option of nuclear war and harming others is another pattern of strategic thinking as seen in Germany under Hitler and USA from 1944 to 1972.
Colonial-Colonial model of strategic thinking encourages the policy makers to adopt a strategy to impose foreign rule over poor and developing countries as an instrument of national interest as found with western countries before II world war.
Where does India stand in the above mentioned styles and pattern of strategic culture? India, in deed, does not have any single pattern in her strategic thinking. It depends upon situations and circumstances inside and out side the country. Looking at Indian history from ancient period it is seen that India has gone through a lot of ups and down and the pattern of strategic thinking kept on changing accordingly. From the time of Mahabharta to Arthasastra the main concern of strategic thinking was the formation of political organization of society, nationalism, patriotism, political morality, unity among people, threats from inside and outside, administrative and ruling culture etc. This is the beginning of formation of the Indian strategic culture when society was getting a shape and the culture was being formed. The style of thinking was both realistic and idealistic at this stage. Many nations of today and their cultures were not even borne during those days.
Ever since the ancient times, the rulers of India set before themselves the ideal to become the ‘Chakraverti’ (Ruler of whole country). In the ancient times, Mauryan emperors dominated almost the whole country from Himalayas in the north to the southern part of Deccan and from the Ganges in the east to the Indus in the west. Even the great rulers of Pathan dynasty Ala-ud-din Khalji and Muhammad Tughlaq, Sher Shah Suri and Mughal rulers like Akbar and shah Jahan did not take rest till they had conquered the entire country, although the extensive southern peninsula always remained independent and was governed by her local provincial dynasty. The Indian rulers attempted to introduce a common system of administration in all the territories occupied by them. Later, the British ruler in India introduced a uniform system of administration in a large part of their British Empire in India. India has, thus, enjoyed political unity in different period of its history. Therefore the style of cultural thinking and the pattern of strategic behavior in India was always politically conscious in terms of national unity and integrity even under different foreign rulers from different origins. Flexibility and adaptability in the style of strategic culture was always maintained according to the circumstances.
Christianity and Islam came to India during 1st and 7th century restpectively and got absorbed in the Indian culture. After Gupta dynasty the central political power declined. Many small states emerged during Rajput period. Subsequently Turkish rulers and the reign of Delhi Sultans attempted to reestablish central political control and to a large extent they succeeded also. However, the main development in the Indian culture during medieval period was the secularism based Bhkti reformers and Muslim Sufi saints like Ramnuja, Jaideva, Kabir, Tulsi Das, Chisti, Nizamudin etc. Tusi Das composed Ramcharitra Manas and described in detail about the strategy of warfare between Rama and Ravna. Vilhanana wrote biography of Vikramaditya VI of Chalukya dynasty and Chanderbardai wrote in his Prithviraj Raso about the exploits of Prithvi Raj III of Ajmer and Delhi. In their compositions they have highlighted the significance of their kings in order to focus their strategy and administration. Thus, even when the central power was not in a proper shape, India’s strategic thinking uninterruptedly continued. The positive style of thinking was followed in order to build up a broad based nation.
The pattern of Indian strategic thinking during Afghan Empire was generated by the socio-political and religious situation. However, its pattern of thinking shifted towards geo-political and ideological dimensions. The disruptive forces like religious fundamentalism and fanaticism promoted by a few foreign rulers for their political interest in the one hand and liberal Sufism and Bhakti movement in the other hand was a new cultural scenario. The rule of Afghan Empire came to an end followed by another foreigner’s rule of British Empire.
Thinking pattern of Indian culture during British rule got a new trends, India for the first time came under European rule. In fact, India had never enjoyed a total political and geographical unity till the 19th century, under British rule. The modern administration with Rule of law, separation of powers at legislative, executive and judicial level, national language, hierarchical administration etc was the new experience for Indians. However, British rule aimed at economic, social and political exploitation by adopting the policy of divide and rule in India from beginning till the end. After the first word war they used anti-Soviet strategy in Northern-Western frontier for the security of their regime in India. Indian soldiers were used in the war for her self-interest, ignoring Indian’s desire. Finally India got independence after a constant struggle and suffering. During British rule, the Indian style of strategic culture turned into a realistic- nationalistic pattern in the given situation.
Unlike other countries, India, from the past, has unique styles, outlook, emphasis and patterns of strategic behavior. It is, therefore, does not fit into any one or two above mentioned established styles and patterns due to – (a) diversity of cultures (b) size of area and population(c) geographical location (d) impact of invasions (e) constant threats from both inside and outside and (f) philosophy of life.
Analytical Framework:
As regards the criticism of strategic culture of India, there are a number of critics who have pointed out certain shortcomings. Let us analyse them one by one:
1.Critics say that there has never been a tradition of thinking culture in terms of strategy in India. While putting forward their arguments they point out that there is a misunderstanding about the issue in hand as some scholars of the opposite school do not distinguish the concept of ‘strategic culture’ from that of the term ‘culture’. India undoubtedly is very rich in culture for thousands of years. Yet it has had no strategic culture like many countries in the world. Having culture does not mean having strategic culture also as these two things are different. They may or may not go together. There are many philosophers/thinkers in the western world also but all of them do not think strategically. They have various areas/fields of thought. The Same is the tradition in India. Manu, Kautilya and Gandhi are the strategic thinkers but what about the rest? Even between Manu and Kautilya and then Katilya and Gandhi, there is a long gap/break of about 400 years 1700 years respectively. Hence, even if India thinks strategically, consistency/continuity is not maintained in the Indian tradition of strategic thought. The Indian picture of national strategy being followed in practice after independence is, indeed, no different as India is missing a long term strategy to tackle external or internal threats, diplomatic pressure etc including nuclear doctrine.
Critic’s views in short as shown above, point out two main criticism of the strategic culture of India--(1) India does not have strategic culture at all and (2) Inconsistency in India’s strategic thinking.
However, both the points appear to be contradictory to each other as if there is no such culture in India, the question of inconsistency does not arise. Earlier in this paper as arguments submitted to clarify that India, not only has this culture, but also it is consistently maintained through out its long history. Therefore, this view about strategic culture of India does not have the basis of sound reality and convincing arguments. Indian history also does not support this view.
2. Other critics believe that India is defensive, scared and lake of biting teeth. As a result it is facing plights in Kashmir and border problem with China. It all happened due to Nehru’s style of defensive strategy. Pt. Nehru, the architect of India’s foreign policy had adopted negative approach by following non-alignment, non-aggressive, non- intervention, anti-colonialism and anti-racialism, as the terms - ‘non’ and ‘anti’- are commonly used in the basic principles of his foreign policy. Not only the term but also the conduct which matters in case of India. Hardly there is any positive contribution of Nehru towards India’s strategic thought. Defensive thinking in strategic term in modern India, indeed, begins with Mahatma Gandhi rather then Nehru. Gandhi insisted on non-violence, pacific settlement of disputes, brotherhood, peaceful co-existence etc. Nehru being the disciple and the follower of Gandhi had attempted to materialize Gandhian thought in practice.
In short, the second school of thought accuses India for being unnecessarily defensive, both in strategic thinking as well as strategic behavior.
The opponents of this view have argued that:
Gandhi led India’s struggle for independence against the mightiest colonial power of the word. Had Gandhi used aggressive/offensive policy with violence against Britain he must not have matched the means with that of the British army. Gandhi got lesson from the consequences of using aggressive means during 1857 revolt. Bhagat Singh, Subhash Chndra Bose, Revolutionary Party etc had also attempted aggressive means and the result of which was known to Gandhi. Britain also preferred to fight with a violent Gandhi rather a Satyagrahi one. Hence, British police and the army kept on provoking Indians to be violent which would have been easier for Britain to crush the struggle as they did earlier. In this situation Gandhi had no other suitable means than the non-violent resistance to fight for independence. However, Gandhian way of strategic thinking can not be called as defensive as explained above in this paper. The strategy adopted by Gandhi was the best in the given situation which was proved to be successful also.
India was a newly born baby in 1947 along with 2/3 Asian, African and Latin American countries in the world after the ll world war. Many of such countries adopted aggressive strategy to survive as independent democratic nations. Subsequently what happened to their fate? Many of them either lost their independence or lost democracy or lost integrity/unity. On the other hand India survived as the largest democracy and growing as word power under Nehru or under his strategy followed by India based on Gandhian strategic culture.
Many big and small powers adopted aggressive strategy. USA dropped nuclear weapons on Japan. Result? USA has been providing security to Japan even till now. USA also attacked Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan etc. Result? Even saving face is a big task for this super power, leave aside the gain and credibility. USSR did the same in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979. Result is the disintegration of another super power. China attacked India, Vietnam, Combodia and USSR. Result is unnecessary enmity with the most friendly countries. A number of many more such instances can be traced out from the world history. Should India also have followed the same strategy? Let the critics to decide.
Nehru had to lead a newly emerged nation-state of India. He had to concentrate on economic and social reconstruction. He could not afford to get entangled in the complicated alliance of rival power system and thus get deflected from principal task of socio-economic planning and development. Therefore Nehru preferred development over defence initially in the given situation. However, he was a dynamic strategic thinker and leader who immediately switched over to defence over development in the changing strategic scenario after Chinese attack. This is what Nehru learnt from Indian traditions of strategic culture in general and from Manu, Kautilya and Gandhi in particular. India, indeed, has set an example of conducting both the strategic principles of Defence and Development as well as Diplomacy and Military Power in the best way of balance in practice
Is India still wrong in following the kind of strategy after 1947? Both defence and offence are the styles and the patterns of strategy. Which of the two is to be adopted, it depends upon the situation and circumstances. India adopted defensive strategy in 1947-48 and in 1965 in the given situation. But the changed situation in 1971 enabled India to be offensive/aggressive during Bangladesh liberation. Therefore, India follows dynamism in her strategy based on India’s dynamic tradition of strategic culture. We wish that the critics are satisfied.
References:
Stuart Poore (2004), Strategic Culture, in John Glenn, Darryl and Stuart Poore, (ed), Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture, Ashgate Publishing Co, Burlington, P.47.
2 Ibid. P.53
3 Everett Carl Dolman, Pure Strategy, Frank Cass, London, 2005,P.14
4 Colin S. Gray, “Strategy and History: Essays on theory and practice ”, Routledge, London,2006, p162
5 The Washington Quarterly, Winter, 1992.pp. 129-30
6 Ibid. p.129
7 Marcus Kim (2004), India(The case study), in Strategic Culture, in John Glenn, Darryl and Stuart Poore, (ed), Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture, Ashgate Publishing Co, Burlington, P.90
8 S.Vijayaraghavan and R.Jayaram,Politcal Thought,Sterling Publication Prvt.Ltd.,p305
9 Lawrence Sondhaus,Strategic Culture and Ways of War,Routledge London, 2006,p.92
10 Marcus Kim (2004), India (The case study), in Strategic Culture, in John Glenn, Darryl and Stuart Poore, (ed), Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture, Ashgate Publishing Co, Burlington, P.93
11Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realistic Foundations of Strategy, Macmillan India Ltd., Delhi, 2005,p.2
12V.Longer,The Defence and Foreign Policy pf India, Sterling Pub.p.6
13 Young India, oct.27.1921.
14 Young India, Dec.19, 1929.
15 Ibid.
16 Harijan, Jan.28, 1939.
17 Young India, Aug.11, 1920
18T.N .Kaul,Diplomacy in Peace and War, Vikash pub.Hause.New Delhi, 1979,P. 3
19 Ibid. p.4
20 Young India,Aug.11,192220
21 Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian-Writing on Indian History, Culture and Identity, Penguin, Landon,2005, P. ix (Preface).
Defence and Foreign policy from Nehru to Indira
There are several examples in the political history of the world of great thinkers whose thought was developed in all its ramifications by their equally illustrious disciples, like the thought of Kautilya by Chandragupta, Lord Budha by Ashoka, Plato by Aristotle, Karl Marx by Lenin and Mahatma Gandhi by Pandit Nehru. But this is a unique example of a daughter, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, meriting comparison with her father, Pandit Nehru.
The comparison of the defence and foreign policy of Nehru with that of Indira Gandhi is a debatable proposition. However, the moot point, in this regard, is whether they are different merely in style and emphasis or in fundamental outlook and content, in mere functioning or policy as such. Attempts were made during the life - time of Mrs. Gandhi to compare her style, outlook, ideology and the outcome of her defence and foreign policy with those of Nehru. However, the final assessment of the role of Mrs. Gandhi in shaping the foreign policy of India could not have been made during her life - time. Now neither Nehru nor Indira are alive. But the basic principles of India’s foreign policy carried out by both of them are still in practice and relevant even after decades of their death. Moreover, as regards defence and foreign policy in particular, Nehru is generally known as idealist, whereas Indira is realist. Whatever may be the arguments of idealist and realist schools of thought in this context, the whole paradigm of foreign policy of India followed during the time of Nehru and Indira is hotly debated in the academic circles as well as also at mass level even now. While making analysis of the foreign policy adopted by the subsequent Prime Ministers like Rajiv Gandhi, AB Bajpayee and Manmohan Singh etc., people do not miss to mention Nehru and Indira. Nehru, indeed, led the foundations of foreign policy of newly born India as an architect that was subsequently further built up and carried out by Indira and others till now, although differences are also visible.
In view of the above, this Paper attempts to concentrate in making a comparative and critical analysis of the defence and foreign policy of Nehru and Indira Gandhi and to focus on its relevance in the present context.
Nehru started his career in foreign affairs at the age of 32 when Indian National Congress adopted a resolution proposed by him in 1920 expressing in a general way a desire to establish co-operation with the neighbouring countries. It is remarkably strange, Mrs. Gandhi also for the first time was seen on international platform at the same age in 1948-49 in Commonwealth Conference, London, and Asian Nation’s Conference, New Delhi, although Nehru was involved in foreign affairs for 43 years in his life time from 1920-1964, where as Mrs. Gandhi was so involved for 35 years from 1949-1984.
At the end of 1926, Nehru attended Brussel’s Congress. A few months later he visited USSR with his father Motilal Nehru and had talked with central executive committee chairman, M.Kalinar and foreign minister, G.V. Chicherin. Like wise, Mrs. Gandhi also started learning diplomacy from her father. She accompanied Nehru several places on various occasions, particularly the Commonwealth Conference, London in 1948 and UNO, Paris, USA, USSR, the Crowning of Queen Elizabeth (where she met Winston Churchill), China in 1954 where she met Chou-En-Lai.
Nehru’s Style of Defence and Foreign Policy:
Though there are many instances, we would take only a few like Kashmir issue, Korean issue and Chinese issue to highlight Nehru’ style of defence and foreign policy.
1. Kashmir issue - The Pathan tribes of Pakistan started invasion of Kashmir on 22 Oct.1947 On Oct. 24 the Maharaja of Kashmir appealed to India for help. India had to take a quick decision and further rush her troops to save Kashmir. But Nehru feared that direct military action would lead to war with Pakistan. Ultimately he decided to send the troops on 27Oct. He took four critical days in taking urgent decision. On the same day the first Indian battalion was air lifted to Srinagar. It had arrived just in time. “ A few minutes later the airfield might well have been in enemy hand.”1
The Indian troops repulsed the invading forces from Srinagar, pressing it back beyond river Uri and thus halted the invader’s offensive operation. That was the best and the last opportunity in his lifetime to get the Kashmir problem permanently solved. He could have ordered the army to clear the entire territory of Kashmir, but he did not. It would be quite interesting to speculate what Mrs. Gandhi would have done in similar circumstances.
Britain and USA wanted that India should refer the Kashmir issue to the UNO so that it could pave the way for their interference. Nehru acted accordingly. He referred this question to Security Council on Dec 31, 1947. Later on this decision of Nehru proved to be a diplomatic blunder. He failed to study the actual international situation. Later he himself realized his mistake. Many years later in April, 1964, shortly before Nehru’s death, Mrs. Gandhi said, probably expressing Nehru’s own views, that “the Kashmir issue should not have been sent to the UNO”2.
2. Korean issue - The Korea war started on June 25,1950. India voted for the American draft resolution in the Security Council on 25 June, which laid the blame on the Korean People’s Democratic Republic. On June 27, 1950, the Security Council adopted the second resolution proposed by USA recommending Collective Security. India didn’t vote. On 28 June 1950, India announced its support to the second resolution. According to this resolution, India was supposed to give military support to South Korea. This resolution was known to enable the US imperialist to mask their intervention in Korea under the flag of the UNO which was supported by India also. Later on July 3, 1950, Nehru said that India could not give military support to South Korea.3 This was the fourth change in Nehru’s attitude towards Korean issue within eight days only. Finally Nehru sent a medical mission to assist the UN Force.
3. Chinese issue - Nehru adopted the policy of appeasement towards communist China right from its birth. India was the second non-communist state to recognize the communist government of China on December 30, 1949. it always supported China’s membership of the UNO . On the other hand, China always treated Nehru as “ watch-dog of imperialism”.4
Tibetan authorities expelled the Kuomintang mission from Lhasa and proclaimed the “Independence of Tibet”.5 On October 25,1950,China started “ liberation of Tibet”6. India simply lodged a protest with the government of China and kept quiet. Later, Nehru recognized China’s sovereignty over Tibet as a gesture of goodwill.
Once again Nehru missed the bus and could not utilize the opportunity and ultimately he was badly humiliated in 1962.By refraining from recognizing Tibet as a sovereign, independent state between 1947 and 1949,at a time when neither the Chinese communists nor the nationalists could have effectively intervened, India lost the opportunity of bringing Tibet into the form of independent nations and simultaneously of ensuring the creation of a buffer-state between India and China7.
Indira Gandhi’s style of Defence and Foreign Policy:
Unlike Nehru, Mrs. Gandhi created the impression of a strong and determined diplomat. Nehru was an intellectual whose actions were marked by a gentlemanly diffidence. He could have been an eminent writer but drifted into politics to which, of course, he gave everything he had. But Mrs. Gandhi, it seems was born to be a world politician.
Taking over the reigns of the government on Jan. 24,1966, Mrs. Gandhi soon undertook her first official tour of Paris, London, Moscow and Washington in March to acquaint these governments with her tune of thinking. She appealed to President Johnson to stop bombing North Vietnam and reconvene the Geneva Conference, which irked Washington. In 1968 she revived National Integration Council and stated, “It was unfortunate that we were lulled into a sense of complacency after the tremendous upsurge of unity at the time of the Chinese attack in 1962”.8
Unlike Nehru’s policy on Tibet, Indira Gandhi decided the annexation of Sikkim strongly and integrated it with India.
Mrs. Gandhi adopted the policy of positive and independent non-alignment in her dealings with the super powers. No power, however great, could trifle with India when she was at the helm of its affairs. She strongly denounced the American aggression or interference in Vietnam, Grenada, West Asia, Central America, Africa and Indian Ocean and British attack on Falklands. On the other hand, she also criticized the march of soviet forces into Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. It was her bold decision to recognize the present government of Kampuchea and the SWAPO as the real representative of Namibia.
With Bangladesh war in 1971, Mrs. Gandhi established her leadership and received acclaim both at home and abroad, for the political and strategic acumen, she displayed. Even Atal Bihari Bajpai – a strong critic of Mrs. Gandhi – compared her with “Bhawani”, 9though subsequently he denied his remarks.
Mrs. Gandhi was a very proud person. India, as we know, faced a grave crisis in 1971 and urgently needed Soviet military supplies and assurance of political support. And yet when she visited Moscow in September that year she refused to open negotiation on the first day with Kosygin, (Prime Minister) because he was not the top boss. It was negotiated only when Brezhnev (President) was available on the next day. Similarly, on the subsequent visit to Washington in connection with the same Bangladesh problem, “ she was so icily cold to Nixon that he almost froze.”10 Examples of such instances can be multiplied.
Her strength of character, determination and perseverance were demonstrated when she was out of power for about three years from 1977 to 1979. During this period, she visited London. It was rather strange that the world leaders – governmental and non-governmental – met her so warmly and the world was surprised to see her popularity at the global stage.
One common remark, as Girilal Jain said, in Pakistan when Bhutto was rotting in jail with hangman’s noose tightening round his neck would illustrate the point. “ Any number of Pakistanis said that if Indira Gandhi had been in power (the Janata was in office then), she would have sent commandos to rescue him.”11She would, of course, have done nothing of this kind but Pakistanis believed that she would have.
Her last tenure as Prime Ministership was also full of achievements. India hosted the 7th Non-aligned Summit in Mar, 1983. Mrs. Gandhi took the chair of the Summit consisting of more than 100 member-countries for the first time in its history of which her father was the principal founder. It was she who stressed the South- South Dialogue and boosted the morale of the Third World. Mrs. Gandhi again presided with great distinction over the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in New Delhi in Nov 1983. Implicit in her remark on this occasion was the determination that she had a job to do it come what may. Her main objective – building of a powerful India which would demand and secure a place worthy of this once great civilization in the comity of nations- was worth the best effort, that the end would justify the means and that she was the instrument of India’s destiny.12
Comparative Analysis
Now neither Nehru nor Indira Gandhi are alive. This is the appropriate time for a comprehensive and objective assessment of the foreign policy perceptions of the father and the daughter. This cannot be concluded, as noted above, that Nehru being an idealist always ignored the national interest and Mrs. Gandhi’s era being realistic was full of achievements in the interest of nation.
On many occasions, Nehru protected the interest of the country too, as did Mrs. Gandhi. Mrs. Gandhi also missed the proper opportunity to the national interest. No doubt, Nehru made mistakes in 1947-49 on Kashmir and Tibet issues, as noted above, and could not draw up suitable and practical defence and foreign policies in the interest of the country But Mrs. Gandhi also made the same mistake in 1971 by not occupying the Pakistan territory up to Lahore. Had she done so, India would have been in a strong position to bargain political / territorial issues with Pakistan, though 1971 war was the greatest achievement of Mrs. Gandhi in particular and India as a whole. After almost 2000 years the country fought unitedly and won a war.
The pillars of the foreign policy of Nehru are anti-colonialism, equality of all races, non-alignment-which meant hostility to none, but deliberate detachment from competitive power blocs, a determination to judge international issues on their merits and to exercise freedom of action on the basis of such judgement, recognition of Asia and Africa- as newly emerging and vital elements in world politics, relaxation of international tensions and peaceful approach towards achieving disarmament and settlement of disputes without recourse to violence and war. Mrs. Gandhi followed the same pillars in principle and practice framed by Nehru. But her style of functioning was obviously not the same.
Mrs. Gandhi’s policy towards India’s neighbours was controversial because she was regarded in same quarters as “imperial”.13 U.S. supply of most sophisticated arms and Chinese nuclear help to Pakistan, unfriendly relations with Sri Lanka on Tamil issue and involvement of US-Western interest in it, proposal of ‘Zone-of-Peace’ by Nepal against the interest of India and super powers rivalry in the Indian ocean at the peak happened during Mrs. Gandhi’s period.
Nehru as an individual had his faults but his policy as such was reasonably sound in the circumstances in which it was formulated and implemented.14 It was altogether a different context - domestic and international - in which Nehru carried out the foreign policy. Had Mrs. Gandhi been the Prime Minister during those days she would have pursued the same path. It was a different set of circumstances which made Mrs. Gandhi adopt a different style and outlook in international affairs. Talking about her father Mrs. Gandhi herself disagreed with the assessment that Nehru did not pay enough attention to defence. She said about the Chinese attack in 1962: “ We saw no reason why we should be attacked. Here was a peaceful nation which was not threatening anybody. We did not have forces on the border with China and so from that point of view one can say that we should have thought of this before, but that is hindsight”.15
There is a furious controversy about the idealistic and ethical content of Nehru’s foreign policy, in spite of Nehru’s own very clear and categorical views on the subject. He knew himself that he was not a Plato’s ‘Philosopher-King’. He was as realistic as Mrs. Gandhi. Though he was a disciple of the greatest idealist of the time-Mahatma Gandhi, undoubtedly he was the practical architect of the Indian Foreign Policy- the most suitable in the circumstances.
Under the leadership of Nehru, India happened to be the first state to have pursued a policy that was new in the history of international relations- the policy of non-alignment. The foundation of this policy was not only the vision of Nehru but also the need of the time in the interest of India. In this context, Mrs. Gandhi said, “ the foundation is a solid one. My father had his feet on the earth too”. 16
The shaping of Indian foreign policy – particularly non-alignment was largely influenced by international development after World War II, such as, the weakening of forces of imperialism, growth of the forces of democracy and progress, the breaking away of a number of countries in Europe and Asia from the capitalist system and the formation of a world socialist system, the upsurge of the national liberation movements and beginning of the collapse of the colonial system, new alignment of forces in the world arena, cold war in full swing and a stage of armed fear and finally the formation of military pacts like NATO and Warsaw Pact.
Moreover, domestic situations also widely influenced the shaping of foreign policy. The domestic context in which that policy was formulated was the goal of the socialistic pattern of society- a society which, while deriving from the basic principles of both-the communist and the western societies, was meant to be specific to the Indian background and conditions. It sought and received economic assistance from both the camps in its efforts to convert a stagnant and capitalistic economy into a modern socialistic one. The three guiding forces behind the domestic development under Nehru were political democracy, economic development and secularism.17 Hence Nehru had to formulate a foreign policy which would ensure the domestic growth in various aspects.
In such international and domestic circumstances, Nehru needed to formulate the foreign policy of a newly independent but poor and partitioned country. Therefore, the policy of non-alignment - virtually mixed-alignment - was preferred to ensure the economic growth of the country through mixed – economy. Like India, other Asian-African countries those who were newly independent or still fighting for their liberation were facing almost the same situations. Hence, it was a wise decision of Pt. Nehru to organize such countries to fight against the common problems for achieving common goal. In this context he chose the policy of anti-colonialism, equality of races, non-alignment and peaceful settlement of disputes so that the Asian-African newly emerging elements could come to a common platform and achieve their national goals without recourse to violence and war.
Mrs. Gandhi Was not a political visionary in a away her father was, but a practitioner of Real Politic. For her, raison d’etre, in the end, overrode everything else. If Nehru was a visionary he also suffered the humiliation of 1962. Mrs. Gandhi may not have had her gaze fixed on Himalayan height of political idealism, but at heart she spared the country that kind of reserve. Moreover, she gave it the heady intoxicant of spectacular victory. She may not have radiated warmth towards the country’s neighbours, but she never let them take India for granted.
But the most remarkable achievement of Nehru in foreign policy was that he gave a country as poor and weak as India- a moral voice in world politics that more than compensated for its lack of economic and military muscle. Under Mrs. Gandhi, India’s power – military technological and economic- grew manifold. As a result its influence in global affairs, while lacking the moral quality of the Nehru era, is more directly related to its true strength. That strength may not always have been used sagaciously but to have built it up so rapidly and formidably is a major accomplishment.
Credit, of course, goes to Mrs. Gandhi for organizing the 7th Non-aligned summit, Commonwealth Conference and Simla Pact with Bhutto, but the circumstances in which Nehru organized the Bandung Conference (1955) and non-alignment organization show his superb understanding and mature organizing capability with a real sense of diplomatic outlook and emphasis.
Relevance:
Now both Nehru and Indira are out of scene for decades. Meanwhile India has crossed many mile-stones. Geo-strategic, socio-political and economic scenario, both at international and national level, have been drastically changed. In this situation, are Nehru and Indira still relevant in respect to their thoughts, outlook, emphasis, contents and styles of defence and foreign policy?
First of all let us take the policy of non-alignment in the present context. The world is no longer bipolar due to Soviet collapse. In the present unipolar scenario, the term ‘non-alignment’ is irrelevant. However, such countries including India are still underdeveloped or developing and are also under the grip of imperialist. So long this situation continues, the objectives of the policy of non-alignment, followed by Nehru and Indira, are relevant.
Second, the friendly relations with neighbouring countries continue to be the core of Indian strategy in the given geo-strategic reality. Kashmir issue remains the same as used to be during Nehru-Indira era, despite Manmohan Singh’s commitment to move forward more than half the distance. Relation with Bangladesh also remains unchanged. Treaty of friendship, 1949 and 1950 with Bhutan and Nepal respectively are yet to be adequately updated. Border dispute with China and Pakistan are unsettled so far. Situation with Myanmar and Sri Lanka are the same despite some positive efforts made from Indian side. It is, therefore, Nehru-Indira’s policy, by and large, is being followed till now.
Third, India’s earlier stand/declarations/commitments on NPT, CTBT and other international treaties remain in practice even after acquiring nuclear weapon. USA is a new strategic partner but yet to be tested whether it is as reliable as used to be the USSR in the past, despite civil-nuclear agreement.
Fourth, internal security/non-strategic threats, in the meanwhile, has increased manifold, particularly in the areas of terrorism, insurgency, Naxalites, communalism, social-justice, political instability, criminalisation of politics, corruption in public life, underworld economy, dynasty in politics etc. It appears to be a greater threat than the external one. India needs Nehru’s vision and Indira’s determination at this juncture.
Fifth, Nehru’s initial style of functioning and emphasis on development and diplomacy over defence and subsequent balancing act in this regard, based on ‘trial and error,’ may be fatal for the present leadership to follow. Indira’ policy on Bangladesh and Rajiv’s attempt of IPKF towards Sri Lanka are the history. Relevance of such acts is always the matter of self confidence, people’s support and ground reality.
Conclusion
We, may therefore, conclude that the differences in the defence and foreign policies of Pt. Nehru and that of Mrs. Gandhi are merely of style and emphasis because of the changing nature of circumstances and situations at home as well as abroad. Moreover, both of them are the pace makers, they can never be irrelevant at any point of time.
The comparison of the defence and foreign policy of Nehru with that of Indira Gandhi is a debatable proposition. However, the moot point, in this regard, is whether they are different merely in style and emphasis or in fundamental outlook and content, in mere functioning or policy as such. Attempts were made during the life - time of Mrs. Gandhi to compare her style, outlook, ideology and the outcome of her defence and foreign policy with those of Nehru. However, the final assessment of the role of Mrs. Gandhi in shaping the foreign policy of India could not have been made during her life - time. Now neither Nehru nor Indira are alive. But the basic principles of India’s foreign policy carried out by both of them are still in practice and relevant even after decades of their death. Moreover, as regards defence and foreign policy in particular, Nehru is generally known as idealist, whereas Indira is realist. Whatever may be the arguments of idealist and realist schools of thought in this context, the whole paradigm of foreign policy of India followed during the time of Nehru and Indira is hotly debated in the academic circles as well as also at mass level even now. While making analysis of the foreign policy adopted by the subsequent Prime Ministers like Rajiv Gandhi, AB Bajpayee and Manmohan Singh etc., people do not miss to mention Nehru and Indira. Nehru, indeed, led the foundations of foreign policy of newly born India as an architect that was subsequently further built up and carried out by Indira and others till now, although differences are also visible.
In view of the above, this Paper attempts to concentrate in making a comparative and critical analysis of the defence and foreign policy of Nehru and Indira Gandhi and to focus on its relevance in the present context.
Nehru started his career in foreign affairs at the age of 32 when Indian National Congress adopted a resolution proposed by him in 1920 expressing in a general way a desire to establish co-operation with the neighbouring countries. It is remarkably strange, Mrs. Gandhi also for the first time was seen on international platform at the same age in 1948-49 in Commonwealth Conference, London, and Asian Nation’s Conference, New Delhi, although Nehru was involved in foreign affairs for 43 years in his life time from 1920-1964, where as Mrs. Gandhi was so involved for 35 years from 1949-1984.
At the end of 1926, Nehru attended Brussel’s Congress. A few months later he visited USSR with his father Motilal Nehru and had talked with central executive committee chairman, M.Kalinar and foreign minister, G.V. Chicherin. Like wise, Mrs. Gandhi also started learning diplomacy from her father. She accompanied Nehru several places on various occasions, particularly the Commonwealth Conference, London in 1948 and UNO, Paris, USA, USSR, the Crowning of Queen Elizabeth (where she met Winston Churchill), China in 1954 where she met Chou-En-Lai.
Nehru’s Style of Defence and Foreign Policy:
Though there are many instances, we would take only a few like Kashmir issue, Korean issue and Chinese issue to highlight Nehru’ style of defence and foreign policy.
1. Kashmir issue - The Pathan tribes of Pakistan started invasion of Kashmir on 22 Oct.1947 On Oct. 24 the Maharaja of Kashmir appealed to India for help. India had to take a quick decision and further rush her troops to save Kashmir. But Nehru feared that direct military action would lead to war with Pakistan. Ultimately he decided to send the troops on 27Oct. He took four critical days in taking urgent decision. On the same day the first Indian battalion was air lifted to Srinagar. It had arrived just in time. “ A few minutes later the airfield might well have been in enemy hand.”1
The Indian troops repulsed the invading forces from Srinagar, pressing it back beyond river Uri and thus halted the invader’s offensive operation. That was the best and the last opportunity in his lifetime to get the Kashmir problem permanently solved. He could have ordered the army to clear the entire territory of Kashmir, but he did not. It would be quite interesting to speculate what Mrs. Gandhi would have done in similar circumstances.
Britain and USA wanted that India should refer the Kashmir issue to the UNO so that it could pave the way for their interference. Nehru acted accordingly. He referred this question to Security Council on Dec 31, 1947. Later on this decision of Nehru proved to be a diplomatic blunder. He failed to study the actual international situation. Later he himself realized his mistake. Many years later in April, 1964, shortly before Nehru’s death, Mrs. Gandhi said, probably expressing Nehru’s own views, that “the Kashmir issue should not have been sent to the UNO”2.
2. Korean issue - The Korea war started on June 25,1950. India voted for the American draft resolution in the Security Council on 25 June, which laid the blame on the Korean People’s Democratic Republic. On June 27, 1950, the Security Council adopted the second resolution proposed by USA recommending Collective Security. India didn’t vote. On 28 June 1950, India announced its support to the second resolution. According to this resolution, India was supposed to give military support to South Korea. This resolution was known to enable the US imperialist to mask their intervention in Korea under the flag of the UNO which was supported by India also. Later on July 3, 1950, Nehru said that India could not give military support to South Korea.3 This was the fourth change in Nehru’s attitude towards Korean issue within eight days only. Finally Nehru sent a medical mission to assist the UN Force.
3. Chinese issue - Nehru adopted the policy of appeasement towards communist China right from its birth. India was the second non-communist state to recognize the communist government of China on December 30, 1949. it always supported China’s membership of the UNO . On the other hand, China always treated Nehru as “ watch-dog of imperialism”.4
Tibetan authorities expelled the Kuomintang mission from Lhasa and proclaimed the “Independence of Tibet”.5 On October 25,1950,China started “ liberation of Tibet”6. India simply lodged a protest with the government of China and kept quiet. Later, Nehru recognized China’s sovereignty over Tibet as a gesture of goodwill.
Once again Nehru missed the bus and could not utilize the opportunity and ultimately he was badly humiliated in 1962.By refraining from recognizing Tibet as a sovereign, independent state between 1947 and 1949,at a time when neither the Chinese communists nor the nationalists could have effectively intervened, India lost the opportunity of bringing Tibet into the form of independent nations and simultaneously of ensuring the creation of a buffer-state between India and China7.
Indira Gandhi’s style of Defence and Foreign Policy:
Unlike Nehru, Mrs. Gandhi created the impression of a strong and determined diplomat. Nehru was an intellectual whose actions were marked by a gentlemanly diffidence. He could have been an eminent writer but drifted into politics to which, of course, he gave everything he had. But Mrs. Gandhi, it seems was born to be a world politician.
Taking over the reigns of the government on Jan. 24,1966, Mrs. Gandhi soon undertook her first official tour of Paris, London, Moscow and Washington in March to acquaint these governments with her tune of thinking. She appealed to President Johnson to stop bombing North Vietnam and reconvene the Geneva Conference, which irked Washington. In 1968 she revived National Integration Council and stated, “It was unfortunate that we were lulled into a sense of complacency after the tremendous upsurge of unity at the time of the Chinese attack in 1962”.8
Unlike Nehru’s policy on Tibet, Indira Gandhi decided the annexation of Sikkim strongly and integrated it with India.
Mrs. Gandhi adopted the policy of positive and independent non-alignment in her dealings with the super powers. No power, however great, could trifle with India when she was at the helm of its affairs. She strongly denounced the American aggression or interference in Vietnam, Grenada, West Asia, Central America, Africa and Indian Ocean and British attack on Falklands. On the other hand, she also criticized the march of soviet forces into Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. It was her bold decision to recognize the present government of Kampuchea and the SWAPO as the real representative of Namibia.
With Bangladesh war in 1971, Mrs. Gandhi established her leadership and received acclaim both at home and abroad, for the political and strategic acumen, she displayed. Even Atal Bihari Bajpai – a strong critic of Mrs. Gandhi – compared her with “Bhawani”, 9though subsequently he denied his remarks.
Mrs. Gandhi was a very proud person. India, as we know, faced a grave crisis in 1971 and urgently needed Soviet military supplies and assurance of political support. And yet when she visited Moscow in September that year she refused to open negotiation on the first day with Kosygin, (Prime Minister) because he was not the top boss. It was negotiated only when Brezhnev (President) was available on the next day. Similarly, on the subsequent visit to Washington in connection with the same Bangladesh problem, “ she was so icily cold to Nixon that he almost froze.”10 Examples of such instances can be multiplied.
Her strength of character, determination and perseverance were demonstrated when she was out of power for about three years from 1977 to 1979. During this period, she visited London. It was rather strange that the world leaders – governmental and non-governmental – met her so warmly and the world was surprised to see her popularity at the global stage.
One common remark, as Girilal Jain said, in Pakistan when Bhutto was rotting in jail with hangman’s noose tightening round his neck would illustrate the point. “ Any number of Pakistanis said that if Indira Gandhi had been in power (the Janata was in office then), she would have sent commandos to rescue him.”11She would, of course, have done nothing of this kind but Pakistanis believed that she would have.
Her last tenure as Prime Ministership was also full of achievements. India hosted the 7th Non-aligned Summit in Mar, 1983. Mrs. Gandhi took the chair of the Summit consisting of more than 100 member-countries for the first time in its history of which her father was the principal founder. It was she who stressed the South- South Dialogue and boosted the morale of the Third World. Mrs. Gandhi again presided with great distinction over the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in New Delhi in Nov 1983. Implicit in her remark on this occasion was the determination that she had a job to do it come what may. Her main objective – building of a powerful India which would demand and secure a place worthy of this once great civilization in the comity of nations- was worth the best effort, that the end would justify the means and that she was the instrument of India’s destiny.12
Comparative Analysis
Now neither Nehru nor Indira Gandhi are alive. This is the appropriate time for a comprehensive and objective assessment of the foreign policy perceptions of the father and the daughter. This cannot be concluded, as noted above, that Nehru being an idealist always ignored the national interest and Mrs. Gandhi’s era being realistic was full of achievements in the interest of nation.
On many occasions, Nehru protected the interest of the country too, as did Mrs. Gandhi. Mrs. Gandhi also missed the proper opportunity to the national interest. No doubt, Nehru made mistakes in 1947-49 on Kashmir and Tibet issues, as noted above, and could not draw up suitable and practical defence and foreign policies in the interest of the country But Mrs. Gandhi also made the same mistake in 1971 by not occupying the Pakistan territory up to Lahore. Had she done so, India would have been in a strong position to bargain political / territorial issues with Pakistan, though 1971 war was the greatest achievement of Mrs. Gandhi in particular and India as a whole. After almost 2000 years the country fought unitedly and won a war.
The pillars of the foreign policy of Nehru are anti-colonialism, equality of all races, non-alignment-which meant hostility to none, but deliberate detachment from competitive power blocs, a determination to judge international issues on their merits and to exercise freedom of action on the basis of such judgement, recognition of Asia and Africa- as newly emerging and vital elements in world politics, relaxation of international tensions and peaceful approach towards achieving disarmament and settlement of disputes without recourse to violence and war. Mrs. Gandhi followed the same pillars in principle and practice framed by Nehru. But her style of functioning was obviously not the same.
Mrs. Gandhi’s policy towards India’s neighbours was controversial because she was regarded in same quarters as “imperial”.13 U.S. supply of most sophisticated arms and Chinese nuclear help to Pakistan, unfriendly relations with Sri Lanka on Tamil issue and involvement of US-Western interest in it, proposal of ‘Zone-of-Peace’ by Nepal against the interest of India and super powers rivalry in the Indian ocean at the peak happened during Mrs. Gandhi’s period.
Nehru as an individual had his faults but his policy as such was reasonably sound in the circumstances in which it was formulated and implemented.14 It was altogether a different context - domestic and international - in which Nehru carried out the foreign policy. Had Mrs. Gandhi been the Prime Minister during those days she would have pursued the same path. It was a different set of circumstances which made Mrs. Gandhi adopt a different style and outlook in international affairs. Talking about her father Mrs. Gandhi herself disagreed with the assessment that Nehru did not pay enough attention to defence. She said about the Chinese attack in 1962: “ We saw no reason why we should be attacked. Here was a peaceful nation which was not threatening anybody. We did not have forces on the border with China and so from that point of view one can say that we should have thought of this before, but that is hindsight”.15
There is a furious controversy about the idealistic and ethical content of Nehru’s foreign policy, in spite of Nehru’s own very clear and categorical views on the subject. He knew himself that he was not a Plato’s ‘Philosopher-King’. He was as realistic as Mrs. Gandhi. Though he was a disciple of the greatest idealist of the time-Mahatma Gandhi, undoubtedly he was the practical architect of the Indian Foreign Policy- the most suitable in the circumstances.
Under the leadership of Nehru, India happened to be the first state to have pursued a policy that was new in the history of international relations- the policy of non-alignment. The foundation of this policy was not only the vision of Nehru but also the need of the time in the interest of India. In this context, Mrs. Gandhi said, “ the foundation is a solid one. My father had his feet on the earth too”. 16
The shaping of Indian foreign policy – particularly non-alignment was largely influenced by international development after World War II, such as, the weakening of forces of imperialism, growth of the forces of democracy and progress, the breaking away of a number of countries in Europe and Asia from the capitalist system and the formation of a world socialist system, the upsurge of the national liberation movements and beginning of the collapse of the colonial system, new alignment of forces in the world arena, cold war in full swing and a stage of armed fear and finally the formation of military pacts like NATO and Warsaw Pact.
Moreover, domestic situations also widely influenced the shaping of foreign policy. The domestic context in which that policy was formulated was the goal of the socialistic pattern of society- a society which, while deriving from the basic principles of both-the communist and the western societies, was meant to be specific to the Indian background and conditions. It sought and received economic assistance from both the camps in its efforts to convert a stagnant and capitalistic economy into a modern socialistic one. The three guiding forces behind the domestic development under Nehru were political democracy, economic development and secularism.17 Hence Nehru had to formulate a foreign policy which would ensure the domestic growth in various aspects.
In such international and domestic circumstances, Nehru needed to formulate the foreign policy of a newly independent but poor and partitioned country. Therefore, the policy of non-alignment - virtually mixed-alignment - was preferred to ensure the economic growth of the country through mixed – economy. Like India, other Asian-African countries those who were newly independent or still fighting for their liberation were facing almost the same situations. Hence, it was a wise decision of Pt. Nehru to organize such countries to fight against the common problems for achieving common goal. In this context he chose the policy of anti-colonialism, equality of races, non-alignment and peaceful settlement of disputes so that the Asian-African newly emerging elements could come to a common platform and achieve their national goals without recourse to violence and war.
Mrs. Gandhi Was not a political visionary in a away her father was, but a practitioner of Real Politic. For her, raison d’etre, in the end, overrode everything else. If Nehru was a visionary he also suffered the humiliation of 1962. Mrs. Gandhi may not have had her gaze fixed on Himalayan height of political idealism, but at heart she spared the country that kind of reserve. Moreover, she gave it the heady intoxicant of spectacular victory. She may not have radiated warmth towards the country’s neighbours, but she never let them take India for granted.
But the most remarkable achievement of Nehru in foreign policy was that he gave a country as poor and weak as India- a moral voice in world politics that more than compensated for its lack of economic and military muscle. Under Mrs. Gandhi, India’s power – military technological and economic- grew manifold. As a result its influence in global affairs, while lacking the moral quality of the Nehru era, is more directly related to its true strength. That strength may not always have been used sagaciously but to have built it up so rapidly and formidably is a major accomplishment.
Credit, of course, goes to Mrs. Gandhi for organizing the 7th Non-aligned summit, Commonwealth Conference and Simla Pact with Bhutto, but the circumstances in which Nehru organized the Bandung Conference (1955) and non-alignment organization show his superb understanding and mature organizing capability with a real sense of diplomatic outlook and emphasis.
Relevance:
Now both Nehru and Indira are out of scene for decades. Meanwhile India has crossed many mile-stones. Geo-strategic, socio-political and economic scenario, both at international and national level, have been drastically changed. In this situation, are Nehru and Indira still relevant in respect to their thoughts, outlook, emphasis, contents and styles of defence and foreign policy?
First of all let us take the policy of non-alignment in the present context. The world is no longer bipolar due to Soviet collapse. In the present unipolar scenario, the term ‘non-alignment’ is irrelevant. However, such countries including India are still underdeveloped or developing and are also under the grip of imperialist. So long this situation continues, the objectives of the policy of non-alignment, followed by Nehru and Indira, are relevant.
Second, the friendly relations with neighbouring countries continue to be the core of Indian strategy in the given geo-strategic reality. Kashmir issue remains the same as used to be during Nehru-Indira era, despite Manmohan Singh’s commitment to move forward more than half the distance. Relation with Bangladesh also remains unchanged. Treaty of friendship, 1949 and 1950 with Bhutan and Nepal respectively are yet to be adequately updated. Border dispute with China and Pakistan are unsettled so far. Situation with Myanmar and Sri Lanka are the same despite some positive efforts made from Indian side. It is, therefore, Nehru-Indira’s policy, by and large, is being followed till now.
Third, India’s earlier stand/declarations/commitments on NPT, CTBT and other international treaties remain in practice even after acquiring nuclear weapon. USA is a new strategic partner but yet to be tested whether it is as reliable as used to be the USSR in the past, despite civil-nuclear agreement.
Fourth, internal security/non-strategic threats, in the meanwhile, has increased manifold, particularly in the areas of terrorism, insurgency, Naxalites, communalism, social-justice, political instability, criminalisation of politics, corruption in public life, underworld economy, dynasty in politics etc. It appears to be a greater threat than the external one. India needs Nehru’s vision and Indira’s determination at this juncture.
Fifth, Nehru’s initial style of functioning and emphasis on development and diplomacy over defence and subsequent balancing act in this regard, based on ‘trial and error,’ may be fatal for the present leadership to follow. Indira’ policy on Bangladesh and Rajiv’s attempt of IPKF towards Sri Lanka are the history. Relevance of such acts is always the matter of self confidence, people’s support and ground reality.
Conclusion
We, may therefore, conclude that the differences in the defence and foreign policies of Pt. Nehru and that of Mrs. Gandhi are merely of style and emphasis because of the changing nature of circumstances and situations at home as well as abroad. Moreover, both of them are the pace makers, they can never be irrelevant at any point of time.
India’s Strategic Culture - Myth or Reality: An Analysis
Introduction
Three generations of scholars in rapid succession have addressed the concept of strategic culture. Each one of them has dealt with the issues concerning almost all aspects of strategic culture in general term. As regards national level study of strategic culture with reference to each particular country having or growing significant global status, it is yet to establish a balance/comprehensive view. So far as
AS regard the concept of strategic culture, Stuart Poore says that “the term strategy has traditionally been used to refer to the way that military power is used by government in the pursuit of their interests. How are these interests shaped? A strategic culture approach tackles this question by considering the relevance of cultural context in influencing strategic preferences”. Moreover, strategic culture does not merely deal with the traditions of using military power but also diplomacy, foreign policy, internal/external threats, International relations etc in order to protect and promote national interest so as to achieve political, economic, military, national and international goals. Scholars disagree over what culture is, how it can be identified and what it does? This has obvious implications for any attempt to develop the concept of strategic culture. Moreover, they also disagree over the extent to which the culture plays a role in shaping the concept of strategic culture.
However, the fact remains that the culture is an inherent (strong) factor that influences policy-makers in shaping their national strategy, though its effectiveness may differ from nation to nation and situation to situation depending upon strategic environment. Citing example, Stuart Poore, quoting David Jones’s analysis of Soviet strategic culture, says that “There were three levels to a state’s strategic culture: a macro-environmental level involving geography, history and ethno-cultural characteristics; a societal level, referring to the socio-economic and political structure of society; and a micro-level consisting of military institutions and the nature of civil-military relations.” American or Anglo-American cultural base may differ from that of the Soviets due to different perceptions and situations pertaining to strategic environment. The same may be true with respect to
Further, the task of devising a workable method for identifying the existence and possible influence of a strategic culture in effecting strategic outcome is not simple. It requires methodology, which may rescue strategic culture from its traditional status and support the same in getting shaped into a workable and updated strategy .The nature of methodology may also vary from time-to-time and nation-to-nation. The grand strategy, military strategy, operation, tactics etc can be workable if a suitable methodology in terms of strategic culture is applied to ensure that the outcome of strategy is achieved. The purpose of military strategy is to link military means with political aim in pursuit of a continuing advantage. This can happen only when a useful methodology is applied to make a workable and updated strategy based on dynamic strategic culture .The same view is also held by Everett Carl Dolman.
The subject of strategic culture matters deeply because it raises core questions about the roots of, and influences upon, strategic behavior. The term strategy is universal but it has to have a cultural context. Colin S. Gray in this regard has pointed out six general points which serves to help advance understanding of the nature and working of strategic culture:
1. Strategic behavior can not be beyond culture
2. Adversity can not cancel culture
3. Strategic culture is a guide to action
4. Strategic culture expresses comparative advantage
5. Strategic culture can be dysfunctional
6. Strategic culture can be variously categorized, such as nationality, geography, weapons and functions, simplicity and complexity, generation and grand strategy.
In this background an attempt is made here to focus strategic culture in the Indian context.
Foundations of Indian Strategic Culture
George Tanham has provoked in his Paper- ‘Indian Strategic Culture’ (1992) that “India has not had a tradition of strategic thinking; no great strategic thinker appears in Indian history and most modern strategics such as Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, who usually couched their theories in general terms based on their own perceptions of the outer world and on their own predictions. Parts of British strategy have been borrowed and adapted, and other strategies have evolved as reactions to situations confronting
George Tanham further provokes that “Indians seem to arrive at strategic concepts and decisions rather than by thinking about them and then making a conscious decision6.” According to him, the reason is that
Tanham needs to verify from Indian history that even during British rule, leave aside independent
Besides Tanham, Indian scholars like Kanti Bajpai, Amitabh Matto etc. also have almost the same opinion about Indian strategic culture in comparison with that of European, as reflected in a volume published in 1996, co-edited by Tanham along with Bajpai and Matto in which Tanham’s essay-‘Indian Strategic Thought,’ is also included. Some other scholars like Marcus, Lawrence Sondhaus, etc have balanced views about Indian culture unlike Tanham and others, although it is also not comprehensive. In this regard Dr.Shrikant Paranjpe’s view is also notable. Pananjpe says in his Paper- Locating Africa in
However, BK Khnna has brought out undisputable fact that India has a rich heritage acquired from its glorious past, dating back to the Indus Valley Civilization, 2300 to 1700 BCE in his Paper-‘Ancient Military Heritage in India and Current Relevance’-referred in Strategic Analysis, IDSA, Aug,1995.The great epics of the Ramayana, Mahabharata and the Puranas give details of the advancements in science and technology and military strategy prevailing at that time. The Rigveda gives us interesting details of political life and military thoughts during the Vedic period. Accounts of battles show that the strategy of war was given a high priority in all matters of the state. The great epics have been characterized as the first foundation upon which the Indian military system was based. The military doctrines, strategies, concepts, procedures and customs of that time are still relevant to a large extent. The implementation scenarios may have changed but underlying theme, i.e. ‘ to achieve the aim’, remains the same.
Indians have not taken to the science of warfare recently. Their fighting traditions go back to 2500 BC. War as a means of maintaining society was accepted as a necessity. When all possible avenues of settlements had been explored and exhausted, war was resorted to. The laws of war were framed on the lines of the present day ingredients of military planning, e.g. principles of war, strategy and tactics. There are glorious examples of large-scale operations undertaken in ancient times, backed by definite military concepts. The strategy of war was practiced in its purest form and its conduct was designed to bring out the best and not the worst of the human traits. Another basic factor, which stands out, is the high standard of ethical code and the constant emphasis on upholding of dharma, all through the ages. Man has fought man since time immemorial for the establishment of ‘good over evil’. Even during the ancient period when dharma played such a dominating role in men’s daily routine, wars had to be undertaken frequently. The epitome of dharma yudha, as it was called then is to be found in good measure in the Ramayana and Mahabharata epics. Kautilya, a contemporary of Aristotle and sun Tzu in the 4th century BC was amongst the greatest and widest exponents of the Indian strategy, art and science of warfare.
Dandaniti or the concept of Danda, aimed at arresting the anarchical conditions in a nation state, thereby ensuring smooth functioning of the administration. It was based on the maxim ‘ No Danda-No state’. The rationale of this concept (Dandaniti) was that evil is inherent in man and only Danda can bring him to see the path of righteousness. This policy has been in vogue in different measures in various periods of Indian history.
Some of the tenets of strategy that were followed included three types of war, namely Dharma Vijay- the righteous war, Lobha Vijay- on account of greed, and Asura Vijay- the devil’s war. Strategic surprise was one of the key principles of waging wars. Similarly, intelligence was considered the single major war-winning factor. In the Rigveda, there are many references to use envoys for civil espionage. Ramayana has referred that Hanuman went to Ravana’s
To gain time, for rallying levies and for causing maximum attrition on the enemy, kings started making forts. The Rigveda testifies to their existence in the prehistoric era, when fortified cities were common. In the post-Epic period, fortified cities abounded. Alexander in the 4th century BC came across fortifications. Kautilya and Bhoja have referred to four kinds of fortresses: hill, forest, island and desert forts.
Apart from strategic culture prevailed during ancient India including Kautilya’s strategic thought, even during modern time, Mahatma Gandhi, the great thinker, has said in detail about strategy, war, armed forces, weapons, disarmament, foreign policy, international relations etc. During early modern history, Shivaji, the great Maratha war-thinker, war campaigner and warrior, had also contributed with both of his thoughts as well as actions to the strategic culture of
Manu Samriti and Kautilya’s Arthasastra became paramount to understand the origins of Indian politico-strategic culture, which further gained considerable influence during Mahatma Gandhi’s struggle for freedom of
Kautilya:
Kautilya, also known as Chanakya and Vishnugupta, was the Guru (mentor) of Chandragupta, the king of Mauryan Empire as well as the minister under Chandragupta. Kautilya’s famous work, Arthasastra was written between forth and third century BCE, although it was discovered and translated only in 1904 by Dr R Shamsastry. It has brought a new insight into the political thought of ancient
However, there has been much debate over the issues generated by Kautilya’s Arthasastra.There are two schools of thought in this regard. The first school is represented by J.Jolly,M.Winternitz,R.Thapar and S.R. Goyal who doubt the authenticity of authorship of this book. Scholars like R.Shamasastry, Ganapathi shastry and N.P.Unni belong to the other school who believe that Arthsastra is the work of Kautilya. Both the schools have their own arguments in support of their views. However, according to Marcus Kim, the arguments of the second school of thought is more convincing that Kautilya is actually the author of Arthsastra.7 The debate over the originality and authenticity of the Arthasastra is, indeed. a complex one, yet the book, undoubtedly has had considerable impact on the formation of Indian identity in the area of strategic culture.The term Artha+sastra literally means the science of wealth. The broad meaning of Arthasastra is a treatise on governance and government which appears to be similar to the concept of Mahabharata’s reference to Dandaniti(the science of polity) contained in Dharmasastra written by Manu during seventh century BCE. The Dandaniti’s strategy is an older system of strategy than Kautilya’s thought and his strategy contained in Arthasastra.Therefore, the tradition of Indian strategic thought does not begin with Kautilya but it is as old as Vedic civilization of India which is one of the oldest civilizations of the world, although Kautilya is the one who for the first time in the history of India has systematically framed a complete paradigm of Indian strategy. He compiled and systematized the idea derived from the tradition. Kautilya himself agreed that his work is based on the works of earlier Indian thinkers who are actually the founders of the science of polity as traced by S.Vijayaraghavan and R.Jayaram8. Marcus Kim has compared Arthasastra to Machiavelli’s ‘The Prince’. The theme of strategic thought of Kautilya in short is appended below:
1. Kautilya deliberately freed politics from the influence of religion and morality like Machiavelli to achieve political/strategic objectives. In the history of political/strategic thought Kautilya is the first thinker who secularized politics and infused tricks and deceitful methods into science of policy and strategy to gain victory in critical wars.
2. The most important aspect of Kautilya’s strategic thought is his conception of elements of state( Mandala), such as the king, the minister, the country, the fort, the treasury, the army and the friend. According to him, power lies in the use and application of these elements by the conqueror effectively. The Mandala concept is a strategic reality perceived by kautilya consisted of eleven kingdoms and conqueror which are strategically situated/located/arranged in order to win war.
3. Kautilya formulated six-fold foreign policy, such as, policy of making peace, policy of hostility, policy of neutrality, show of force for war purpose to the enemy, seeking refuge with another king, and dual policy of making peace with one king and the policy of hostility with another.
4. He instructed the use of any means for security of the king and the country including the use of spying against ministers and enemies, use of treacherous fighting, employment of secret weapons and even the use of chemical weapons in warfare.
5. Whether Kautilya maintained an ethical dimension to the Arthasastra in terms of diplomacy, it is a debatable issue amongst the scholars. However, following Vedic moral principles, he regards the state as a moral institution but in terms of international relations he emphasized on separation of politics from theology and morality.
6. He maintains both the interacting dimensions: a political rationalism based on pragmatic outlook, and another form of rationalism based on traditional Vedic Dharma.
Lawrence Sondhaus has attempted to clarify the realistic cleverness of Kautilya by citing an instance of his strategic tricks. He says that “Specific action attributed to Kautilya’s advice include deterring Alexander from following up on his initial success in Punjab in 327 BCE by playing the Greek army’s fear of war elephants, exaggerating the number in the elephant corps of the Magadha forces in a clever disinformation campaign that compelled Alexander to withdraw his war-weary army from India before it fought another major action.”9
Mahatma Gandhi:
According to Marcus Kim “If Kautilya contributed the bases of political rationalism to the dynamics of modern Indian politics and strategy, Gandhiji has reinforced the moral logic that has existed for centuries via his life-long accomplishments. Gandhi’s ideas cover almost all issues in contemporary politics-from individual to global ideals.”10 However, it appears that both Kautilya and Gandhi stand at two different extremes of realism and idealism. Kautilya stands at the extreme of realism where as Gandhi at the other extreme of idealism.
Moreover, the scholar like Bharat Karnad has different view about Gandhi. To him, Gandhi was a confused strategic thinker. In his words “…his (Gandhi) confused and confusing legacy have had much to do with this state of affairs (strategy followed by
The first Indian to speak for
Gandhiji did not believe that there was any threat to
The most debatable aspect of Gandhian strategy is his view on non- violent resistance (Satyagraha) .The critics of Gandhian strategy conclude that Gandhi’s non-violence is an impractical/utopian concept without perhaps going through his following statement: “I do believe that, where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence…I would rather have India resort to arms in order to defend her honour than that she should, in a cowardly manner, become or remain a helpless witness to her dishonour.”17
In short, Gandhi’s contributions on strategic culture are as under-
1.Gandhi was apostle of peace and non-violence, peace not of graveyard and non- violence not of the weak, with the possibility of a nuclear holocaust as well as low intensive conflict threatening to destroy the nation and humanity, the significance of Gandhian strategic thought is even greater today then ever before.
2. For Gandhi peace and non-violence is the means to achieve an end of ideal society in
3. During the time of Gandhi Indian army was an imperial force which had to serve the purpose of empire, not the service to the Indian people. Indian looked at army as a cruel instrument to exploit them and hence hated British army. In this situation Gandhi was giving his statements about army. If Gandhi visualized the role of today’s army, his opinion about soldier would have been different. The same is the case with non-violence also. Violent resistance might have not been workable to fight against
4. Gandhism is not a doctrinaire or dogmatic creed but a dynamic philosophy that can be applied to complex and concrete problems including -national defence, security and warfare. Gandhi said, “…religion of non-violence is not meant merely for Rishis and saints but is relevant to common people as well.” He was not “pleading for
The traditions of Strategic culture of
Dimensions:-
This paper examines certain dimensions in terms of
1.Socio-cultural –
Amartya Sen says that “
2 Historical –
Therefore, during the entire known Indian history of about 4500 years from 2500 BCE (Indus Valley Civilisation) to 1947 AD (end of British rule), India did not have even a loose form of central power for as long as 3711 years. In the real sense of the term,
Many great nations in the world, in the lesser challenging situations than
3. Legacy of pre-independence era-
4. Politico-Ideological –
Indian liberal culture, irrespective of religion, caste, region, language etc, has ensured national integrity and security of
Moreover,
In this background one can argue that India does not need to make an arithmetical/ special/ deliberate effort to create the paradigm of a long term strategy for war and national security because the centuries old strategic culture of her own in the forms of ideologies is readily available which automatically guide to shape national strategy in times of requirement.
Styles and Patterns:
Now this Paper would focus on certain general styles of strategic thinking and patterns of strategic culture in practice in various countries and to locate
1. Geo-political- It refers to a line of strategic thinking in terms of geo-political realities in the interest of the nation. Presently the region of
2. Ideological- Certain nations strategically think in ideological terms, like the erstwhile USSR’s thinking on Marxian line, USA capitalistic and India non-alignment line (during cold war) and decide their strategy accordingly.
3. Diversionary- Some nations, sometimes as a short term measure, use diversionary line of thinking to shape their strategy so that the internal/domestic attention can be diverted towards self created external threats/war to avoid internal instability/insecurity or threats from inside.
4. Imperialistic- Imperialistic way of thinking in terms of strategic culture is another style and pattern generally seen with powerful nations/super powers.
5. Fundamentalistic- Fundamentalism in context with religion, region, ethnic etc as the pattern of thinking is followed by religious and other such countries.
6. Economic-There are countries whose strategic thinking is based on economic gain. The world is treated by them merely as market for selling their goods and act with profit motives.Their foreign and defence policy, international relations etc are directed towards business and economic interest.
7. Expansion- In this model expansion of territory or ideology or culture is the main thought of strategic culture for making national strategy.
8. Idealistic- Morality based idealism with broad humane outlook is also the line of cultural thinking of some countries like
9. Realistic- Hard realities of national interest even with the option of nuclear war and harming others is another pattern of strategic thinking as seen in Germany under Hitler and USA from 1944 to 1972.
10. Colonial-Colonial model of strategic thinking encourages the policy makers to adopt a strategy to impose foreign rule over poor and developing countries as an instrument of national interest as found with western countries before II world war.
Where does
Ever since the ancient times, the rulers of
Christianity and Islam came to
The pattern of Indian strategic thinking during Afghan Empire was generated by the socio-political and religious situation. However, its pattern of thinking shifted towards geo-political and ideological dimensions. The disruptive forces like religious fundamentalism and fanaticism promoted by a few foreign rulers for their political interest in the one hand and liberal Sufism and Bhakti movement in the other hand was a new cultural scenario. The rule of Afghan Empire came to an end followed by another foreigner’s rule of
Thinking pattern of Indian culture during British rule got a new trend,
Unlike other countries,
Analytical Framework:
As regards the criticism of strategic culture of
1.Critics say that there has never been a tradition of strategic culture in
Critic’s views in short as shown above, point out two main criticism of the strategic culture of
However, both the points appear to be contradictory to each other as if there is no such culture in
2. Other critics believe that
In short, the second school of thought accuses
The opponents of this view have argued that:
- Gandhi led
-
- Many big and small powers adopted aggressive strategy.
- Nehru had to lead a newly emerged nation-state of
Is
Conclusion
In the narrow conceptual sense of the term ‘strategy’ (military sense)
Regarding
Scholars warn
1 Stuart Poore (2004), Strategic Culture, in John Glenn, Darryl and Stuart Poore, (ed), Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture, Ashgate Publishing Co, Burlington, P.47.
2 Ibid. P.53
3
4 Colin S. Gray, “Strategy and History: Essays on theory and practice ”, Routledge,
5 The
6 Ibid. p.129
7 Marcus Kim (2004), India(The case study), in Strategic Culture, in John Glenn, Darryl and Stuart Poore, (ed), Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture, Ashgate Publishing Co, Burlington, P.90
8 S.Vijayaraghavan and R.Jayaram,Politcal Thought,Sterling Publication Prvt.Ltd.,p305
9 Lawrence Sondhaus,Strategic Culture and Ways of War,Routledge London, 2006,p.92
10 Marcus Kim (2004), India (The case study), in Strategic Culture, in John Glenn, Darryl and Stuart Poore, (ed), Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture, Ashgate Publishing Co, Burlington, P.93
11Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realistic Foundations of Strategy, Macmillan India Ltd.,
12V.Longer,The Defence and Foreign Policy pf
13 Young India, oct.27.1921.
14 Young
15 Ibid.
16 Harijan, Jan.28, 1939.
17 Young
18T.N .Kaul,Diplomacy in Peace and War, Vikash pub.Hause.New
19 Ibid. p.4
20 Young
21 Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian-Writing on Indian History, Culture and Identity, Penguin, Landon,2005, P. ix (Preface).
22 Marcus Kim, p. 97
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