Monday, May 10, 2010
North–East Region of India:In search of Peace and Stability
North–East Region of India:In search of Peace and Stability
(Dr Nand Kishor Kumar)
Introduction
There are two conflicting views about insurgency in the Northeast region: first, it is still the most serious threat to the internal dimension of national security. Second, the situation in the region is changing fast, it is as good or bad as any other part of India and hence the insurgency is no longer a serious threat as used to be earlier.
An attempt is made here to analyze the changing pattern, ground reality and overall dimensions of internal security in the Northeast region. It also aims at finding the extent/level of under-going progress in the region in view of threats on national security.
The North-East region of India is comprised of seven states as popularly known as ‘seven sisters’, namely Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Tripura. Except Manipur and Tripura (both were separate princely states during British Rule), all other members of the seven sisters were parts of undivided Assam for a fairly long time even after independence. As regards Sikkim, it is neither geographically contiguous nor it maintains socio–cultural, political, historical and economic relationship with seven sisters. Hence, it cannot be included as a part of this region despite its location near the same area.
Most of the states of this region are rich in natural resources with fertile land, rich forest, water resources, oil and petroleum, small-scale traditional industries at village level based on locally available raw materials, and considerable mineral deposits, including hydrocarbons apart from advance culture, art, music, dance, historical heritage, high literacy rate etc.
However, the development in the region has lagged behind the rest of the country due to historical reasons and geographical location. Most of the states are basically agrarian and industrially backward. They have poor infrastructure and high unemployment rate. Transport linkage and connectivity, both within the region and with the rest of the country, are still woefully inadequate. Being landlocked and having inhospitable terrain has also limited the expansion of marketing avenues.
In this situation, numerous insurgent groups have cropped up in this region. Therefore, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh says about insurgency as “problematic and worrisome” and according to the Home Minister p. Chidambaram, “ There has not been much progress,” in the North-East in view of undergoing action against insurgency.1 The insurgency in the Northeast region is considered a serious threat to the national security. More than 50,000 people have lost their lives due to the insurgency alone since 1947.
However, the fact at the grass-root level is that the insurgency does not affect the Northeast in its entirety as it is confined to a few pockets only. Supporting this view P. R. Kyndiah, the Minister for Tribal Affairs and Development of North-Eastern States, Govt. of India, argues that “ You can not paint the entire Northeast region with a single brush. There is need to look at this beautiful and resource rich region in a correct perspective. Economic and social compulsions have rendered some parts of the region vulnerable to rising ethnically, insurgency, crime and political instability.”2
With reference to a Research Project completed/compiled by PL Sanjeev and PC Shekar Reddy on Northeast Region, PR Kyndiah further emphasized that “ The finding that 71.23% of the villages of the region have been totally crime free for several years is indeed a revelation. The reasons for their remaining violence free are equally significant. The close-3knit social fabric, respect for traditional value and ethos and age-old democratic institutions are object lessons not only for other parts of the Northeast but also for rest of the country. At a time when the so-called developed societies are prone to unrest due to intolerance and societal imbalances, the crime free villages can serve as a role model, deserving admiration and emulation…They are focused on what they think is best suited to them. It is observed that they aspire for peace, economic development, proper infrastructure, transparent administration and good and clean governance without impairing their values, traditions and ethos, which they treasure.”3
Taking into account the findings of the research referred by Kyndiah as mentioned above, the state-wise scenario of both crime prone and crime free villages unfolds refreshing vistas that dispel the misplaced perception that the entire region is prone to violence.
In this background, let us see the ground level reality of each state.
Assam
A stream of immigrants from upper Burma invaded Assam in 1228 A.D. and continued to rule till the British came to occupy the region in 1826. The invaders belonged to the Shan dynasty and called themselves ‘Tai’ (celestial origin) but popularly known as ‘Ahoms’, the origin of the term Assam (as per Sanskrit word ‘A-sam,’ means unequal). The region was earlier known as Pragjyotishpur or Kamrup as referred in Ramayana, Mahabharata and other classical literatures.
Besides Ahom kingdom, the Northeast region had also witnessed the rise of several independent political formations during the medieval period like the kingdom of Koch, Cacher, Jayintia, Manipur, Tripura and many other small vassal states. There were other hill tribes too, such as the Dafalas, Miris, Nagas, Khamptis, Singphos, Mishmis etc who maintained distinct identities and political independence.4
However, the two most dominant kingdoms of Ahom and Koch were able to influence the region in a very significant manner over centuries in the east and the west of the region respectively. These two kingdoms enjoyed a continuous existence for a long period of time. They also maintained their political independence against repeated attacks by none other than the mighty Mughals until the East India Company appeared on the scene in 1826.
The Ahoms did not enter India through its northeast frontiers with an expansionist design. They never wanted to be a colonial power. There long survival, as a monolithic dynasty cannot be brushed aside as a mere historical accident. Indeed, it was a glorious period of medieval Indian history. The Ahom period witnessed a remarkable cultural unification of the region with the mainstream Indian ethos. The Assamese creativity and development of Assamese culture and literature had reached its zenith during this period under the leadership of Sri Sankardeva. There may be a very little material trade between Assam and the rest of India during this period, but there was a lot of intellectual interactions.
From cultural point of view the Ahoms rule was also liberal and broad based. The Ahoms never tried to impose their views, their religion and culture and their language on the tribes they ruled in Assam. Instead, they tried to merge completely with the local culture and traditions. This attitude was purely political and strategic, as it would have been otherwise possible for the minority migrant class to maintain their domination over a large number of people with such varied cultures. The development of a common language was also essential for the establishment of a steady political system. The Ahoms realized this extremely well and thus helped develop Assamese as a common language in the region. Their acceptance of Hinduism and the introduction of Assamese language to replace the Tai language in the Ahom Court cannot be explained by any other reasoning. Further, by treating the subdued tribes as equals and encouraging intermarriage, the Ahoms significantly contributed to the formation of nascent Assamese nation-state. Social stratification was gradually broken as non-Ahoms families admitted into Ahom fold and were given status and privileges bestowed on nobles. Even Muslims did not suffer any disabilities on account of their religious faith. A large number of Muslims were in several departments of the state. This deliberate policy, whereby Ahoms assimilated themselves, was a major reason for the formation of an Assamese society free from caste, prejudices, which was further strengthen by the equalizing impact of the Vaishanava movement. It helped the Ahoms adopt a policy of decentralization of powers with powerful central authority. All the small powers subordinated to the Ahom kingdom provided a unified front in times of emergency posed by an external threat.5
However, the dynasty that can take pride in ruling over many centuries in the midst of repeated attacks by the Mughal Empire and which was often thought to be inviolable, eventually collapsed due to internal disorders like:
1. The insurrection of the Moamorias (they belong to Vaishnava sect founded by Anirudha Dev, a Kalita by caste-a low social rank like Doms, Kacharis etc. who played an important role in the downfall of the Ahoms rule).
2. The rebellion of the Darrang Prince.
3. The depredations of the Burkendazes.
4. Local chieftains raising their heads and assuming virtual independence.
5. The frontier tribes carrying on with the plunder of Assamese villages.6
The long civil war and internal disorders brought the end of the rule of Ahoms and the people, in general, therefore, welcomed with great respite the entry of the British rule into the political scenario of Assam in 1826. When British rule ended in 1947, Assam became a full-fledged state of India and the process of cultural, political and economic integration with India was complete.
Subsequently the process of the break up of Assam began and the parts of this state emerged as separate states like Nagaland, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh including. Currently the area of Assam is 78,438 sq.km. and the population is 26,638,407. Insurgency dates back to formation of United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) in April 1981. Since then, several insurgent groups have cropped up, mostly claming to represent their respective communities. The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), for instance, is standing for a sovereign Bodo state. Assam currently has eight active militant groups, such as, ULFA, Karbi Longry NC Hills Liberation Front (LNLF), All Adivasi National Liberation Army, Dima Halam Daoga (Jewe) aka Black Widow, Kuki Revolutionary Army, Hmar Peoples Conventions (Democratic), Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.
Apart from these, there are six groups, including a faction each of the ULFA and IDFB, in ceasefire. The other four are: United People’s Democratic Solidarity, Adivasi Cobra Militant Force, Birsa Commando Force and Dima Halam Daogah (DHD).
In Assam there were 248 insurgency-related incidents in 2007, as many as 207 in 2008 and 221 in first five month of 2009. While 132 civilians were killed in 2007, 93 were killed in 2008 and 83 in the first five months of 2009.
The problem of militancy in Assam has its origin in the large-scale migration of refugees from East Pakistan (Bangladesh) since India’s partition in 1947. A continuous flow of illegal migration across the border has disturbed the local demography and brought much of India’s Northeast to the knife-edge of violence.
Apart from ULFA, the emergence of a Bodo insurgency in Assam had become another major problem. However, in Feb 2003, the Bodo Tribal Council was made as a result of the tripartite accord between the center, Assam govt. and Bodo Liberation Tiger and on May 24, 2005 the ceasefire agreement was signed.
Nagaland
The Ahom rule was bounded on the southeast by the Patkai range of mountain inhabited by Nagas, comprised of a diversity of tribes, each speaking its own language and calling itself by a distinctive name, but collectively known as the Nagas. The Ahoms had never subjugated the Nagas, although they were under the sovereignty of the Ahom rule. But it was subjugated by the British rule in 1866 and formed a district under Assam. Nagaland became a state in 1963 under India. The area of the state is 16,579 sq.km. and the population is 1,988,636.
Nagland’s history of insurgency dates back to August 14, 1947 when AZ Phizo, founder of the Naga National Council hoisted the flag for ‘Independent Nagaland’. Since then several organizations with the same objective have been born. Right now the state has two major groups: National Socialist Council of Nagalim (IM) and National Socialist Council of Nagalim (k). While both the groups are under a ceasefire agreement with the government, the situation continues to remain troublesome. Meanwhile, the main insurgent group of Nagaland is engaged in dialogue with the central govt. in search of lasting peace. Sufficient time is required to defuse the old problem started immediately after the independence of the country.
Nagaland has recorded 128 insurgency-related incidents in 2007 as many as 145 in 2008 and 56 till May 2009. Twenty one civilians were killed in 2007, 35 in 2008 and 2 till May 2009.
Meghalaya
It is comprised of three distinct tracts of regions, namely Garo, Khasi and Jaintia hills, the vassal states under the two rulers, Garo king and Jaintia king, which were brought under British rule of Assam in 1869 and 1835 respectively. After the independence of India it became a separate state on January 1, 1972. Earlier, it was a part of the composite state of Assam. Its area is 22,429 sq.km. and the population 2,306,069.
Meghalaya has been plagued with problem of insurgency since the latter part of the 1980s. It has three terrorist outfits operating on its soil, such as, Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC), Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC), and the Peoples Liberation Front of Meghalaya (PLFM). In addition to the continuing divide the locals and the non-locals, issues of identity, growing corruption and perceived injustice in the Garo Hills, are considered to be reasons for the violence in Meghalaya. The combined violence of the insurgent outfits in the state has shown a significant decline by 45%(from 85 to 47) in terms of incidents and killings by 41% (from 42 to 25) in 2004 as compared to the year 2003.
Mizoram
Mizoram was known as Lushai hills and the people lived their were called as Lushai. They came from northern china. The earliest Mizos who migrated to India were known as Kukis. The Lushais were the last of the Mizos tribes who migrated to India. Various ethnic groups of the Lushais identify themselves as Mizos. Lushais hardly came in contact with the Ahom kingdom. British rule brought it under their administration in 1880. In 1954 it was renamed as Mizo district of Assam by an Act of the Indian parliament. Subsequently it was made a separate state in 1987. Its area is 21,081 sq.km. and the population is 891,058.
The Mizo National Front (MNF)-led insurgency movement came to an end in 1986.The MNF transformed itself into regional political party subsequent to signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the government of India on June 30, 1986. It also formed the government, winning the state legislative assembly election, following the formal declaration of Mizoram as a state in 1987. Since then, no militant outfit has disrupted the overall peaceful environment prevailing in the state.
Arunachal Pradesh
This is consisted of various tribes and ethnic groups like Akas, Abors, Duflas, Miris, Mishmis and Singphos who live in different areas of NEFA. Initially it was brought under the direct control of the External Affairs Ministry, and was then transferred to the Home Ministry. In 1972 NEFA was renamed as Union Territory and subsequently made a separate state in 1987. The area of this state is 83,743 sq.km. and population is 1,091,117. There are 26 major tribes and several sub-tribes inhabit the area. Broadly, the people may be divided into three cultural groups on the basis of their socio-religious affinities, such as, Buddhists, Sun/Moon worshippers, and elementary Vaishnavites.
The two district of Tirap and Changlang in the eastern part of the state, adjoining Nagaland and Assam have been affected by Naga underground-related violence. This state faced no problems of militancy in the decades following its creation in 1987, unlike some states in the Northeast. However, insurgency has been pushed into this peaceful state, primarily by faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN), which have long created havoc in the neighbouring state of Nagaland. In Arunachal, the areas most affected now are the district of Tirap and Changlang.
Traditionally, Arunachal’s porous and un-administered border with Nagaland and Myanmar have been used by several militant groups of the Northeast in their journey to China and Myanmar. Militants found it less cumbersome to use various rivulets, especially near the Pansu Pass to transport essential items like medicines, arms and drugs through the area. Among the major objectives of these militants groups was the acquisition of military training from Myanmar’s insurgent groups.
The story of insurgency in Arunachal Pradesh is also that of the politician-insurgent nexus in the state. Till the year 2000, the NSCN-K enjoyed dominance in Tirap and Changlang and in spite of its rivalry with the Isak-Muivah faction (NSCN-IM) in Nagaland, the latter never made any forays into what was known to be a Khaplang stronghold.
In the year 2004, 41 violent incidents resulted in killing of 43 persons (extremists- 35, SF-2 and civilians-6). In 2003, 39 persons were killed (ext.31, SF-1 and civ.- 7 in 50 incidents. Arunachal Pradesh is bounded with China and hence both central and the state govt. are seriously concerned with its security.
Manipur
Manipur is known since the times of Mahabharata, but its long independent existence remained in obscurity until a powerful kingdom, led by Gharib Nawaz7 sprang up its place in 1714. The subsequent history of Manipur was essentially a history of conflicts with the Burmese. Finally it came under British rule and after 1947 Manipur became a full-fledged state under India. Its area is 22,327 sq.km. and the population is 2,388,634.
With three major ethnic groups in Manipur, its insurgency is also a primarily divided into rebel groups of the Meitei, Naga and Kuki tribes. While the Meitei insurgent’s prime objective is to free their pre-British territorial boundary from ‘Indian occupation’, Naga rebels of Manipur support the demands sovereign Nagalim (Greater Nagaland) comprising Nagaland along with the Naga-majority area of Manipur, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Myanmar. The Kukies on the other hand, support the demand of separate Kukiland for which Kukis of Myanmar are also fighting.
Manipur has numerous insurgent groups, such as, Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), United National Liberation Front (UNLF), Revolutionary Peoples Front (RPF), Peoples Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), Manipur Liberation Front Army (MLFA), Kanglei Yawol Khnna Lup (KYKL), Revolutionary Joint Committee (RJC), Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP), Peoples United Liberation Front (PULF), National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K), National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-I/M), Naga Lim Guard (NLG),Kuki National Front(KNF),Kuki National Army(KNA),Kuki Defence Force(KDF),Kuki Democratic Movement (KDM),Kuki National Organisation(KNO),Kuki Security Forces(KSF), Chin Kuki Revolutionary Front(CKRF),KomRem Peoples Convention (KRPC), Zomi Revolutionary Volunteers(ZRV),Zomi Revolutionary Army(ZRA), Zomi Reunification Organisation(ZRO), and Hmar Peoples Convention(HPC).
Insurgency-related incidents in Manipur: 240 in 2007, as many as 262 in 2008 and 211 in the first five months of 2009. 46civilians were killed in 2007, 76 in 2008 and 40 in 2009(until May).8
Tripura
Tripura is comprised of Bengalis (69%) and rest of the tribal like Tripuris (50% of the total population of the tribal), Reangs, Chakmas (Budhist), Halams (Muslims-originally hailed from Kuki), Lushais, Darlongs etc. It was an independent unit under the Maharaja even during British rule. This was never under the Ahom rule. After independence, the Regent Maharani signed an agreement of merger of Tripura with the Indian Union on 15 Oct 1949 and became Union Territory in 1 Nov 1956. It attained full statehood on 21 Jan 1972. The state has the Tripura Tribal Area District Council under special provision in the Constitution of India. The area of this state is 10,492 sq. km. and the population is 3,191,168(2001 census)
The genesis of insurgency in Tripura can be traced to the massive influx of Bengali refugees from East Pakistan following partition. The indigenous people, who accounted for 95%of the population of Tripura in 1931 census, had been reduced to just 31% at the time the 1991 census. This has led to serious discontent among the tribal, who have become a minority in their own land.
In addition to land, control of trade and business, govt. jobs are now in the hands of immigrants. In order to protect their rights, some tribes formed a political front called Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti (TUJS) in June 1967. They demanded an autonomous district council under the Sixth Schedule of the constitution, adoption of Kok Borok as official language and the restoration of tribal lands allotted to non-tribal.
By 1970, some militant leaders had agreed that armed insurgency could help them secure their demands. The Tripura Sena (Tripura Army) was created. Subsequently, in Dec. 1978, The Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) was formed under the leadership of Bijoy Hrangkhal to fight for an independent Tribal State. To assuage tribal feeling, the state government passed the Tripura Tribal Area Autonomous District Council Act in 1979. However, it was strongly opposed by a section of the Bengali population. To counter the pressure from the tribal extremist, they also launched a militant organization called Amra Bengali (we are Bengali). Consequently, violent communal clashes broke out in several parts of the state in which about 1,800 people lost their lives and over 3,600 dwellings were burnt. In June 1980, the army was inducted in the state, and the situation was brought under control.
The TNV, with its stronghold in the Jampui area bordering Mizoram, had close links with the Mizo National Front (MNF). But with the signing of the Mizo Accord in 1986 and the subsequent surrender of the MNF to the authorities, the TNV’s ability to continue the armed struggle was severely curbed. On Aug 12, 1988, the TNV signed a memorandum of Settlement with the state govt. and its members laid down arms and came over-ground. The main point of the agreement was the restoration of alienated lands to the tribal people. However, there were persistent complain that the agreement had not been implemented. New militant outfits had since come into being and there has been a resurgence of militancy in the state.9
Insurgency in this background has been the reality in all these states of this region. It affects the life of people of this region in many ways including economic, social, security, employment etc. There are many factors or reasons behind the insurgency. Let us see those factors:
Factors leading to the rise of Insurgency in Northeast
Insurgency has been constantly raising its heads in this region since the beginning of independence. A number of factors together are responsible for rising/continuing of insurgency in the Northeast region, such as:
Ethnic
In these immensely diverse and complicated ethnicities, discord relating to local resources, land, forest, etc. have been there. Inter-tribal flare-ups have been quite common – clashes between Kukis and Nagas, Maities and Pangans, Kukis and Zomis, Khasis and Garos, Bodos and Santhals etc., apart from these inter and intra-tribal conflicts, the Nagas launched a movement for self-determination which led to the rise of insurgency spearheaded by two main formations – NSCN (I/M) and NSCN (K). Largely owing to the Naga separatist movement, today, there are plethora of ethnic insurgent formations demanding self-determination and autonomy. The NSCN (I/M) and NSCN (K) apart, other major insurgent groups are: PLA, UNLF, PREPAK, KYKL – All Meitis, KNA – Thadou Kuki, ULFA-Assamese, NDFB-Bodos, NKFT, ATTF-Tripurri, HPC, ANVC-Garos etc.10
The turmoil in the Northeast is substantially linked to ethnic political aspirations, fierce pride in distinct cultural-heritage and the vehemence to protect ethnic identities, territories and resources. This psychology is exacerbated by the geography of the region and the demographic currents, a tenuous land link with the rest of the country, international borders, illegal immigration, narcotic traffic, smuggling of weapons etc.
Connectivity
The Northeast region spread over 255,000 sq.km., has a relatively a small population of about 40 millions. The partition of the country led to its being virtually cut-off from the rest of the country. The severance of traditional trade routes and loss of traditional markets resulted in severe market disruptions. In the post-independence era, the focus of development was on improving links with the rest of India involving a tedious and a long journey through the so-called ‘chicken’s neck’. This made the region’s trade with mainland markets more expensive. Recent thinking has sought to encourage trade between Northeast and the countries surrounding it as a means to develop to promote development of the region. Proponents of this line of thinking feel that transportation to and from the surrounding countries would be far less than to and from the rest of the country. Hence stringer economic ties with these countries would be beneficial for the Northeast region.11
The region has mix of rail, road and sea routes infrastructure. However, since the facilities straddle different countries, the complexities of traversing international boundaries have stood in the way of development of a sound and efficient transport network.
The two main highways run parallel to the Brahmaputra on its north and south banks. These function as trunk routes with extension to the other parts of the region. As regard railway system, the partition of India has disrupted the corridors ran through Bangladesh. The corridor through Silliguri is now the only one providing a rail link with the rest of India. The trans hills section connects with the Barak Valley (Assam) and short extension provide links to Tripura. The states like Arunachal, Nagaland (except the periphery of Dima pur), Mizoram, Manipur and Meghalaya do not have even a single inch of railway line. However, the old meter gauge line from Silliguri to Tinsukia has been converted to broad gauge.
The lack of infrastructures pertaining to communication, connectivity and transportation is providing the supporting/favorable base to the insurgents in terms of hideouts, training/grouping and the area to escape from the police operation, apart from isolation of the people from the main stream of the nation. The Northeast region connected with the rest of India by a narrow chicken’s-neck at the Silliguri corridor – merely 22 km. wide between Bangladesh and Nepal/Bhutan – is a serious concern for the national security in the present internal/external scenario of security threats.
External
Northeast is the frontline area bounded by China, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Bhutan. History shows that the neighbouring countries have also played vital role in encouraging insurgency in this region, deliberately or otherwise. Initially China, for ideological/strategic purpose, was actively involved in the region till 1970. Subsequently Bangladesh and Myanmar, for one or the other reason, are also responsible for the same.
Bangladesh lies contiguous to India’s sensitive Northeast, which has been the focus of destabilization, through anti-Indian insurgencies. A number of important leaders of Indian insurgent groups staying in Bangladesh, some with their families. These include Arabind Rajkhowa, Parash Barua etc. (ULFA), Ranjan Daimary (NDFB), Julius Dorphang (HNLC), Dilash Marak (ANVC), B. Debbarma (NLFT), J. Singh (KLO), RK Meghan (UNLF), MM Ngouba etc. (PLA), and Ranjit Debbarma (ATTF).12 Most of such leaders use Bangladesh passports. There are a number of training camps of the Indian insurgents in Bangladesh. Moreover, Bangladesh has emerged as a conduit for flow of sophisticated arms and explosives to insurgents. The Northeast insurgents receive consignment of arms from Singapore, Thailand, Myanmar and China via Bangladesh territory.
Despite India’s repeated request Bangladesh is not co-operating and persistently denied that the Indian militant groups are operating from Bangladesh territory. Border between India and Bangladesh is such that can not be easily managed due to difficulty in identification of anti-Indian elements in absence of identity cards as the culture, language, dresses etc. of people of both the sides are similar. Besides, Bangladesh has been rejecting India’s proposal for joint inspection of training camps and the identification of insurgents on the border.
As regards Myanmar which shares a 1463 km. long porous border with Northeast region, the main ethnic groups of this country – Chin, Shan, Mon, Arakan, Kachin and Karen – are involved in the armed separatist movements. These ethnic diversities cut across international boundaries and can have an adverse impact on regional security. The counter insurgency operations by Myanmar’s security forces have been harsh, which led the refugee exodus to Thailand and India. Militant outfits like NSCN of Nagaland, UNKF OF Manipur, PDF of Tripura and UNLF OF Assam are operating in conjunction with Indo-Myanmar Revolution Front along the Indo-Myanmar border.
Indian militant outfits have set up bases in western Myanmar, beyond the reach of the Indian army. They also use the north Myanmar corridor to reach China for training and weapons. In the mid-1990 the Myanmar army participated in joint operation with India. However it pulled out midway because the Indian govt., in the meanwhile, awarded Nehru Peace Prize to Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of pro-democracy movement in Myanmar.
Moreover, the flourishing narcotics trade along India’s border with Myanmar is helping the insurgent groups to procure arms for their secessionist campaigns.
The role of Bhutan, in this context, has been positive in favour of India. When a series of operations launched by Indian security forces, the insurgents started going deep into Bhutan. The Bhutan govt., immediately on 15 Dec. 2003, launched a major offensive against the Assam armed groups hiding in their jungle in Bhutan. About 1,000 of them were either killed or captured and another 1,000 fled the country. In this operation the son of the king of Bhutan had also taken part and injured.
Migration
The demographic growth of Assam over the course of the twentieth century is the highest recorded by any region in the Indian sub-continent. Between 1901 and 1991, the population of India grew by 354%. In contrast, the population of Assam expanded by 676% - from 3.3 million to 22.3 million. Most of the difference between the rate of population growth in Assam and that of India as a whole can be attributed to the unprecedented migration of population from other regions to Assam-particularly from the densely populated neighbouring plains of East Bengal (later East Pakistan and Bangladesh). It is estimated that only about half the population of Assam in 1971 were descendants of the residents of the current territory of Assam in 1901.13 As regards Tripura, the indigenous tribal constituted 70% of the population in 1901. Immigration reduced that proportion to a bare 30% in 1991.
This demographic influx has had adverse effects on the delicate ethnic balance within the population. It has, overtime, created a deep sense of social and cultural insecurity among indigenous people and has threatened their political leverage. In a state characterized by increasing unemployment, immigration is seen as directly reducing the labour market earning opportunities for indigenous people.
This situation had created student led mass movement in Assam in 1979-84 against illegal immigration which further created major social and political upheaval and brought the problem into a sharp focus. The same situation had forced/encouraged misguided people to start/join ULFA in Assam and Tribal militia in Tripura. Besides, the Accord signed between govt. and leaders of the Assam movement in1985 effectively legitimized all immigration entering Assam before 24 Dec. 1971. Only those entering illegally after that date were liable for deportation. Hence, migration, indeed, is a serious problem in the Northeast region. People have the feeling that they are becoming minority in their home - land.
Economic
As regards economic factor, according to Alokesh Barua and Arindam Bandyopadhyay, “ A view commonly shared by many in the Northeast is that the development process has failed to integrate the economy of the Northeast with Indian mainstream and as a result, the region has been economically stagnating for long. Economic stagnation, it is argued, has been solely responsible for rising poverty, unemployment and a fall in the general well-being of the people.”14
Supporting the same view in other words Gulshan Sachdeva says, in this context, that “ The present economic policy framework for the North east region is based on its political economy and a cultural approach, adjusted with regional planning models. It is implemented mainly through the Planning Commission and the Northeastern Council. Despite huge financial investment this has failed to produce the desired results.”15
The argument is stressed upon, one step further, in constructing an in-built reasoning that the lack of development and industrialization has resulted in growing relative economic disparity of the region vis-à-vis the national average. This rising disparity, it is further alleged, has led to the growing sense of alienation among the people and has manifested itself in various forms of separatist movements in the region. The basic foundation of these movements thus, is an increasingly saleable theory of under development based on the assumption that the central govt. has been neglecting the region since independence, causing much of its present-day economic woes.
The whole region hardly has any industry other than the oil and petroleum as well as tea gardens, which were developed by the British rule for their self-interest. The region is full of various resources, which could be used for economic progress of the region. Agriculture and cottage industries have limited scope due to inadequate plain land and the market for selling their local products. Decreasing income resources and increasing population result into unemployment and insurgency.
Conclusion
This region provides a classical case of an ethnic cauldron that has been kept boiling over centuries by the contradictory processes of assimilation and preservation of ethnic identity. The most striking feature of the social order of the region is perhaps its heterogeneity. Three major groups inhibit the region; the hill tribes who belong to the Mongoloid stock, the plains tribes and the non-tribal population of the plains whose roots are traced to the Aryans, Negroid or Dravidians. These groups exhibit tremendous diversity in terms of race (probably greater variety than in any other part of the globe); language (as many as 420 languages and dialects); and religion (Animism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity). Extraordinary ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic diversity characterizes this hill-forest region, which has more than 160 Scheduled Tribes (These are the unique tribal communities recognised under Article 342 of the Indian Constitution). The region shares about 263,000 sq.km. (98%) of its boundary with the countries like Bangladesh, China, Myanmar and Bhutan, which provides ideal terrain for guerilla warfare. Further, the narrow Silliguri corridor connecting this region with the mainstream is strategically sensitive.
The recent Chinese frequent incursions on the line of control and its recent objections on the visit of Prime Minster, Manmohan Singh and Dalai Lama to Arunachal Pradesh has cautioned the governments of India to be careful about the Northeast in general and Arunachal in particular. In view of Chinese territorial claim over Arunachal Pradesh, it has strategically become more significant as it is the largest frontline state of the region in terms of area, which has long boundary with China.
However, now the Northeast region is no longer as backward/isolated/ turmoil/lack of communication as used to be earlier as the situation all over the area is changing fast.
Although, geographical location can not be changed but the same can be developed strategically. Therefore, realising the lack of communication during the war with China in 1962, the govt. of India has subsetequently constructed national highway from Delhi to Gauhati and three bridges - over Ganga at Mokamah (Bihar)/Bramhputra at Gauhati/place near Nowgaon (Assam)- passing through the narrow Silliguri corridor. The meter gauge railway line has also been converted into broad gauge. Besides, railway line has also been extended in the hilly-forest area from Dharam Nager to Agertalla (Tripura).
Christian missionary, as earlier used to be criticized for creating anti-India sentiments amongst the tribal in the region, is no longer in practice now. They are, in fact, being appreciated for improving literacy in the region. Apart from national/secular/liberal political parties, the religion/tribal-based parties are also becoming mass-based political units to represent local socio-religious/ethnic/orthodox groups of people along with regional parties. Students of this region are getting education in various cities of mainstream India. Youth are joining all India service and the armed forces. Migration, now, is not a serious problem as used to be earlier. Inter-tribal clashes, except in a few area, is not seen as threat on social security. The local products are getting market outside the region. Present government of Bangladesh has assured India to act against the insurgents/anti-India elements hiding there. Now, in the changing global strategic scenario, Myanmar and China are no longer the hub of training camps/hideouts of the Northeast insurgents.
The total number of insurgents in all these states of the Northeast region is merely about 18,000 and weapon holding cadres about 9,000. Overall insurgent violence in the Northeast declined by about 19% in the year 2004 as compared to the previous year. The killing of the civilian/security forces also decreased by 15% during the same period. After 2004, the situation is further improved. Meanwhile, nine insurgent groups of the Northeast have already suspended operations by signing ceasefire agreement with the government. Moreover, at the grass-root level, more than 71% villages of the region are crime free. Now, except a few parts of Assam and Manipur, the situation in the region, by enlarge, is under control. Even the situation in Assam and Manipur, it is not as turmoil as used to be earlier.
Neither a single factor alone is responsible for rising of insurgency, nor any single remedial measure can cure it. It is a centuries old complex issue. Such issues take time to settle. Therefore, Suitable measures along with sufficient time need to be consistently followed. A lot of remedial actions are taken, a lot more are in pipelines and further initiatives are at the planning stage. This is a long term process.
Overall situation in the region appears to be satisfactory. It is argued that it is, at least almost similar to the rest of the country. If the critics who do not agree with this view and they argue that the present day Northeast region is still a threat to the national security, then the same can be said about any other region of the country also. Today Kashmir, terrorism and Naxalites are, indeed, the much bigger threats to the internal dimension of national security than the insurgency in the Northeast region.
(Dr Nand Kishor Kumar)
Introduction
There are two conflicting views about insurgency in the Northeast region: first, it is still the most serious threat to the internal dimension of national security. Second, the situation in the region is changing fast, it is as good or bad as any other part of India and hence the insurgency is no longer a serious threat as used to be earlier.
An attempt is made here to analyze the changing pattern, ground reality and overall dimensions of internal security in the Northeast region. It also aims at finding the extent/level of under-going progress in the region in view of threats on national security.
The North-East region of India is comprised of seven states as popularly known as ‘seven sisters’, namely Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Tripura. Except Manipur and Tripura (both were separate princely states during British Rule), all other members of the seven sisters were parts of undivided Assam for a fairly long time even after independence. As regards Sikkim, it is neither geographically contiguous nor it maintains socio–cultural, political, historical and economic relationship with seven sisters. Hence, it cannot be included as a part of this region despite its location near the same area.
Most of the states of this region are rich in natural resources with fertile land, rich forest, water resources, oil and petroleum, small-scale traditional industries at village level based on locally available raw materials, and considerable mineral deposits, including hydrocarbons apart from advance culture, art, music, dance, historical heritage, high literacy rate etc.
However, the development in the region has lagged behind the rest of the country due to historical reasons and geographical location. Most of the states are basically agrarian and industrially backward. They have poor infrastructure and high unemployment rate. Transport linkage and connectivity, both within the region and with the rest of the country, are still woefully inadequate. Being landlocked and having inhospitable terrain has also limited the expansion of marketing avenues.
In this situation, numerous insurgent groups have cropped up in this region. Therefore, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh says about insurgency as “problematic and worrisome” and according to the Home Minister p. Chidambaram, “ There has not been much progress,” in the North-East in view of undergoing action against insurgency.1 The insurgency in the Northeast region is considered a serious threat to the national security. More than 50,000 people have lost their lives due to the insurgency alone since 1947.
However, the fact at the grass-root level is that the insurgency does not affect the Northeast in its entirety as it is confined to a few pockets only. Supporting this view P. R. Kyndiah, the Minister for Tribal Affairs and Development of North-Eastern States, Govt. of India, argues that “ You can not paint the entire Northeast region with a single brush. There is need to look at this beautiful and resource rich region in a correct perspective. Economic and social compulsions have rendered some parts of the region vulnerable to rising ethnically, insurgency, crime and political instability.”2
With reference to a Research Project completed/compiled by PL Sanjeev and PC Shekar Reddy on Northeast Region, PR Kyndiah further emphasized that “ The finding that 71.23% of the villages of the region have been totally crime free for several years is indeed a revelation. The reasons for their remaining violence free are equally significant. The close-3knit social fabric, respect for traditional value and ethos and age-old democratic institutions are object lessons not only for other parts of the Northeast but also for rest of the country. At a time when the so-called developed societies are prone to unrest due to intolerance and societal imbalances, the crime free villages can serve as a role model, deserving admiration and emulation…They are focused on what they think is best suited to them. It is observed that they aspire for peace, economic development, proper infrastructure, transparent administration and good and clean governance without impairing their values, traditions and ethos, which they treasure.”3
Taking into account the findings of the research referred by Kyndiah as mentioned above, the state-wise scenario of both crime prone and crime free villages unfolds refreshing vistas that dispel the misplaced perception that the entire region is prone to violence.
In this background, let us see the ground level reality of each state.
Assam
A stream of immigrants from upper Burma invaded Assam in 1228 A.D. and continued to rule till the British came to occupy the region in 1826. The invaders belonged to the Shan dynasty and called themselves ‘Tai’ (celestial origin) but popularly known as ‘Ahoms’, the origin of the term Assam (as per Sanskrit word ‘A-sam,’ means unequal). The region was earlier known as Pragjyotishpur or Kamrup as referred in Ramayana, Mahabharata and other classical literatures.
Besides Ahom kingdom, the Northeast region had also witnessed the rise of several independent political formations during the medieval period like the kingdom of Koch, Cacher, Jayintia, Manipur, Tripura and many other small vassal states. There were other hill tribes too, such as the Dafalas, Miris, Nagas, Khamptis, Singphos, Mishmis etc who maintained distinct identities and political independence.4
However, the two most dominant kingdoms of Ahom and Koch were able to influence the region in a very significant manner over centuries in the east and the west of the region respectively. These two kingdoms enjoyed a continuous existence for a long period of time. They also maintained their political independence against repeated attacks by none other than the mighty Mughals until the East India Company appeared on the scene in 1826.
The Ahoms did not enter India through its northeast frontiers with an expansionist design. They never wanted to be a colonial power. There long survival, as a monolithic dynasty cannot be brushed aside as a mere historical accident. Indeed, it was a glorious period of medieval Indian history. The Ahom period witnessed a remarkable cultural unification of the region with the mainstream Indian ethos. The Assamese creativity and development of Assamese culture and literature had reached its zenith during this period under the leadership of Sri Sankardeva. There may be a very little material trade between Assam and the rest of India during this period, but there was a lot of intellectual interactions.
From cultural point of view the Ahoms rule was also liberal and broad based. The Ahoms never tried to impose their views, their religion and culture and their language on the tribes they ruled in Assam. Instead, they tried to merge completely with the local culture and traditions. This attitude was purely political and strategic, as it would have been otherwise possible for the minority migrant class to maintain their domination over a large number of people with such varied cultures. The development of a common language was also essential for the establishment of a steady political system. The Ahoms realized this extremely well and thus helped develop Assamese as a common language in the region. Their acceptance of Hinduism and the introduction of Assamese language to replace the Tai language in the Ahom Court cannot be explained by any other reasoning. Further, by treating the subdued tribes as equals and encouraging intermarriage, the Ahoms significantly contributed to the formation of nascent Assamese nation-state. Social stratification was gradually broken as non-Ahoms families admitted into Ahom fold and were given status and privileges bestowed on nobles. Even Muslims did not suffer any disabilities on account of their religious faith. A large number of Muslims were in several departments of the state. This deliberate policy, whereby Ahoms assimilated themselves, was a major reason for the formation of an Assamese society free from caste, prejudices, which was further strengthen by the equalizing impact of the Vaishanava movement. It helped the Ahoms adopt a policy of decentralization of powers with powerful central authority. All the small powers subordinated to the Ahom kingdom provided a unified front in times of emergency posed by an external threat.5
However, the dynasty that can take pride in ruling over many centuries in the midst of repeated attacks by the Mughal Empire and which was often thought to be inviolable, eventually collapsed due to internal disorders like:
1. The insurrection of the Moamorias (they belong to Vaishnava sect founded by Anirudha Dev, a Kalita by caste-a low social rank like Doms, Kacharis etc. who played an important role in the downfall of the Ahoms rule).
2. The rebellion of the Darrang Prince.
3. The depredations of the Burkendazes.
4. Local chieftains raising their heads and assuming virtual independence.
5. The frontier tribes carrying on with the plunder of Assamese villages.6
The long civil war and internal disorders brought the end of the rule of Ahoms and the people, in general, therefore, welcomed with great respite the entry of the British rule into the political scenario of Assam in 1826. When British rule ended in 1947, Assam became a full-fledged state of India and the process of cultural, political and economic integration with India was complete.
Subsequently the process of the break up of Assam began and the parts of this state emerged as separate states like Nagaland, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh including. Currently the area of Assam is 78,438 sq.km. and the population is 26,638,407. Insurgency dates back to formation of United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) in April 1981. Since then, several insurgent groups have cropped up, mostly claming to represent their respective communities. The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), for instance, is standing for a sovereign Bodo state. Assam currently has eight active militant groups, such as, ULFA, Karbi Longry NC Hills Liberation Front (LNLF), All Adivasi National Liberation Army, Dima Halam Daoga (Jewe) aka Black Widow, Kuki Revolutionary Army, Hmar Peoples Conventions (Democratic), Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam (MULTA), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen.
Apart from these, there are six groups, including a faction each of the ULFA and IDFB, in ceasefire. The other four are: United People’s Democratic Solidarity, Adivasi Cobra Militant Force, Birsa Commando Force and Dima Halam Daogah (DHD).
In Assam there were 248 insurgency-related incidents in 2007, as many as 207 in 2008 and 221 in first five month of 2009. While 132 civilians were killed in 2007, 93 were killed in 2008 and 83 in the first five months of 2009.
The problem of militancy in Assam has its origin in the large-scale migration of refugees from East Pakistan (Bangladesh) since India’s partition in 1947. A continuous flow of illegal migration across the border has disturbed the local demography and brought much of India’s Northeast to the knife-edge of violence.
Apart from ULFA, the emergence of a Bodo insurgency in Assam had become another major problem. However, in Feb 2003, the Bodo Tribal Council was made as a result of the tripartite accord between the center, Assam govt. and Bodo Liberation Tiger and on May 24, 2005 the ceasefire agreement was signed.
Nagaland
The Ahom rule was bounded on the southeast by the Patkai range of mountain inhabited by Nagas, comprised of a diversity of tribes, each speaking its own language and calling itself by a distinctive name, but collectively known as the Nagas. The Ahoms had never subjugated the Nagas, although they were under the sovereignty of the Ahom rule. But it was subjugated by the British rule in 1866 and formed a district under Assam. Nagaland became a state in 1963 under India. The area of the state is 16,579 sq.km. and the population is 1,988,636.
Nagland’s history of insurgency dates back to August 14, 1947 when AZ Phizo, founder of the Naga National Council hoisted the flag for ‘Independent Nagaland’. Since then several organizations with the same objective have been born. Right now the state has two major groups: National Socialist Council of Nagalim (IM) and National Socialist Council of Nagalim (k). While both the groups are under a ceasefire agreement with the government, the situation continues to remain troublesome. Meanwhile, the main insurgent group of Nagaland is engaged in dialogue with the central govt. in search of lasting peace. Sufficient time is required to defuse the old problem started immediately after the independence of the country.
Nagaland has recorded 128 insurgency-related incidents in 2007 as many as 145 in 2008 and 56 till May 2009. Twenty one civilians were killed in 2007, 35 in 2008 and 2 till May 2009.
Meghalaya
It is comprised of three distinct tracts of regions, namely Garo, Khasi and Jaintia hills, the vassal states under the two rulers, Garo king and Jaintia king, which were brought under British rule of Assam in 1869 and 1835 respectively. After the independence of India it became a separate state on January 1, 1972. Earlier, it was a part of the composite state of Assam. Its area is 22,429 sq.km. and the population 2,306,069.
Meghalaya has been plagued with problem of insurgency since the latter part of the 1980s. It has three terrorist outfits operating on its soil, such as, Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC), Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC), and the Peoples Liberation Front of Meghalaya (PLFM). In addition to the continuing divide the locals and the non-locals, issues of identity, growing corruption and perceived injustice in the Garo Hills, are considered to be reasons for the violence in Meghalaya. The combined violence of the insurgent outfits in the state has shown a significant decline by 45%(from 85 to 47) in terms of incidents and killings by 41% (from 42 to 25) in 2004 as compared to the year 2003.
Mizoram
Mizoram was known as Lushai hills and the people lived their were called as Lushai. They came from northern china. The earliest Mizos who migrated to India were known as Kukis. The Lushais were the last of the Mizos tribes who migrated to India. Various ethnic groups of the Lushais identify themselves as Mizos. Lushais hardly came in contact with the Ahom kingdom. British rule brought it under their administration in 1880. In 1954 it was renamed as Mizo district of Assam by an Act of the Indian parliament. Subsequently it was made a separate state in 1987. Its area is 21,081 sq.km. and the population is 891,058.
The Mizo National Front (MNF)-led insurgency movement came to an end in 1986.The MNF transformed itself into regional political party subsequent to signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the government of India on June 30, 1986. It also formed the government, winning the state legislative assembly election, following the formal declaration of Mizoram as a state in 1987. Since then, no militant outfit has disrupted the overall peaceful environment prevailing in the state.
Arunachal Pradesh
This is consisted of various tribes and ethnic groups like Akas, Abors, Duflas, Miris, Mishmis and Singphos who live in different areas of NEFA. Initially it was brought under the direct control of the External Affairs Ministry, and was then transferred to the Home Ministry. In 1972 NEFA was renamed as Union Territory and subsequently made a separate state in 1987. The area of this state is 83,743 sq.km. and population is 1,091,117. There are 26 major tribes and several sub-tribes inhabit the area. Broadly, the people may be divided into three cultural groups on the basis of their socio-religious affinities, such as, Buddhists, Sun/Moon worshippers, and elementary Vaishnavites.
The two district of Tirap and Changlang in the eastern part of the state, adjoining Nagaland and Assam have been affected by Naga underground-related violence. This state faced no problems of militancy in the decades following its creation in 1987, unlike some states in the Northeast. However, insurgency has been pushed into this peaceful state, primarily by faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN), which have long created havoc in the neighbouring state of Nagaland. In Arunachal, the areas most affected now are the district of Tirap and Changlang.
Traditionally, Arunachal’s porous and un-administered border with Nagaland and Myanmar have been used by several militant groups of the Northeast in their journey to China and Myanmar. Militants found it less cumbersome to use various rivulets, especially near the Pansu Pass to transport essential items like medicines, arms and drugs through the area. Among the major objectives of these militants groups was the acquisition of military training from Myanmar’s insurgent groups.
The story of insurgency in Arunachal Pradesh is also that of the politician-insurgent nexus in the state. Till the year 2000, the NSCN-K enjoyed dominance in Tirap and Changlang and in spite of its rivalry with the Isak-Muivah faction (NSCN-IM) in Nagaland, the latter never made any forays into what was known to be a Khaplang stronghold.
In the year 2004, 41 violent incidents resulted in killing of 43 persons (extremists- 35, SF-2 and civilians-6). In 2003, 39 persons were killed (ext.31, SF-1 and civ.- 7 in 50 incidents. Arunachal Pradesh is bounded with China and hence both central and the state govt. are seriously concerned with its security.
Manipur
Manipur is known since the times of Mahabharata, but its long independent existence remained in obscurity until a powerful kingdom, led by Gharib Nawaz7 sprang up its place in 1714. The subsequent history of Manipur was essentially a history of conflicts with the Burmese. Finally it came under British rule and after 1947 Manipur became a full-fledged state under India. Its area is 22,327 sq.km. and the population is 2,388,634.
With three major ethnic groups in Manipur, its insurgency is also a primarily divided into rebel groups of the Meitei, Naga and Kuki tribes. While the Meitei insurgent’s prime objective is to free their pre-British territorial boundary from ‘Indian occupation’, Naga rebels of Manipur support the demands sovereign Nagalim (Greater Nagaland) comprising Nagaland along with the Naga-majority area of Manipur, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Myanmar. The Kukies on the other hand, support the demand of separate Kukiland for which Kukis of Myanmar are also fighting.
Manipur has numerous insurgent groups, such as, Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), United National Liberation Front (UNLF), Revolutionary Peoples Front (RPF), Peoples Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK), Manipur Liberation Front Army (MLFA), Kanglei Yawol Khnna Lup (KYKL), Revolutionary Joint Committee (RJC), Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP), Peoples United Liberation Front (PULF), National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K), National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-I/M), Naga Lim Guard (NLG),Kuki National Front(KNF),Kuki National Army(KNA),Kuki Defence Force(KDF),Kuki Democratic Movement (KDM),Kuki National Organisation(KNO),Kuki Security Forces(KSF), Chin Kuki Revolutionary Front(CKRF),KomRem Peoples Convention (KRPC), Zomi Revolutionary Volunteers(ZRV),Zomi Revolutionary Army(ZRA), Zomi Reunification Organisation(ZRO), and Hmar Peoples Convention(HPC).
Insurgency-related incidents in Manipur: 240 in 2007, as many as 262 in 2008 and 211 in the first five months of 2009. 46civilians were killed in 2007, 76 in 2008 and 40 in 2009(until May).8
Tripura
Tripura is comprised of Bengalis (69%) and rest of the tribal like Tripuris (50% of the total population of the tribal), Reangs, Chakmas (Budhist), Halams (Muslims-originally hailed from Kuki), Lushais, Darlongs etc. It was an independent unit under the Maharaja even during British rule. This was never under the Ahom rule. After independence, the Regent Maharani signed an agreement of merger of Tripura with the Indian Union on 15 Oct 1949 and became Union Territory in 1 Nov 1956. It attained full statehood on 21 Jan 1972. The state has the Tripura Tribal Area District Council under special provision in the Constitution of India. The area of this state is 10,492 sq. km. and the population is 3,191,168(2001 census)
The genesis of insurgency in Tripura can be traced to the massive influx of Bengali refugees from East Pakistan following partition. The indigenous people, who accounted for 95%of the population of Tripura in 1931 census, had been reduced to just 31% at the time the 1991 census. This has led to serious discontent among the tribal, who have become a minority in their own land.
In addition to land, control of trade and business, govt. jobs are now in the hands of immigrants. In order to protect their rights, some tribes formed a political front called Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti (TUJS) in June 1967. They demanded an autonomous district council under the Sixth Schedule of the constitution, adoption of Kok Borok as official language and the restoration of tribal lands allotted to non-tribal.
By 1970, some militant leaders had agreed that armed insurgency could help them secure their demands. The Tripura Sena (Tripura Army) was created. Subsequently, in Dec. 1978, The Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) was formed under the leadership of Bijoy Hrangkhal to fight for an independent Tribal State. To assuage tribal feeling, the state government passed the Tripura Tribal Area Autonomous District Council Act in 1979. However, it was strongly opposed by a section of the Bengali population. To counter the pressure from the tribal extremist, they also launched a militant organization called Amra Bengali (we are Bengali). Consequently, violent communal clashes broke out in several parts of the state in which about 1,800 people lost their lives and over 3,600 dwellings were burnt. In June 1980, the army was inducted in the state, and the situation was brought under control.
The TNV, with its stronghold in the Jampui area bordering Mizoram, had close links with the Mizo National Front (MNF). But with the signing of the Mizo Accord in 1986 and the subsequent surrender of the MNF to the authorities, the TNV’s ability to continue the armed struggle was severely curbed. On Aug 12, 1988, the TNV signed a memorandum of Settlement with the state govt. and its members laid down arms and came over-ground. The main point of the agreement was the restoration of alienated lands to the tribal people. However, there were persistent complain that the agreement had not been implemented. New militant outfits had since come into being and there has been a resurgence of militancy in the state.9
Insurgency in this background has been the reality in all these states of this region. It affects the life of people of this region in many ways including economic, social, security, employment etc. There are many factors or reasons behind the insurgency. Let us see those factors:
Factors leading to the rise of Insurgency in Northeast
Insurgency has been constantly raising its heads in this region since the beginning of independence. A number of factors together are responsible for rising/continuing of insurgency in the Northeast region, such as:
Ethnic
In these immensely diverse and complicated ethnicities, discord relating to local resources, land, forest, etc. have been there. Inter-tribal flare-ups have been quite common – clashes between Kukis and Nagas, Maities and Pangans, Kukis and Zomis, Khasis and Garos, Bodos and Santhals etc., apart from these inter and intra-tribal conflicts, the Nagas launched a movement for self-determination which led to the rise of insurgency spearheaded by two main formations – NSCN (I/M) and NSCN (K). Largely owing to the Naga separatist movement, today, there are plethora of ethnic insurgent formations demanding self-determination and autonomy. The NSCN (I/M) and NSCN (K) apart, other major insurgent groups are: PLA, UNLF, PREPAK, KYKL – All Meitis, KNA – Thadou Kuki, ULFA-Assamese, NDFB-Bodos, NKFT, ATTF-Tripurri, HPC, ANVC-Garos etc.10
The turmoil in the Northeast is substantially linked to ethnic political aspirations, fierce pride in distinct cultural-heritage and the vehemence to protect ethnic identities, territories and resources. This psychology is exacerbated by the geography of the region and the demographic currents, a tenuous land link with the rest of the country, international borders, illegal immigration, narcotic traffic, smuggling of weapons etc.
Connectivity
The Northeast region spread over 255,000 sq.km., has a relatively a small population of about 40 millions. The partition of the country led to its being virtually cut-off from the rest of the country. The severance of traditional trade routes and loss of traditional markets resulted in severe market disruptions. In the post-independence era, the focus of development was on improving links with the rest of India involving a tedious and a long journey through the so-called ‘chicken’s neck’. This made the region’s trade with mainland markets more expensive. Recent thinking has sought to encourage trade between Northeast and the countries surrounding it as a means to develop to promote development of the region. Proponents of this line of thinking feel that transportation to and from the surrounding countries would be far less than to and from the rest of the country. Hence stringer economic ties with these countries would be beneficial for the Northeast region.11
The region has mix of rail, road and sea routes infrastructure. However, since the facilities straddle different countries, the complexities of traversing international boundaries have stood in the way of development of a sound and efficient transport network.
The two main highways run parallel to the Brahmaputra on its north and south banks. These function as trunk routes with extension to the other parts of the region. As regard railway system, the partition of India has disrupted the corridors ran through Bangladesh. The corridor through Silliguri is now the only one providing a rail link with the rest of India. The trans hills section connects with the Barak Valley (Assam) and short extension provide links to Tripura. The states like Arunachal, Nagaland (except the periphery of Dima pur), Mizoram, Manipur and Meghalaya do not have even a single inch of railway line. However, the old meter gauge line from Silliguri to Tinsukia has been converted to broad gauge.
The lack of infrastructures pertaining to communication, connectivity and transportation is providing the supporting/favorable base to the insurgents in terms of hideouts, training/grouping and the area to escape from the police operation, apart from isolation of the people from the main stream of the nation. The Northeast region connected with the rest of India by a narrow chicken’s-neck at the Silliguri corridor – merely 22 km. wide between Bangladesh and Nepal/Bhutan – is a serious concern for the national security in the present internal/external scenario of security threats.
External
Northeast is the frontline area bounded by China, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Bhutan. History shows that the neighbouring countries have also played vital role in encouraging insurgency in this region, deliberately or otherwise. Initially China, for ideological/strategic purpose, was actively involved in the region till 1970. Subsequently Bangladesh and Myanmar, for one or the other reason, are also responsible for the same.
Bangladesh lies contiguous to India’s sensitive Northeast, which has been the focus of destabilization, through anti-Indian insurgencies. A number of important leaders of Indian insurgent groups staying in Bangladesh, some with their families. These include Arabind Rajkhowa, Parash Barua etc. (ULFA), Ranjan Daimary (NDFB), Julius Dorphang (HNLC), Dilash Marak (ANVC), B. Debbarma (NLFT), J. Singh (KLO), RK Meghan (UNLF), MM Ngouba etc. (PLA), and Ranjit Debbarma (ATTF).12 Most of such leaders use Bangladesh passports. There are a number of training camps of the Indian insurgents in Bangladesh. Moreover, Bangladesh has emerged as a conduit for flow of sophisticated arms and explosives to insurgents. The Northeast insurgents receive consignment of arms from Singapore, Thailand, Myanmar and China via Bangladesh territory.
Despite India’s repeated request Bangladesh is not co-operating and persistently denied that the Indian militant groups are operating from Bangladesh territory. Border between India and Bangladesh is such that can not be easily managed due to difficulty in identification of anti-Indian elements in absence of identity cards as the culture, language, dresses etc. of people of both the sides are similar. Besides, Bangladesh has been rejecting India’s proposal for joint inspection of training camps and the identification of insurgents on the border.
As regards Myanmar which shares a 1463 km. long porous border with Northeast region, the main ethnic groups of this country – Chin, Shan, Mon, Arakan, Kachin and Karen – are involved in the armed separatist movements. These ethnic diversities cut across international boundaries and can have an adverse impact on regional security. The counter insurgency operations by Myanmar’s security forces have been harsh, which led the refugee exodus to Thailand and India. Militant outfits like NSCN of Nagaland, UNKF OF Manipur, PDF of Tripura and UNLF OF Assam are operating in conjunction with Indo-Myanmar Revolution Front along the Indo-Myanmar border.
Indian militant outfits have set up bases in western Myanmar, beyond the reach of the Indian army. They also use the north Myanmar corridor to reach China for training and weapons. In the mid-1990 the Myanmar army participated in joint operation with India. However it pulled out midway because the Indian govt., in the meanwhile, awarded Nehru Peace Prize to Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of pro-democracy movement in Myanmar.
Moreover, the flourishing narcotics trade along India’s border with Myanmar is helping the insurgent groups to procure arms for their secessionist campaigns.
The role of Bhutan, in this context, has been positive in favour of India. When a series of operations launched by Indian security forces, the insurgents started going deep into Bhutan. The Bhutan govt., immediately on 15 Dec. 2003, launched a major offensive against the Assam armed groups hiding in their jungle in Bhutan. About 1,000 of them were either killed or captured and another 1,000 fled the country. In this operation the son of the king of Bhutan had also taken part and injured.
Migration
The demographic growth of Assam over the course of the twentieth century is the highest recorded by any region in the Indian sub-continent. Between 1901 and 1991, the population of India grew by 354%. In contrast, the population of Assam expanded by 676% - from 3.3 million to 22.3 million. Most of the difference between the rate of population growth in Assam and that of India as a whole can be attributed to the unprecedented migration of population from other regions to Assam-particularly from the densely populated neighbouring plains of East Bengal (later East Pakistan and Bangladesh). It is estimated that only about half the population of Assam in 1971 were descendants of the residents of the current territory of Assam in 1901.13 As regards Tripura, the indigenous tribal constituted 70% of the population in 1901. Immigration reduced that proportion to a bare 30% in 1991.
This demographic influx has had adverse effects on the delicate ethnic balance within the population. It has, overtime, created a deep sense of social and cultural insecurity among indigenous people and has threatened their political leverage. In a state characterized by increasing unemployment, immigration is seen as directly reducing the labour market earning opportunities for indigenous people.
This situation had created student led mass movement in Assam in 1979-84 against illegal immigration which further created major social and political upheaval and brought the problem into a sharp focus. The same situation had forced/encouraged misguided people to start/join ULFA in Assam and Tribal militia in Tripura. Besides, the Accord signed between govt. and leaders of the Assam movement in1985 effectively legitimized all immigration entering Assam before 24 Dec. 1971. Only those entering illegally after that date were liable for deportation. Hence, migration, indeed, is a serious problem in the Northeast region. People have the feeling that they are becoming minority in their home - land.
Economic
As regards economic factor, according to Alokesh Barua and Arindam Bandyopadhyay, “ A view commonly shared by many in the Northeast is that the development process has failed to integrate the economy of the Northeast with Indian mainstream and as a result, the region has been economically stagnating for long. Economic stagnation, it is argued, has been solely responsible for rising poverty, unemployment and a fall in the general well-being of the people.”14
Supporting the same view in other words Gulshan Sachdeva says, in this context, that “ The present economic policy framework for the North east region is based on its political economy and a cultural approach, adjusted with regional planning models. It is implemented mainly through the Planning Commission and the Northeastern Council. Despite huge financial investment this has failed to produce the desired results.”15
The argument is stressed upon, one step further, in constructing an in-built reasoning that the lack of development and industrialization has resulted in growing relative economic disparity of the region vis-à-vis the national average. This rising disparity, it is further alleged, has led to the growing sense of alienation among the people and has manifested itself in various forms of separatist movements in the region. The basic foundation of these movements thus, is an increasingly saleable theory of under development based on the assumption that the central govt. has been neglecting the region since independence, causing much of its present-day economic woes.
The whole region hardly has any industry other than the oil and petroleum as well as tea gardens, which were developed by the British rule for their self-interest. The region is full of various resources, which could be used for economic progress of the region. Agriculture and cottage industries have limited scope due to inadequate plain land and the market for selling their local products. Decreasing income resources and increasing population result into unemployment and insurgency.
Conclusion
This region provides a classical case of an ethnic cauldron that has been kept boiling over centuries by the contradictory processes of assimilation and preservation of ethnic identity. The most striking feature of the social order of the region is perhaps its heterogeneity. Three major groups inhibit the region; the hill tribes who belong to the Mongoloid stock, the plains tribes and the non-tribal population of the plains whose roots are traced to the Aryans, Negroid or Dravidians. These groups exhibit tremendous diversity in terms of race (probably greater variety than in any other part of the globe); language (as many as 420 languages and dialects); and religion (Animism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity). Extraordinary ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic diversity characterizes this hill-forest region, which has more than 160 Scheduled Tribes (These are the unique tribal communities recognised under Article 342 of the Indian Constitution). The region shares about 263,000 sq.km. (98%) of its boundary with the countries like Bangladesh, China, Myanmar and Bhutan, which provides ideal terrain for guerilla warfare. Further, the narrow Silliguri corridor connecting this region with the mainstream is strategically sensitive.
The recent Chinese frequent incursions on the line of control and its recent objections on the visit of Prime Minster, Manmohan Singh and Dalai Lama to Arunachal Pradesh has cautioned the governments of India to be careful about the Northeast in general and Arunachal in particular. In view of Chinese territorial claim over Arunachal Pradesh, it has strategically become more significant as it is the largest frontline state of the region in terms of area, which has long boundary with China.
However, now the Northeast region is no longer as backward/isolated/ turmoil/lack of communication as used to be earlier as the situation all over the area is changing fast.
Although, geographical location can not be changed but the same can be developed strategically. Therefore, realising the lack of communication during the war with China in 1962, the govt. of India has subsetequently constructed national highway from Delhi to Gauhati and three bridges - over Ganga at Mokamah (Bihar)/Bramhputra at Gauhati/place near Nowgaon (Assam)- passing through the narrow Silliguri corridor. The meter gauge railway line has also been converted into broad gauge. Besides, railway line has also been extended in the hilly-forest area from Dharam Nager to Agertalla (Tripura).
Christian missionary, as earlier used to be criticized for creating anti-India sentiments amongst the tribal in the region, is no longer in practice now. They are, in fact, being appreciated for improving literacy in the region. Apart from national/secular/liberal political parties, the religion/tribal-based parties are also becoming mass-based political units to represent local socio-religious/ethnic/orthodox groups of people along with regional parties. Students of this region are getting education in various cities of mainstream India. Youth are joining all India service and the armed forces. Migration, now, is not a serious problem as used to be earlier. Inter-tribal clashes, except in a few area, is not seen as threat on social security. The local products are getting market outside the region. Present government of Bangladesh has assured India to act against the insurgents/anti-India elements hiding there. Now, in the changing global strategic scenario, Myanmar and China are no longer the hub of training camps/hideouts of the Northeast insurgents.
The total number of insurgents in all these states of the Northeast region is merely about 18,000 and weapon holding cadres about 9,000. Overall insurgent violence in the Northeast declined by about 19% in the year 2004 as compared to the previous year. The killing of the civilian/security forces also decreased by 15% during the same period. After 2004, the situation is further improved. Meanwhile, nine insurgent groups of the Northeast have already suspended operations by signing ceasefire agreement with the government. Moreover, at the grass-root level, more than 71% villages of the region are crime free. Now, except a few parts of Assam and Manipur, the situation in the region, by enlarge, is under control. Even the situation in Assam and Manipur, it is not as turmoil as used to be earlier.
Neither a single factor alone is responsible for rising of insurgency, nor any single remedial measure can cure it. It is a centuries old complex issue. Such issues take time to settle. Therefore, Suitable measures along with sufficient time need to be consistently followed. A lot of remedial actions are taken, a lot more are in pipelines and further initiatives are at the planning stage. This is a long term process.
Overall situation in the region appears to be satisfactory. It is argued that it is, at least almost similar to the rest of the country. If the critics who do not agree with this view and they argue that the present day Northeast region is still a threat to the national security, then the same can be said about any other region of the country also. Today Kashmir, terrorism and Naxalites are, indeed, the much bigger threats to the internal dimension of national security than the insurgency in the Northeast region.
INDIA IN QUEST OF STRATEGIC SPACE
INDIA IN QUEST OF STRATEGIC SPACE
(Dr. NK Kumar)
Introduction:
Is India at the crossroads today in the current strategic scenario? Is it crossing through a transitional phase in the prevailing security environment? Is its stand on security merely a myth/dilemma? Is it stuck on the dead-end? Many more such questions are haunting in the mind of intellectuals. Answers to these questions are far from being easy and simple one, but not difficult too if the ground reality is critically/objectively analyzed. The aim of this article is to analyze various strategic options for India and to focus on suitable answers to such questions in the given situation. It begins with conceptualizing security in the present strategic environment for India - a nation on the threshold of major power status. This provides a ground for interpreting the changing international and sub-continental strategic situation and to locate India’s appropriate place in it. This paper makes an attempt to focus India’s search for strategic space in the complex global and sub-continental strategic scenario. It reviews by outlining briefly what kind of broad policy choices are optional for India as an emerging power.
Ever since India’s birth as an independent nation state, it happened to be on the target of the most ‘powerful imperialist’ (USA) as well as the most ‘adventurous communist regime’ (China) and the ‘fanatical military regime’ (Pak). They kept on raising unrealistic/imaginary/hypothetical issues, one after another, despite India’s all possible good gestures to them. After the end of cold war the peace broke out worldwide. But the strategic situation around India in the sub-continent remained the same and the peace is still a dream. India’s quest for peaceful and secured space appears to be shattered under external threats. Moreover, domestic scenario, due to regionalism/religious fundamentalism/left extremism, is also no different. No stone is being left unturned by the anti-India forces from both outside and inside, to shake the dream of a nation, which sincerely struggles to survive with peaceful co-existence. In almost same situation, many newly born nation-states after the II world war, have either lost their independence or broken into pieces or politically surrendered under pressures.
In these circumstances, India does not find space for respite even for a moment since the time it snatched freedom from the clutches of the colonial monster. Does India need same method of snatching peace and security for her survival also? In other words, does India need the kind of means used by her for gaining independence for her survival as an independent nation also? If so, then India’s traditional defensive approach needs to be reviewed and the offensive/aggressive face is to be focused. If India intends to do so, first of all it needs to conceptualize her national security properly and carefully before any attempt is made to shift her decades old strategic stand.
In this regard, let us conceptualize national security in general term before touching upon the same in the Indian context.
Security has been defined and understood variously by various experts on various occasions. Security, in fact, is an abstract and also an elusive term; it means different things to different people, it also has different concepts in different situations. At Psychological level the term security presents images of peace and harmony, a feeling of being well guarded from several uncertainties. At another level it has an underpinning of vulnerability and fear from which we may guard ourselves but from that very action others may feel insecure. In this context, let us see traditional and transnational views.
For traditional view, according to Walter Lipmann “… a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interest to avoid war and is able, if challenged to maintain them by war.”1 Henry Kissinger says, “ National security in its widest sense comprises every action by which a society seeks to assure its survival or to realize its aspirations internationally.”2 It means military or defence forces to insure territorial security of the nation against various threats. This is the responsibility of the state; the actor in the society of states, rather than individual, to protect national security.3
As regards transnational view, the two terms are associated together- One is the concept of comprehensive security and the other is human security. The first argues that security concerns have to look into the political, economic and socio-cultural dimensions of security of the people of any state and the other seeks direct linkage with human well being. While the concept of comprehensive security continues to accept the relevance of the nation state and places its discourse within the parameter of a nation state, the concept of human security takes a more global view. It would, therefore, be appropriate to locate the concept of human security within the transnational approaches that focus on the human dimension looking beyond the nation state barriers.4
Broadly speaking there are two dimensions of national security-external and internal. External security rests on the premise that there are perpetual clashes of interest among the nations and these are often irreconcilable, which may lead to war. On the other hand internal security rests on the assumption that every society is perpetually torn by intra-societal conflicts which often lead to political disorder, violence and social turmoil.
National security also has both military and non-military dimensions. Military dimension of security is also called as strategic or traditional or conventional dimension of security. And the non-military dimension in other words is known as non-strategic or non-traditional or non-conventional dimension of security. Armed force is involved to protect the nation and society in case of threats from inside or outside on national security under the concept of military dimension of security.5 As regard the concept of non-military dimension, the army is not normally involved unless and until the situation goes beyond the control of civil and police administrations. Non-military dimension of security also covers comprehensive/human interest at global level in terms of international concept of common security. For instance, the interest relating to environment etc. for which all the nations make efforts to tackle threats on environment so as to ensure common interest of the entire global community.
In this background, the national security of India conceptually moves, by and large, within the same parameters of traditional barriers of nation-state. Indian armed force, like those of others countries, protects national border and territory against external threats along with protecting national integrity/unity against internal threats posed by internal militant groups.
However, India’s strategic scenario is not always similar to many other nation- states. It is, therefore, apart from guarding border against hostile countries, its main thrust area, now a days, is the internal dimension of security to tackle cross border terrorism and insurgency, besides time to time supporting police in low intensive conflicts against naxalites etc. It is also supporting civil administration during natural calamities/disasters.6 Other nation-states may have different nature of strategic situation and hence their military’s thrust area may also differ from that of India. Unlike USA and a few members-states of NATO, the Indian army is not deployed abroad in a state’s politically deigned agenda. The involvement of Indian army in IPKF operation in Sri Lank in 1987-89 is an exception. It is, therefore, argued that the security in the Indian context cannot be conceptualized in general term due to its different nature of strategic situations.
As regards India’s non-military/non-traditional/internal dimensions of security is concerned, following are the main components:7
- Economic – Economic growth, Employment, poverty, Energy,
corruption, Money laundering, Redistribution of economic resources,
fake currency, Black money, Recession, Drug trafficking etc.
- Socio-cultural – Social-justice, Caste issue, Tribal issue, Religious minority, Linguistic minority, Child marriage, Dowry etc.
- Human – Human rights, Exploitation against women, children and labour, Health, Migration, illiteracy etc.
- Environmental – Land, Water, Natural resources, Pollution, Food, Forest, Climate.
- Political - Political stability, Center-state relation, Criminalisation of politics, Caste- politics, Vote-bank politics, Coalition-politics, Political unanimity on national issues.
Economic face of India shows that it’s GDP stands at the top and its other aspects of economy at the bottom in the world. About 33% people are under poverty line, gap between rich and poor is widening and unemployment as well as corruption, money laundering, scarcity of energy etc are increasing at alarming level. Thus, the imbalance economic development is the root-cause of many internal dimensions of Indian security.
Fragmented socio-cultural configuration continues to dominate over national security of India from the beginning of the origin of nation state. Socio-cultural diversities comprising various components together in homogeneous framework provides a basic pre-requisite of both the development as well security of the nation, which is missing in India. Fragmentation at any step for whatsoever reason in the internal framework of nation-state is a serious challenge to national security.
Human approach to national security based on humanism argues for strengthening the foundation of internal security of a nation-state. Human dimension of security is also significant for global framework of transnational security. India’s poor human right record is a serious challenge to the national security.
Environmental aspect of security is significant for both national and global framework of security. Although, there is no immediate threat of declining environmental balance on national security, but in the long term the environmental dimension is an area of concern for both national and international security.9 India is co-operating with the global community on environmental issues on her behalf and also on behalf of developing countries.
Soviet/Yugoslavian instance of political dimension of internal security, which led to disintegration of strong nation-states, is a cautionary signal to the world, though the nature of such threats varies from nation to nation. The political scenario of coalition politics, growing regional political parties and the vote-bank politics in India pose a significant threat on national security in the long term.10
Changing scenario and India’s stand
The global strategic scenario after the breaking up of the former USSR has undergone a major transformation. The end of cold war has brought about the loss of a quantified bipolarity and has ushered the polarization of intent, capability and power (military and non-military). The multipolar nodes of power is emerging with potential deploy and threaten the use of weapons of mass destruction even when the history of the post world war period till date has not precipitated and all nuclear war.11
However, the hostiled strategic scenario in the Indian sub-continent, more or less, remains the same. In the meanwhile India and Pakistan are in possession of nuclear weapon and China and India are emerging as economic global power. As regards internal dimension of Indian security, the economic globalization and the evolution of information technology along with liberalization of Indian economy have a positive impact on India in terms of increasing GDP, foreign currency, defence budget, employment inside/outside the country etc. As a result the domestic pressures (financial and human) on national security is decreasing.
Conceptualizing security in general term is comprised of three aspects – abstraction, theorization and materialization. As the nation states despite being asymmetrical to each other on more than one count, will continue to remain a prime actors in the foreseeable future as a unit of analysis in international relation and global system, the role of the armed forces will continue to remain a significant factor, though in the Indian context, their thrust area of operation in the traditional sense may escalate and deescalate both. In the changing situation the Indian armed force have greater task inside the country to protect internal security rather than their deployment on border. Therefore, all the three aspects of security need to be touched upon with open mind.
Conceptualizing security and giving a sense of direction and implementation of security policies will require bridging the gap between the realm of idea and the domain of public policy making, the latter being an offshoot of the organizations at the government and non-government levels are empowered to examine holistically the totality of security considerations. As a market driven new world order is emerging because of globalization, the changing self-perceptions of nation state will impinge on the manner in which they articulate their security concerns and coping strategies. One has to therefore consider that both financial and technological aspects will operate and play a significant role based on resources and opportunities. 12
It is in this emerging scenario that the think tank of intellectuals has to pave the way to suggest options to the makers of security policy so as to ensure that the pre-planned action is kept in hand before any internal crisis emerges for internal security. India, a growing global power cannot afford any more dilemma and myth in the process of policy making. Ambiguity on the part of policy making and the dilemma at any level of implementation of the same takes the nation-state nowhere near the situation to tackle the challenges of internal dimension of national security.
However, the perception of changing situation is not so simple, as UP Thakur and C. Narasimha Rao argue, “ because the context has changed, the forces we have to fight we have changed, the tools and technique with which we can fight effectively are new, the players are new, the attitudes are new. And all these are in permanent changeable state and unpredictable. Things change in nanoseconds, not in days and months. The very scale of measure has changed. It is no longer Himalayan border we are fighting for, we are fighting forces external and within that are dynamic and unpredictable. If it is 21st century, we can not conceptualize war doctrine for the 20sh century.” 13
Now it is a different world and different time. We have to conceptualize security differently. It is more so for India – the India that does not change, the India that always think itself to be safe and secure enough. but always prove wrong, must see reason to change – to secure itself and its people in the new age of knowledge economy.
Conceptualization of security also involves question of what and whose interest we protect, how we protect, who all are involved in protecting. Is it only military that is supposed to protect while others keep watching? And also, the issue of where the protection begins – is it at border alone or in every home and field? The concept of protection must be replaced by the concept of growth and development; the concept of defence must yield to the concept of proactive force capability. We must shift security philosophy to a positive action agenda for the overall development and progress of the nation, where every citizen, every activity, every sector and every entity becomes the generator of strength and power, and contributes to the strength and might of the nation-state.14
In the changing scenario, therefore, India needs to conceptualize her security in certain perspectives to get her updated.
Perspectives:
We cannot predict future scenario of security threats but we can certainly base our projection on historical, socio-cultural, psychological, economic, political, and technological moorings/perspectives.
- Historical – Military history of India from the time of Mauryan empire till the Kargil conflict and also the military history of the world beginning from the time of Napoleon till the end of gulf war 1991, are full of lessons of war, security, strategy, tactics etc. Having analyzed history one can make a framework of conceptualizing security of both internal and external dimensions well in time before actual threats knock the door.
- Socio-cultural – Indian society and culture is a complex issue, not only because of diversities but also for its contradictory components and complicated configuration. In the existing scenario, to find a bridging device in the gap of socio-cultural gulf causing internal insecurity is not simple. It is, therefore, a long-term framework of socio-cultural reality at national level needs to be analyzed and to evolve a common space for peaceful co-existence all sub-cultures together so that the national unity amongst socio-cultural diversity can ensure internal security.
- Psychological – Intangible elements of national power like national morale, national character and national leadership are psychologically inter-connected in terms of internal and external dimensions of national security. Recently the national level of Indian military leadership like the navel chief and the air force chief have separately stated that the overall capability of Indian armed forces is not only much inferior to that of China but also it can not even tackle Pakistan. Besides, the vice-chief of air force staff has also openly criticized the culture of political leadership of both the ruling opposition party for delaying the procurement of arms. Besides, the Army Chief openly stated unprofessionally that India is getting prepared for war with two enemies-Pak and China. The psychological/adverse impacts of such pessimistic and provoking public statements on national morale and also on national image can be well imagined. They should understand that no nation-state could be physically secured if it is psychologically insecure. This is not only a gross misuse of democratic norms but also a broad violation of military ethics. India, therefore, needs to learn strategic culture and security norms in the perspective of psychological propensities.
- Economic - Economic problem is a core issue, which causes plights in all aspects of security, whether to prepare in external or internal dimensions, to meet military or non-military threats or to take initiative in setting basic infrastructures of socio-cultural and human security. Economic support cannot be substituted. However, the country like India cannot be expected to create and mobilize sufficient economic resources for security preparations over night, though Indian economy now is growing fast and also allocating finance to defence budget manifold in comparison with past 10-15 years. But is it sufficient to tackle Pak-China together on external front and the vast area on internal front from economic development of Kashmir, north-east region, Naxalites affected belt, besides many more commitments and urgent financial requirements to ensure the preparation of national security on long term basis? Certainly not. But what is the way out? All these shot comings and impediments are to be kept in mind while security planning and policy is viewed in the initial stages, as the economic perspective of security cannot be ignored.
- Political – India being the largest democratic political system in the world has certain plus and minus in terms of security. A number of serious internal security issues like Mozo problem, Punjab problem, Assam problem, anti-Hindi problem in Tamilnadu etc. have been solved through dialogue, and many more are in the process of heading towards democratic solution. However, the democratic norms demand transparency in policy, planning and strategy concerning security, which may be misused by anti-national elements as happened during 26/11 terrorist attack in Mumbai where the militants came to know about police action through the Indian TV news channels. The political reality and its commitments are important in relation to national security. In this background, therefore, political perspective is significant in the security context.
- Technological – Modern technology is significant in all walk of life including modern warfare. We have seen the role of air power technology during the Gulf War in 1991 where ten lakhs well trained professional army of Iraq was forced to surrender. Is India prepared for such warfare against well-equipped hostile power with modern arms? What is the present status of military technology in India? Is the indigenous source of military technology sufficient or do we depend upon imports from other countries? When we talk about technology we mean modern indigenous military software and hardware in terms of quality of weapons, communication/information system, intelligence, training etc. In the given situation, can we fight a war in 21st century with the guns of 19th century? Military history shows that the modern weapons, latest technology, proper training and morale of the man can make miracle in warfare. In this perspective India needs to maintain the level of military preparedness of modern quality.
However, mere perspectives of security are not enough for proper formation and conceptualization of security policy for India in the present international and regional strategic scenario. We, therefore, need to follow certain tenants in this regard, such as:
Tenants
- Military power and diplomacy
- Defence and development
- Technology and knowledge-based security personnel
- Federal pluralism and unanimity on national issues
Broadly speaking, both, the military power and diplomacy are the means to protect / promote national interest. Whereas the former possess physical strength to guard national territory against threats from inside and outside and the later is a skill to manage international relations in the interest of the nation. And hence, the goal of both of them is the same – the protection of national interest. Besides, both of them are also complementary to each other. Alone either of them cannot provide sufficient security to the nation. India, therefore, must insure that the military muscle and the diplomacy should go together. India herself has demonstrated the same during Bangladesh liberation. World takes lesson from India as how to protect national interest by balancing army and the foreign relations together. Indira’s diplomacy with USSR and Manek shaw’s military strategy make a wonderful combination to ensure an unprecedented victory. Security – policy makers in India need to maintain the same in future too. Is India attempting to repeat her own history by making strategic relation with USA? Whether USA deserves to be as trusted as used to be USSR or not, it is altogether a different issue in view of the Indo – USA relations during the cold – war era. Whatever may be, in the present unipolar scenario India does not have any other option.
Defence and development is another important tenant of conceptualizing security for India in principle. The concept of long tern security refers to balancing expenses on defence and development. It is true that no expense is too much when it comes to the nation’s security. But what about economic development? The fact remains that the economic growth is the foundation of national security. It is, therefore, both are equally significant. “ The entire process of defence budget allocation in an independent India was inherited from British with no conceptual or procedural changes.”15 Budgeting has always been conceived as a process for systematically relating expenditure of funds to accomplishment of planned objectives. Thus its main principal emphasis is on planning and relating it to resources required and finances needed to accomplish the objectives. However, in practice this dimension is rarely reflected explicitly in the government budgets.16
India is one of the four oldest civilizations of the world. It is comprised of 31 regions, 1618 languages, 6400 castes, 6 religions, 6 ethnic groups, 29 major festivals 150 languages, 544 dialects and 1 country. In such a huge diversity if there is a slight imbalance in maintaining socio-cultural equilibrium it leads to a serious internal security crisis like the demolition of Babri Mashjid and Mandal Commission.
Defence expenditure also depends upon threat perception. The land frontier extends to about 15200 km with China, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Pakistan. India’s coastline extends over 7500 km and the island territories in the Bay of Bengal are more than 1100 km from the Indian mainland. The Indian landmass has an area of about 3.2 million sq.km and the EEZ has an area of about 2 million sq. km. It is a tough task of the Indian defence to take care. Hence budget needs to be in accordance with threat perceptions.
As regards development, it is not merely an economic phenomenon; it also perceived as multidimensional process involving the reorganization and re-orientation of entire economic and social system. GDP/GNP does not always indicate the ground reality, nor it shows the socio-economic equality in the real sense of the term. India’s GDP is good enough, yet about 35% Indians are under below poverty line. Many Indians are scholars at global level; still about 30% people are illiterates. In this situation, if an undeveloped India is economically insecure, can a strong defence, if it is, alone provide adequate national security in both internal and external dimensions? It is, therefore, India needs overall development in both the areas of defence and development. How it could be achieved, it all depends upon the planners and strategy makers for a long-term security.
Technology and knowledge-based security personnel are the needs of the modern security environment. Technology, in general, refers to the latest scientific know-how and the modern apparatus/tools/instruments for mechanizing the system. In security term, the technology refers to the modernization of military weapons and other hardware. Moreover, imparting proper training to the staff is also equally important so as to handle the modern arms efficiently. Besides, “the international divide today is not just about political misalignments or economic disparities but also about security related policies of denial of duel-use technologies, imbalances in arms export policies in trade practices and fierce industrial competition. Concerns of trans-national tensions on issues such as WMD proliferation, militarisation of outer space, global warming, competition to energy resources and adverse impact of advances in Bio and Nano technologies also influences security perceptions. Motivational cross-connections and technical inter-linkages of this 21st century scenario can present serious impediments to national security. As we move forward to a more knowledge-based society, information security and cyber security issues are posing new challenges to the management of security, thereby increasing vulnerabilities with no clear answers yet.”17 All these challenges of acquiring/developing modern arms, imparting modern training to the staff and the management of security are to be kept in mind while military preparedness is assured.
Federal pluralism and unanimity on national issues is a principle, which argues for maintaining national unity in diversity of interest. Federalism refers to autonomy of state under a federal/central govt. so as to maintain unity at center over diversity at state level. Its relevance is widely indorsed at the broad level of global democratic commitments in general and in the Indian perspective in particular. However, in India the commitments for constitutional provision of federal structure come in the way of tackle terrorist acts and other internal security related problems, as some scholars like Ashutosh Varshney argue.18 He has pointed out three laws and practices in support of his view:
a. As per Indian constitution, internal law and order is on the state-list, not a subject of central or concurrent list. Unlike US concept of ‘federal crime,’ under federal law, India does not have this type of system under central govt. to tackle terrorist act directly as this is state’s responsibility.
b. National security guard (commandos) under central govt. does not function properly due to non-cooperation of states.
c. In contrast to the FBI in USA, which combines intelligence and investigation functions, the CBI in India has to depend upon IB for intelligence information. Newly created National Investigation Agency by an act of Indian Parliament cannot be expected to act like FBI because it is not the result of amendment of the constitution, which requires approval of 2/3 of parliament and half the state’s assemblies. Hence, it is not binding for the state to follow. Moreover, the NIA also does not have its own organizational structures to function independently.
However, Varshney’s argument does not cover the whole truth, as the Indian constitutional framework is totally different from than that of the USA and hence it cannot be compared in this context. The main point is missed out in his argument that USA, being a presidential/federal system unlike India’s parliamentary/quasi-federal system, maintains separate constitutions for both - center and state besides separate judiciary and citizenship. Hence, it is not convincing to conclude abruptly that federalism weakens India’s response to terrorism, although the constitutional provisions relating to center-state relation in India need to be clarified in term of internal dimensions of security either by amendments to the constitution or opinion of the supreme court. Whatever may be, there must be unanimous view amongst all political parties including center and the state governments on national issues affecting national security.
Conclusion:
Is strategic policy based on strategic culture missing in India? It is debatable proposition. Scholars like George Tanham believe that there is no strategic culture in India.19 The opposite view argues that there has been a constant strategic thinking in India right from ancient history, though the pattern/nature of Indianised form of strategic culture differs from that of the western one. However, the fact remains that the level of such culture in the civil society of India is not at the democratic standard. An organized think-tank is also lacking. Independent/impartial/professional views are hardly taken into account while national policy on security is processed. Moreover, democracy is taken as an excuse by the political leadership for lagging behind Chinese level of military preparedness/economic growth, which may satisfy vote-bank but does not ensure national security.
However, strategic thinkers like Kautilya and Gandhi will not make security policy of the nation today, nor the policy-making responsibility can be entirely rested with government. People including the intellectuals, opposition parties, media, authors, scholars, etc., have to come forward instead of mere making irrelevant comments with fault finding negative tendency. Strategic culture has to grow and policy formation also has to be thinking-based on long-term basis. There is no short-cut remedy if India has the vision to grow as an effective international actor. India has to create space by her own in a tough global race for herself. No one else will do it for India. Instead of blaming neighbouring countries and imperialist for various problems, it needs to develop her own strength at global standard and that would be the best answer to the cross-border terrorism and frequent incursions on LAC.
Frankly speaking, the plain truth is that India now is on the verge of being a world power in the growing multi-polar world strategic scenario. India is not enjoying this status on the mercy of others but by virtue of her own economic growth, military strength, democratic system and national integrity and unity. Indian scholars who examine Indian security from western view need to review their thought-process. India, indeed, occupies a strong and enough strategic space to maintain her national security. Pakistani/Chinese designed anti-India strategy can never destabilized India. This is not an emotional myth, but the hard reality.
Where does India stand in the global system today? Widely acknowledged as an emerging power, it has an expanding role in regional and global politics. Its claims to such a role rest on its size, the rapid growth of its economy, its military capacity, its position as a large democratic state and its history of leadership in the developing world. An enhanced role is also in tune with its expanding interests. Many of these interests are linked to those of the major powers. In the economic sphere, India has joined WTO and the other multilateral regimes. In the military-political arena, it is committed to multilateralism with respect to the agenda of the major powers, especially on WMD, terrorism and the stabilisation of weak states. As its longstanding outsider status vis-à-vis the non-proliferation regime dissolves, it has a stronger stake and potentially a greater role in the same regime, this time as an insider. Given that global cooperation is essential to systemic stability, India will have to consider how and to what extent it can become a major stakeholder in the non-proliferation regime. Choices on membership of its non-universal components, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Proliferation Security Initiative, will be critical, if not always easy to make.20
As an emerging power, India is also seeking an entente with the US, which goes well beyond the India-US nuclear cooperation agreement. From a policy that in the heyday of non-alignment and autarky placed much emphasis on keeping its distance, India has shifted to close economic and military relations with the ‘hegemonic power’ in a classic exercise of bandwagoning. At the same time, reflecting its understanding of the changing world described earlier, it has spread its bets and engaged fruitfully with other major powers. Despite Indian reservations about China’s intentions, the India-China relationship has shifted from zero-sum game to a mixed –motive game in which the two manoeuvre and play strategic balancing games against each other, but simultaneously cooperate in trade for mutual benefit. This reflects a major strength of Indian foreign policy; it recognizes the high potential cost of an antagonistic relationship with China.21
A school of thought frequently makes criticism that India is becoming or has already become a subordinate ally of the US after Indo-US Nuclear Deal, it is overlooking some facts. First, even if the non-alignment is dead, its legacy is still relevant. India is still in a position to maintain her decision-making autonomy. Second, India having historical/civilizational richness, national pride and aspiration for growing world power, it cannot be a subordinate of any other power including USA. Third, the existing US allies like France and Germany co-operate with USA on many global issues but they are less cordial on many more issues including the invasion of Iraq. As regards India, which co-operate USA on the issue of global terrorism, WMD, civil nuclear, climate, Iran, South Korea etc. but it ignores US views on Pakistan, China, Palestine etc. India, therefore, can be a strategic partner, but not a pliant subordinate.
The fact remains that the Indo-US Nuclear Deal helps India in dealing with other global powers like France, Russia, European Union, Japan, Germany etc. on various issues including nuclear, science and technology. As Indo-US relations grow closer, Pakistan finds it politically more and difficult to play the asymmetric warfare game with India. China too takes India more seriously after the said Deal as happened during the recent Copenhagen Summit on climate change. India allying with USA does not mean against China. The US itself is not inclined to do more than hedge against China, and India has common interest with it. Unless there is a positive breakthrough, the present policy of India towards China – hedging on political-military front and side by side giving a thrust to economic co-operation – is likely to continue. India has grown global responsibility after its unconventional reaction on Iran’s nuclear controversy.
The recent Copenhagen Climate Change conference has marked the beginning of global relevance of India being a multi-polar power along with China, from where India is unlikely to look behind. Apart from diplomacy, India is also, undoubtedly a potential military power having capability to defend her national interest against any threats. Today, India is successfully balancing economic development with defence as well as managing diplomacy together with military muscle to serve national interest from a strong position.
Reference:
(Dr. NK Kumar)
Introduction:
Is India at the crossroads today in the current strategic scenario? Is it crossing through a transitional phase in the prevailing security environment? Is its stand on security merely a myth/dilemma? Is it stuck on the dead-end? Many more such questions are haunting in the mind of intellectuals. Answers to these questions are far from being easy and simple one, but not difficult too if the ground reality is critically/objectively analyzed. The aim of this article is to analyze various strategic options for India and to focus on suitable answers to such questions in the given situation. It begins with conceptualizing security in the present strategic environment for India - a nation on the threshold of major power status. This provides a ground for interpreting the changing international and sub-continental strategic situation and to locate India’s appropriate place in it. This paper makes an attempt to focus India’s search for strategic space in the complex global and sub-continental strategic scenario. It reviews by outlining briefly what kind of broad policy choices are optional for India as an emerging power.
Ever since India’s birth as an independent nation state, it happened to be on the target of the most ‘powerful imperialist’ (USA) as well as the most ‘adventurous communist regime’ (China) and the ‘fanatical military regime’ (Pak). They kept on raising unrealistic/imaginary/hypothetical issues, one after another, despite India’s all possible good gestures to them. After the end of cold war the peace broke out worldwide. But the strategic situation around India in the sub-continent remained the same and the peace is still a dream. India’s quest for peaceful and secured space appears to be shattered under external threats. Moreover, domestic scenario, due to regionalism/religious fundamentalism/left extremism, is also no different. No stone is being left unturned by the anti-India forces from both outside and inside, to shake the dream of a nation, which sincerely struggles to survive with peaceful co-existence. In almost same situation, many newly born nation-states after the II world war, have either lost their independence or broken into pieces or politically surrendered under pressures.
In these circumstances, India does not find space for respite even for a moment since the time it snatched freedom from the clutches of the colonial monster. Does India need same method of snatching peace and security for her survival also? In other words, does India need the kind of means used by her for gaining independence for her survival as an independent nation also? If so, then India’s traditional defensive approach needs to be reviewed and the offensive/aggressive face is to be focused. If India intends to do so, first of all it needs to conceptualize her national security properly and carefully before any attempt is made to shift her decades old strategic stand.
In this regard, let us conceptualize national security in general term before touching upon the same in the Indian context.
Security has been defined and understood variously by various experts on various occasions. Security, in fact, is an abstract and also an elusive term; it means different things to different people, it also has different concepts in different situations. At Psychological level the term security presents images of peace and harmony, a feeling of being well guarded from several uncertainties. At another level it has an underpinning of vulnerability and fear from which we may guard ourselves but from that very action others may feel insecure. In this context, let us see traditional and transnational views.
For traditional view, according to Walter Lipmann “… a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interest to avoid war and is able, if challenged to maintain them by war.”1 Henry Kissinger says, “ National security in its widest sense comprises every action by which a society seeks to assure its survival or to realize its aspirations internationally.”2 It means military or defence forces to insure territorial security of the nation against various threats. This is the responsibility of the state; the actor in the society of states, rather than individual, to protect national security.3
As regards transnational view, the two terms are associated together- One is the concept of comprehensive security and the other is human security. The first argues that security concerns have to look into the political, economic and socio-cultural dimensions of security of the people of any state and the other seeks direct linkage with human well being. While the concept of comprehensive security continues to accept the relevance of the nation state and places its discourse within the parameter of a nation state, the concept of human security takes a more global view. It would, therefore, be appropriate to locate the concept of human security within the transnational approaches that focus on the human dimension looking beyond the nation state barriers.4
Broadly speaking there are two dimensions of national security-external and internal. External security rests on the premise that there are perpetual clashes of interest among the nations and these are often irreconcilable, which may lead to war. On the other hand internal security rests on the assumption that every society is perpetually torn by intra-societal conflicts which often lead to political disorder, violence and social turmoil.
National security also has both military and non-military dimensions. Military dimension of security is also called as strategic or traditional or conventional dimension of security. And the non-military dimension in other words is known as non-strategic or non-traditional or non-conventional dimension of security. Armed force is involved to protect the nation and society in case of threats from inside or outside on national security under the concept of military dimension of security.5 As regard the concept of non-military dimension, the army is not normally involved unless and until the situation goes beyond the control of civil and police administrations. Non-military dimension of security also covers comprehensive/human interest at global level in terms of international concept of common security. For instance, the interest relating to environment etc. for which all the nations make efforts to tackle threats on environment so as to ensure common interest of the entire global community.
In this background, the national security of India conceptually moves, by and large, within the same parameters of traditional barriers of nation-state. Indian armed force, like those of others countries, protects national border and territory against external threats along with protecting national integrity/unity against internal threats posed by internal militant groups.
However, India’s strategic scenario is not always similar to many other nation- states. It is, therefore, apart from guarding border against hostile countries, its main thrust area, now a days, is the internal dimension of security to tackle cross border terrorism and insurgency, besides time to time supporting police in low intensive conflicts against naxalites etc. It is also supporting civil administration during natural calamities/disasters.6 Other nation-states may have different nature of strategic situation and hence their military’s thrust area may also differ from that of India. Unlike USA and a few members-states of NATO, the Indian army is not deployed abroad in a state’s politically deigned agenda. The involvement of Indian army in IPKF operation in Sri Lank in 1987-89 is an exception. It is, therefore, argued that the security in the Indian context cannot be conceptualized in general term due to its different nature of strategic situations.
As regards India’s non-military/non-traditional/internal dimensions of security is concerned, following are the main components:7
- Economic – Economic growth, Employment, poverty, Energy,
corruption, Money laundering, Redistribution of economic resources,
fake currency, Black money, Recession, Drug trafficking etc.
- Socio-cultural – Social-justice, Caste issue, Tribal issue, Religious minority, Linguistic minority, Child marriage, Dowry etc.
- Human – Human rights, Exploitation against women, children and labour, Health, Migration, illiteracy etc.
- Environmental – Land, Water, Natural resources, Pollution, Food, Forest, Climate.
- Political - Political stability, Center-state relation, Criminalisation of politics, Caste- politics, Vote-bank politics, Coalition-politics, Political unanimity on national issues.
Economic face of India shows that it’s GDP stands at the top and its other aspects of economy at the bottom in the world. About 33% people are under poverty line, gap between rich and poor is widening and unemployment as well as corruption, money laundering, scarcity of energy etc are increasing at alarming level. Thus, the imbalance economic development is the root-cause of many internal dimensions of Indian security.
Fragmented socio-cultural configuration continues to dominate over national security of India from the beginning of the origin of nation state. Socio-cultural diversities comprising various components together in homogeneous framework provides a basic pre-requisite of both the development as well security of the nation, which is missing in India. Fragmentation at any step for whatsoever reason in the internal framework of nation-state is a serious challenge to national security.
Human approach to national security based on humanism argues for strengthening the foundation of internal security of a nation-state. Human dimension of security is also significant for global framework of transnational security. India’s poor human right record is a serious challenge to the national security.
Environmental aspect of security is significant for both national and global framework of security. Although, there is no immediate threat of declining environmental balance on national security, but in the long term the environmental dimension is an area of concern for both national and international security.9 India is co-operating with the global community on environmental issues on her behalf and also on behalf of developing countries.
Soviet/Yugoslavian instance of political dimension of internal security, which led to disintegration of strong nation-states, is a cautionary signal to the world, though the nature of such threats varies from nation to nation. The political scenario of coalition politics, growing regional political parties and the vote-bank politics in India pose a significant threat on national security in the long term.10
Changing scenario and India’s stand
The global strategic scenario after the breaking up of the former USSR has undergone a major transformation. The end of cold war has brought about the loss of a quantified bipolarity and has ushered the polarization of intent, capability and power (military and non-military). The multipolar nodes of power is emerging with potential deploy and threaten the use of weapons of mass destruction even when the history of the post world war period till date has not precipitated and all nuclear war.11
However, the hostiled strategic scenario in the Indian sub-continent, more or less, remains the same. In the meanwhile India and Pakistan are in possession of nuclear weapon and China and India are emerging as economic global power. As regards internal dimension of Indian security, the economic globalization and the evolution of information technology along with liberalization of Indian economy have a positive impact on India in terms of increasing GDP, foreign currency, defence budget, employment inside/outside the country etc. As a result the domestic pressures (financial and human) on national security is decreasing.
Conceptualizing security in general term is comprised of three aspects – abstraction, theorization and materialization. As the nation states despite being asymmetrical to each other on more than one count, will continue to remain a prime actors in the foreseeable future as a unit of analysis in international relation and global system, the role of the armed forces will continue to remain a significant factor, though in the Indian context, their thrust area of operation in the traditional sense may escalate and deescalate both. In the changing situation the Indian armed force have greater task inside the country to protect internal security rather than their deployment on border. Therefore, all the three aspects of security need to be touched upon with open mind.
Conceptualizing security and giving a sense of direction and implementation of security policies will require bridging the gap between the realm of idea and the domain of public policy making, the latter being an offshoot of the organizations at the government and non-government levels are empowered to examine holistically the totality of security considerations. As a market driven new world order is emerging because of globalization, the changing self-perceptions of nation state will impinge on the manner in which they articulate their security concerns and coping strategies. One has to therefore consider that both financial and technological aspects will operate and play a significant role based on resources and opportunities. 12
It is in this emerging scenario that the think tank of intellectuals has to pave the way to suggest options to the makers of security policy so as to ensure that the pre-planned action is kept in hand before any internal crisis emerges for internal security. India, a growing global power cannot afford any more dilemma and myth in the process of policy making. Ambiguity on the part of policy making and the dilemma at any level of implementation of the same takes the nation-state nowhere near the situation to tackle the challenges of internal dimension of national security.
However, the perception of changing situation is not so simple, as UP Thakur and C. Narasimha Rao argue, “ because the context has changed, the forces we have to fight we have changed, the tools and technique with which we can fight effectively are new, the players are new, the attitudes are new. And all these are in permanent changeable state and unpredictable. Things change in nanoseconds, not in days and months. The very scale of measure has changed. It is no longer Himalayan border we are fighting for, we are fighting forces external and within that are dynamic and unpredictable. If it is 21st century, we can not conceptualize war doctrine for the 20sh century.” 13
Now it is a different world and different time. We have to conceptualize security differently. It is more so for India – the India that does not change, the India that always think itself to be safe and secure enough. but always prove wrong, must see reason to change – to secure itself and its people in the new age of knowledge economy.
Conceptualization of security also involves question of what and whose interest we protect, how we protect, who all are involved in protecting. Is it only military that is supposed to protect while others keep watching? And also, the issue of where the protection begins – is it at border alone or in every home and field? The concept of protection must be replaced by the concept of growth and development; the concept of defence must yield to the concept of proactive force capability. We must shift security philosophy to a positive action agenda for the overall development and progress of the nation, where every citizen, every activity, every sector and every entity becomes the generator of strength and power, and contributes to the strength and might of the nation-state.14
In the changing scenario, therefore, India needs to conceptualize her security in certain perspectives to get her updated.
Perspectives:
We cannot predict future scenario of security threats but we can certainly base our projection on historical, socio-cultural, psychological, economic, political, and technological moorings/perspectives.
- Historical – Military history of India from the time of Mauryan empire till the Kargil conflict and also the military history of the world beginning from the time of Napoleon till the end of gulf war 1991, are full of lessons of war, security, strategy, tactics etc. Having analyzed history one can make a framework of conceptualizing security of both internal and external dimensions well in time before actual threats knock the door.
- Socio-cultural – Indian society and culture is a complex issue, not only because of diversities but also for its contradictory components and complicated configuration. In the existing scenario, to find a bridging device in the gap of socio-cultural gulf causing internal insecurity is not simple. It is, therefore, a long-term framework of socio-cultural reality at national level needs to be analyzed and to evolve a common space for peaceful co-existence all sub-cultures together so that the national unity amongst socio-cultural diversity can ensure internal security.
- Psychological – Intangible elements of national power like national morale, national character and national leadership are psychologically inter-connected in terms of internal and external dimensions of national security. Recently the national level of Indian military leadership like the navel chief and the air force chief have separately stated that the overall capability of Indian armed forces is not only much inferior to that of China but also it can not even tackle Pakistan. Besides, the vice-chief of air force staff has also openly criticized the culture of political leadership of both the ruling opposition party for delaying the procurement of arms. Besides, the Army Chief openly stated unprofessionally that India is getting prepared for war with two enemies-Pak and China. The psychological/adverse impacts of such pessimistic and provoking public statements on national morale and also on national image can be well imagined. They should understand that no nation-state could be physically secured if it is psychologically insecure. This is not only a gross misuse of democratic norms but also a broad violation of military ethics. India, therefore, needs to learn strategic culture and security norms in the perspective of psychological propensities.
- Economic - Economic problem is a core issue, which causes plights in all aspects of security, whether to prepare in external or internal dimensions, to meet military or non-military threats or to take initiative in setting basic infrastructures of socio-cultural and human security. Economic support cannot be substituted. However, the country like India cannot be expected to create and mobilize sufficient economic resources for security preparations over night, though Indian economy now is growing fast and also allocating finance to defence budget manifold in comparison with past 10-15 years. But is it sufficient to tackle Pak-China together on external front and the vast area on internal front from economic development of Kashmir, north-east region, Naxalites affected belt, besides many more commitments and urgent financial requirements to ensure the preparation of national security on long term basis? Certainly not. But what is the way out? All these shot comings and impediments are to be kept in mind while security planning and policy is viewed in the initial stages, as the economic perspective of security cannot be ignored.
- Political – India being the largest democratic political system in the world has certain plus and minus in terms of security. A number of serious internal security issues like Mozo problem, Punjab problem, Assam problem, anti-Hindi problem in Tamilnadu etc. have been solved through dialogue, and many more are in the process of heading towards democratic solution. However, the democratic norms demand transparency in policy, planning and strategy concerning security, which may be misused by anti-national elements as happened during 26/11 terrorist attack in Mumbai where the militants came to know about police action through the Indian TV news channels. The political reality and its commitments are important in relation to national security. In this background, therefore, political perspective is significant in the security context.
- Technological – Modern technology is significant in all walk of life including modern warfare. We have seen the role of air power technology during the Gulf War in 1991 where ten lakhs well trained professional army of Iraq was forced to surrender. Is India prepared for such warfare against well-equipped hostile power with modern arms? What is the present status of military technology in India? Is the indigenous source of military technology sufficient or do we depend upon imports from other countries? When we talk about technology we mean modern indigenous military software and hardware in terms of quality of weapons, communication/information system, intelligence, training etc. In the given situation, can we fight a war in 21st century with the guns of 19th century? Military history shows that the modern weapons, latest technology, proper training and morale of the man can make miracle in warfare. In this perspective India needs to maintain the level of military preparedness of modern quality.
However, mere perspectives of security are not enough for proper formation and conceptualization of security policy for India in the present international and regional strategic scenario. We, therefore, need to follow certain tenants in this regard, such as:
Tenants
- Military power and diplomacy
- Defence and development
- Technology and knowledge-based security personnel
- Federal pluralism and unanimity on national issues
Broadly speaking, both, the military power and diplomacy are the means to protect / promote national interest. Whereas the former possess physical strength to guard national territory against threats from inside and outside and the later is a skill to manage international relations in the interest of the nation. And hence, the goal of both of them is the same – the protection of national interest. Besides, both of them are also complementary to each other. Alone either of them cannot provide sufficient security to the nation. India, therefore, must insure that the military muscle and the diplomacy should go together. India herself has demonstrated the same during Bangladesh liberation. World takes lesson from India as how to protect national interest by balancing army and the foreign relations together. Indira’s diplomacy with USSR and Manek shaw’s military strategy make a wonderful combination to ensure an unprecedented victory. Security – policy makers in India need to maintain the same in future too. Is India attempting to repeat her own history by making strategic relation with USA? Whether USA deserves to be as trusted as used to be USSR or not, it is altogether a different issue in view of the Indo – USA relations during the cold – war era. Whatever may be, in the present unipolar scenario India does not have any other option.
Defence and development is another important tenant of conceptualizing security for India in principle. The concept of long tern security refers to balancing expenses on defence and development. It is true that no expense is too much when it comes to the nation’s security. But what about economic development? The fact remains that the economic growth is the foundation of national security. It is, therefore, both are equally significant. “ The entire process of defence budget allocation in an independent India was inherited from British with no conceptual or procedural changes.”15 Budgeting has always been conceived as a process for systematically relating expenditure of funds to accomplishment of planned objectives. Thus its main principal emphasis is on planning and relating it to resources required and finances needed to accomplish the objectives. However, in practice this dimension is rarely reflected explicitly in the government budgets.16
India is one of the four oldest civilizations of the world. It is comprised of 31 regions, 1618 languages, 6400 castes, 6 religions, 6 ethnic groups, 29 major festivals 150 languages, 544 dialects and 1 country. In such a huge diversity if there is a slight imbalance in maintaining socio-cultural equilibrium it leads to a serious internal security crisis like the demolition of Babri Mashjid and Mandal Commission.
Defence expenditure also depends upon threat perception. The land frontier extends to about 15200 km with China, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Pakistan. India’s coastline extends over 7500 km and the island territories in the Bay of Bengal are more than 1100 km from the Indian mainland. The Indian landmass has an area of about 3.2 million sq.km and the EEZ has an area of about 2 million sq. km. It is a tough task of the Indian defence to take care. Hence budget needs to be in accordance with threat perceptions.
As regards development, it is not merely an economic phenomenon; it also perceived as multidimensional process involving the reorganization and re-orientation of entire economic and social system. GDP/GNP does not always indicate the ground reality, nor it shows the socio-economic equality in the real sense of the term. India’s GDP is good enough, yet about 35% Indians are under below poverty line. Many Indians are scholars at global level; still about 30% people are illiterates. In this situation, if an undeveloped India is economically insecure, can a strong defence, if it is, alone provide adequate national security in both internal and external dimensions? It is, therefore, India needs overall development in both the areas of defence and development. How it could be achieved, it all depends upon the planners and strategy makers for a long-term security.
Technology and knowledge-based security personnel are the needs of the modern security environment. Technology, in general, refers to the latest scientific know-how and the modern apparatus/tools/instruments for mechanizing the system. In security term, the technology refers to the modernization of military weapons and other hardware. Moreover, imparting proper training to the staff is also equally important so as to handle the modern arms efficiently. Besides, “the international divide today is not just about political misalignments or economic disparities but also about security related policies of denial of duel-use technologies, imbalances in arms export policies in trade practices and fierce industrial competition. Concerns of trans-national tensions on issues such as WMD proliferation, militarisation of outer space, global warming, competition to energy resources and adverse impact of advances in Bio and Nano technologies also influences security perceptions. Motivational cross-connections and technical inter-linkages of this 21st century scenario can present serious impediments to national security. As we move forward to a more knowledge-based society, information security and cyber security issues are posing new challenges to the management of security, thereby increasing vulnerabilities with no clear answers yet.”17 All these challenges of acquiring/developing modern arms, imparting modern training to the staff and the management of security are to be kept in mind while military preparedness is assured.
Federal pluralism and unanimity on national issues is a principle, which argues for maintaining national unity in diversity of interest. Federalism refers to autonomy of state under a federal/central govt. so as to maintain unity at center over diversity at state level. Its relevance is widely indorsed at the broad level of global democratic commitments in general and in the Indian perspective in particular. However, in India the commitments for constitutional provision of federal structure come in the way of tackle terrorist acts and other internal security related problems, as some scholars like Ashutosh Varshney argue.18 He has pointed out three laws and practices in support of his view:
a. As per Indian constitution, internal law and order is on the state-list, not a subject of central or concurrent list. Unlike US concept of ‘federal crime,’ under federal law, India does not have this type of system under central govt. to tackle terrorist act directly as this is state’s responsibility.
b. National security guard (commandos) under central govt. does not function properly due to non-cooperation of states.
c. In contrast to the FBI in USA, which combines intelligence and investigation functions, the CBI in India has to depend upon IB for intelligence information. Newly created National Investigation Agency by an act of Indian Parliament cannot be expected to act like FBI because it is not the result of amendment of the constitution, which requires approval of 2/3 of parliament and half the state’s assemblies. Hence, it is not binding for the state to follow. Moreover, the NIA also does not have its own organizational structures to function independently.
However, Varshney’s argument does not cover the whole truth, as the Indian constitutional framework is totally different from than that of the USA and hence it cannot be compared in this context. The main point is missed out in his argument that USA, being a presidential/federal system unlike India’s parliamentary/quasi-federal system, maintains separate constitutions for both - center and state besides separate judiciary and citizenship. Hence, it is not convincing to conclude abruptly that federalism weakens India’s response to terrorism, although the constitutional provisions relating to center-state relation in India need to be clarified in term of internal dimensions of security either by amendments to the constitution or opinion of the supreme court. Whatever may be, there must be unanimous view amongst all political parties including center and the state governments on national issues affecting national security.
Conclusion:
Is strategic policy based on strategic culture missing in India? It is debatable proposition. Scholars like George Tanham believe that there is no strategic culture in India.19 The opposite view argues that there has been a constant strategic thinking in India right from ancient history, though the pattern/nature of Indianised form of strategic culture differs from that of the western one. However, the fact remains that the level of such culture in the civil society of India is not at the democratic standard. An organized think-tank is also lacking. Independent/impartial/professional views are hardly taken into account while national policy on security is processed. Moreover, democracy is taken as an excuse by the political leadership for lagging behind Chinese level of military preparedness/economic growth, which may satisfy vote-bank but does not ensure national security.
However, strategic thinkers like Kautilya and Gandhi will not make security policy of the nation today, nor the policy-making responsibility can be entirely rested with government. People including the intellectuals, opposition parties, media, authors, scholars, etc., have to come forward instead of mere making irrelevant comments with fault finding negative tendency. Strategic culture has to grow and policy formation also has to be thinking-based on long-term basis. There is no short-cut remedy if India has the vision to grow as an effective international actor. India has to create space by her own in a tough global race for herself. No one else will do it for India. Instead of blaming neighbouring countries and imperialist for various problems, it needs to develop her own strength at global standard and that would be the best answer to the cross-border terrorism and frequent incursions on LAC.
Frankly speaking, the plain truth is that India now is on the verge of being a world power in the growing multi-polar world strategic scenario. India is not enjoying this status on the mercy of others but by virtue of her own economic growth, military strength, democratic system and national integrity and unity. Indian scholars who examine Indian security from western view need to review their thought-process. India, indeed, occupies a strong and enough strategic space to maintain her national security. Pakistani/Chinese designed anti-India strategy can never destabilized India. This is not an emotional myth, but the hard reality.
Where does India stand in the global system today? Widely acknowledged as an emerging power, it has an expanding role in regional and global politics. Its claims to such a role rest on its size, the rapid growth of its economy, its military capacity, its position as a large democratic state and its history of leadership in the developing world. An enhanced role is also in tune with its expanding interests. Many of these interests are linked to those of the major powers. In the economic sphere, India has joined WTO and the other multilateral regimes. In the military-political arena, it is committed to multilateralism with respect to the agenda of the major powers, especially on WMD, terrorism and the stabilisation of weak states. As its longstanding outsider status vis-à-vis the non-proliferation regime dissolves, it has a stronger stake and potentially a greater role in the same regime, this time as an insider. Given that global cooperation is essential to systemic stability, India will have to consider how and to what extent it can become a major stakeholder in the non-proliferation regime. Choices on membership of its non-universal components, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Proliferation Security Initiative, will be critical, if not always easy to make.20
As an emerging power, India is also seeking an entente with the US, which goes well beyond the India-US nuclear cooperation agreement. From a policy that in the heyday of non-alignment and autarky placed much emphasis on keeping its distance, India has shifted to close economic and military relations with the ‘hegemonic power’ in a classic exercise of bandwagoning. At the same time, reflecting its understanding of the changing world described earlier, it has spread its bets and engaged fruitfully with other major powers. Despite Indian reservations about China’s intentions, the India-China relationship has shifted from zero-sum game to a mixed –motive game in which the two manoeuvre and play strategic balancing games against each other, but simultaneously cooperate in trade for mutual benefit. This reflects a major strength of Indian foreign policy; it recognizes the high potential cost of an antagonistic relationship with China.21
A school of thought frequently makes criticism that India is becoming or has already become a subordinate ally of the US after Indo-US Nuclear Deal, it is overlooking some facts. First, even if the non-alignment is dead, its legacy is still relevant. India is still in a position to maintain her decision-making autonomy. Second, India having historical/civilizational richness, national pride and aspiration for growing world power, it cannot be a subordinate of any other power including USA. Third, the existing US allies like France and Germany co-operate with USA on many global issues but they are less cordial on many more issues including the invasion of Iraq. As regards India, which co-operate USA on the issue of global terrorism, WMD, civil nuclear, climate, Iran, South Korea etc. but it ignores US views on Pakistan, China, Palestine etc. India, therefore, can be a strategic partner, but not a pliant subordinate.
The fact remains that the Indo-US Nuclear Deal helps India in dealing with other global powers like France, Russia, European Union, Japan, Germany etc. on various issues including nuclear, science and technology. As Indo-US relations grow closer, Pakistan finds it politically more and difficult to play the asymmetric warfare game with India. China too takes India more seriously after the said Deal as happened during the recent Copenhagen Summit on climate change. India allying with USA does not mean against China. The US itself is not inclined to do more than hedge against China, and India has common interest with it. Unless there is a positive breakthrough, the present policy of India towards China – hedging on political-military front and side by side giving a thrust to economic co-operation – is likely to continue. India has grown global responsibility after its unconventional reaction on Iran’s nuclear controversy.
The recent Copenhagen Climate Change conference has marked the beginning of global relevance of India being a multi-polar power along with China, from where India is unlikely to look behind. Apart from diplomacy, India is also, undoubtedly a potential military power having capability to defend her national interest against any threats. Today, India is successfully balancing economic development with defence as well as managing diplomacy together with military muscle to serve national interest from a strong position.
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