Indo
– China Strategic Rivalry
(By Dr. Nand Kishor Kumar)
Introduction
Richard Nixon in 1994 stated that “China’s
economic power makes US lecture about human rights imprudent. Within a decade,
it will make them irrelevant. Within two decades, it will make them laughable.
By then the Chinese may threaten to withhold MFN status from the US unless we
do more to improve living conditions in Detroit, Harlem and South Central LA.”[i]
Looking at today’s Chinese strategic
stature in 2014, the aforesaid prophesy made by Richard Nixon about China seems
to be appropriate.
However, despite the fact that no such
eminent prophecy was made for future growth of India, the significant status
occupied by India over the last 65 years, ever since her independence in 1947,
is not the product of strategic mercy by any super power, as USA did for China,
but by virtue of its own efforts, that too, in unfavorable scenario inside and
outside India. It is, therefore, the fact that China has undoubtedly grown
tremendously in all aspects of national power, but India is also not very far
behind. In this background Indo – China relation needs to be analyzed and
examined in the present context without being prejudiced, biased and influenced
by anti-India so-called western/Indian scholars who have the tendency to
underrate India in relation to China. Yes, India’s strategic face is not as
bright as that of China, but overall India’s position is also not as grim and pessimist
looking as such authors attempt to paint it
This paper attempts to focus the
framework of strategic background of both India and China in context with their
relationship and also to highlight the impact of their strategic rivalry on the
vital national, regional and global interest.
Strategic
Perception
Strategy has
been defined as a Plan designed to achieve a particular long term aim. It is
also an art of planning and directing military activity in a war or battle.
According to Stuart Poore, “…the term strategy has tradionally been used to
refer to the way that the military power is used by government in the pursuit
of their interest. How are theses interest shaped? A strategic culture approach
tackles this question by considering the relevance of cultural context in
influencing strategic preferences.”(Neorealism vs. Strategic Culture, in the
book – Strategic Culture- by John Glenn and Stuart Poore, p. 47).
Colin S. Gray in his ‘Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and
Practice’, P. 162 has pointed out six principles of strategic culture:
1.
Strategic behavior cannot be beyond
culture
2.
Adversity cannot cancel culture
3.
Strategic culture is a guide to
action
4.
Strategic culture expresses
comparative advantage
5.
Strategic culture can be
dysfunctional
6.
Strategic culture can be variously
categorized, such as nationality, geography, weapons and functions, simplicity
and complexity, generation and grand strategy.
As regards Chinese strategic culture in
terms of aforesaid six principles, the general impression about China begins
with Sun Tzu of China, authored the ‘ Art of War’, sometime between the 8th
and 5th century BC, 3-4 centuries earlier than our own Kautilya, who
wrote the ‘Arthshastra’ during 4th - 3th century BC. Both wrote
broadly about strategy. They discussed statecraft, diplomacy, relationship with
other nations and a host of other topics in their respective books. The
prevalence of ‘strategic culture’ in the two countries can be gleaned from the
fact that Sun Tzu’s strategic principles were continuously updated by
subsequent Chinese strategists over the centuries to keep them relevant to the
changing technologies and environment. Kautilya’s Arthshastra has become the
object of historical studies and no serious attempts were made either by the
military analysts or other strategists to evaluate its practical applicability
and pertinent to developmental changes in India. Basically a moderate strategic
culture has been followed in India throughout its history unlike China.
The near absence of an aggressive
strategic culture in India is further driven home if one scrolls down any
listing of military strategists/writers over time. While Chinese names are like
Jiao Yu, Shen Kuo, Sun Bin, Sun Tzu, Wu Qi, Liu Zi, Wang Xiangsui, Zhuge Liang
and Mao Zedong, where as the only Indian in this list is Kautilya. China’s push
to become a global power is based on modern interpretation of Sun Tzu’s classic
and Chinese scholars rely on historical strategic lessons and ‘Art of War’ to
develop strategy of the Chinese state and its leaders. In contrast, the
strategic lessons India has learnt from its previous wars or international
engagements.
The contrasting strategic cultures of
China and India have strongly influenced bilateral relations in the past. The
relations between the two countries will always have elements of competition
and contest. Many international relations always maintain that given their
geographical proximity and sheer sizes, China and India are natural rivals.
Nancy Jetley, in her analysis of Sino-Indian relations, in an article written
in 1992 stated that, “It needs to be clearly recognized that China’s claims to
vast territory of India are related in the main to ideological intent. The
Chinese strategy, as it unfolded after 1959 was designed not so much to gain
possession of a few thousand square miles of mountainous territory – not all of
which are strategically vital to China – as to eliminate India as a power of
consequence from the Asian scene. China’s policy in South Asia – imposing deep
national humiliation on India by exposing its strategic shortcomings in 1962,
tarnishing its image as a great Asian country, systematically eroding its
special ties with its Himalayan neighbors, exploiting sub-continental
dissensions by embarking on a deliberate poly of collusion with Pakistan and
above all weakening the political stability of India through its clandestine
support to Mizo and Naga insurgents – has been essentially an exercise in
isolating India and eroding its influence in the region.” India regained some
of its stature displaying superior military strategy in 1971.[ii]
Following aggressive strategy by China
and a moderate strategy of Five Principles – policy of peaceful co-existence
and others (Panchshee) – followed by India, is a subject of serious analysis
separately. What is gain/loss of such strategies of China and India is a matter
of perception and national objectives as well as strategic goal. Hence India’s
strategic perception cannot be undermined without doing proper analytical study
by unbiased strategists.
The western author like George Tanham stated
that “India has not had a tradition of strategic thinking …..”.[iii]
Further he said “Indiams seem to arrive at strategic concept and decision rather
than by thinking about them and then making a conscious decision.”[iv]
Tanham is perhaps not familiar with complexities inherent to the Indian
culture. Hence it is harder to trace out for him that there is a systematic
strategic thought propounded by Manu (700 BC),Kautilya (300-400 BC), Ved Vyas
and epics like Ramayan, Geeta, Mahabharata, Purans, Vedas etc in the past and
subsequently Gandhiji, Subhash Bose, Ambedkar, Nehru, Indira, Rajeev, Bajpai,
Savarkar, Shivaji etc. Unfortunately, many numbers of Indian authors, without
applying their own reliable resources, blindly follow Tanham. Whatever is said
by western scholar, we have the habit of saying yes without verifying the fact.
Tanhanm, if he is not known to the Indian culture, it could be understood as he
is outsider, but how can we do it while living all the time in this culture.
Scholars like Francine R. Frankel,
Harry Harding, Susan L. Shirk, Stephen Cohen etc. argue that China hardly
bothers for India. For China, India merits little attention and, even after
India’s May 1998 nuclear test, is not taken seriously as a security threat.
China does not even consider India as one of the significant power in the
world. India is simply not on China’s “radar screen”.[v]
China’s smug attitude toward India is not just a pose adopted in official
statements for international purpose; it is reflected domestically as well.
India has many more experts on China than China has experts on India. Indian
policy toward China are broadly debated and handled at the highest level of
political leadership, in contrast to Chinese policy toward India, which are
ignored by the public and managed by the diplomats and bureaucrats. China’s
indifference to India and its disdainful, patronizing attitude toward India,
infuriate the Indians.
Steven A. Hoffmann has highlighted
India’s view on China.[vi]
For India, China looms large as an economic and political rival and also as a
security threat. However, India is self confident that it has potential to grow
as a world power by means of its territorial/population size, economic
strength, information technology, nuclear power, military muscels, skillful
diplomacy, balance of defence and development, independent foreign policy,
active participation in global affairs – UNO, WTO etc., democracy and Rule of
Law, Independent judiciary, qualified man power with command of English language
etc.
Therefore, this is an illogical/mythical
perception that India stands nowhere before China in term of strategic culture.
The fact, as described above, that both China and India are very rich in
strategic culture since last almost 3000 years. A part from it both shares a
number of attributes. Exceptionally large population, sharing a 4,700 km long border,
huge continental size, old civilization, culture and a history of invasions,
internal turmoil and foreign exploitation are some of the major similarities.
Even in their post – II World War history, both suffered from widespread
poverty, dependence on agriculture, natural calamities, social and financial
inequalities and a myriad other impediments to national development.
Their approaches to national
security, however, are completely different. China chose to send its armies to
‘liberate’ Tibet, and entered the Korean war in support of North Korea, which
was clearly the aggressor, India chose to go to the UNO when it was attacked by
Pakistan in J & K. [vii]
China possessed nuclear weapon in 1964 despite Soviet Union’s Security umbrella
over China, when India felt that possession of nuclear weapon was immoral and
asserted for total disarmament. Even if India tested nuclear capability in 1974
for peaceful purpose, it did not produce weapon. Besides, Chinese solders
frequently violating LOC with India and objecting/humiliating Indians from
Arunachal and J and K to visit China on normal visa. Chinese aggressive
approach and India’s moderate outlook, based on their respective cultures being
followed for centuries, is the main point of difference in terms of strategic
culture between the two.
In 1931 during Manchurian crisis, Indian
National Congress (INC) supported China. In 1937 when Japan attacked main land
of China, not only INC accused Japan, but also sent medical mission to China as
a token of good gesture. Moreover, India is the second non-communist country in
the world which recognized communist China as a legitimate representative of
China despite the fact that entire western countries recognized Taiwan instead
of Communist China. Taiwan was not only an ordinary member of UNO but also the
permanent member of Security Council of the UNO till 197o when it was replaced
by communist China with the western support. India, despite 1962 humiliation,
kept raising Chinese (PLC) issue in UNO so that it could become the member of
UNO before 1970.
China has been using Pakistan to contain
India. India, following tit for tat, could have also easily taken support of
Taiwan, South Korea and Japan against China; it did not do it keeping in mind
its standard of diplomacy. However, India, despite being moralist, is conscious
of national security and other vital national interest. ‘ Look east’ policy brings India closure to
Japan, South Korea, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Vietnam and other member of ASEAN as
wll as other countries in Asia Pacific, South East Asia and South Asia to
counter China at its door.
Hence, the views of anti-India
scholars are not at all updated in terms of strategic tradition. If India is as
weak as they claim it would have been collapsed as a nation immediately after
partisan of Pakistan, Pak attack in 1948, 1965 and Chinese attack in 1962. The
fact is that India now is one of the 6 most significant nations in the world in
terms of national power. Along with India, almost 2/3 countries of the world
got independence after II World War and many of them subsequently collapsed or
lost independence for one or the other reasons. Besides, only a very few of
such survived countries now stand with true democracy like India. However, it
is not a miracle or someone’s unethical blessings behind the growth of India
but by dint of its relevant strategy, policy and planning to operate state machinery,
will to survive in the critical juncture of domestic and external hindrances,
consensus approach in the diversity of culture and the art of management of coalition
governance at the centre, and above all, a consistent self confidence,
tolerance and a dynamic foreign and security policy.
What views China has about India,
it is concerned to China as it is entitled to have it, but as scholars look
that, it does not bother India despite the fact that India has respect for
China that it is a great nation during past and present too. India is aware of
its destination and the means to achieve it and it does not care what others
think about it.
Strategic
Framework
India
The strategy of China that Susan L. Shirk and
Frankel talk about is not suited to Indian Strategic culture. China follows
strategy of war, aggression, intervention, attack, occupation, belligerence,
offence, invasion etc. Such concept of strategy is almost similar to the
western one, imperialist, expansionist etc. India is very much clear about it.
It has no intention of attacking others by initiating war, aggression or
intervention or even proxy war as it respects the sovereignty of others. That
is why it carries out Panchshil – the Five Principles-, Peaceful
co-existence, non-aggression, non-intervention, non-alignment, non-apartheid,
anti-colonialism, anti-racialism, anti-imperialism etc. Basically India is defensive in approach as
regards its security policy is concerned.
But it does not mean that it
would not retaliate in case it is attacked. It fights out against the
aggressor by all means. Initially in the beginning of its independence it
continued her faith on the goodness of Pakistan, China and others. India being
a newly independent country followed the priority of ‘development over
defence’. As a result it suffered due to attack by Pakistan and China in
1948 and 1962 respectfully. Taking lesions from it, immediately after 62 debacles
India by adopting a new strategy of ‘the balance of defence and
development,’ it reorganized her new face that the world had seen
absolutely a different India in 1965 and 1971 wars. Subsequently the nuclear
test in 1974 and 98, IPKF involvement in Sri Lanka, Army operation in Maldives,
annexation of Sikkim, kargill conflict etc. are the instances of India’s
strategic strength. Watching a tough face of India, her enemies understood the
strategic reality of a strong nation. Now they do not dare to repeat the
history of 1948 or 1962. Is it a weak India or is it the absence of strategic
culture?
India follows the strategy of the
‘balance of armed forces and diplomacy’. These two elements of national
power - a strong military forces and the skillful diplomacy - are cleverly
utilized by India to protect her border and to promote her external national
interest respectfully. ‘Dynamism and flexibility’ as an approach of her
strategic outlook and its emphasis on ‘humanity and morality’ based on
India’s centuries old strategic culture ensure her solid road towards strategic
success.
‘ No First Attack’ in
conventional warfare and ‘No First Use of Nuclear Weapon’ are the policy
of long term strategic framework of India, that is seriously carried out in
practice, and it is not merely a show-piece of strategic face, nor it is a sign
of weakness of her strategy. India is a land of Mahatma Gandhi who believed
that the ‘peace and non-violence are an arms of braves, not of
cowardice’. Gandhi’s concept of peace and non-violence is not negative in
approach as in case of Mahbeer Jain’s thought. This is a dynamic strategy
propounded by Gandhi that is followed by India during freedom struggle and also
after independence. The peace based strategy is a long term means of national
outlook depending upon the situation and circumstances. When Pakistan attacked
on Kashmir, India sent armed forces to save Kashmir with Gandhi’s
blessings/support. It is, therefore, pacific means – negotiation, conciliation,
third-party approach, judicial/arbitration/tribunal means etc. is followed till
it is succeeding to achieve strategic goal. If it fails to realize national strategic
target, India does not hesitate to shift to another option like muscles power/offensive
means etc. depending upon the situation.
The Geeta, Mahabharat, Ramayan
etc. - the great centuries old Indian epics- teach an art of war and the principles
of strategy. Lord Krishna, the great architect of war theory, encouraged Arjun
in Geeta that attack the enemy vigorously in the battle field, whoever be
the enemy, and forget about the result of war (karmanye wadhikaraste ma falesu
kadachanam) However, he stressed upon the war for justice, not the war
for unjust and immoral aspirations. Perhaps, this teaching of Geeta had
motivated Indira Gandh to go for the most difficult war in 1971, despite a
clear US nuclear threat on India, which finally ensured unprecedented victory
in the world history. While fighting
this war India still maintained her commitment for ‘no first attack’ and
‘non-intervention’. The fact remains in this context that first Pakistan
initiated war on western frontier of India and entered into Indian territory,
which led Indian armed forces to retaliate in the eastern frontier on East
Pakistan. Hence Indian retaliation was fully justified even from the views and
norms of international law - Right to Preservation- apart from following
India’s own commitment for war strategy.
Nehru’s style of security and
foreign policy has been the subject of criticism – particularly his policy on
Kashmir and China. Most of such critics are either politically motivated or
biased or ill-informed. Some other critics, in this context, blame him for
being idealist, as a result India suffered. However, this fact is ignored by
such critics that both Pakistan and China directly and the western powers
indirectly were aware that if India goes uninterrupted even for 10 – 15 years
in the beginning of independence, it would be impossible for them to prevent it
from growing as regional and global power. Nehru was not unaware of their
intentions. Hence, he preferred small sacrifice for the sake of national and
political stability and sovereignty. And he succeeded in facing initial storm
and saved the nation from well architected conspiracy made by them jointly or
separately. Nehru’s decision to put up Kashmir problem to UNO, his acceptance
of Tibet as part of China and following non-alignment is said to be his
tactical move to keep up Indian flag flying at a critical juncture. It is
argued that had he not succeeded in plying his shrewd move at that stage of strategically
adverse situation, India could have paid very heavy price. Yes, Nehru’s move
seems to be following idealism but sometimes such approach of idealism is more
suitable for the protection of national interest rather than realism propounded
by Morgenthau. A nation like India that believes in dynamism in application of
suitable policy, has faith in such a ideology which insists on balancing
idealism and realism in the area of security and foreign policy. Extreme of
either of the two is sometime disastrous for the nation. Nehru was well known
and versatile master in dealing with such affairs, and hence he succeeded in
leading the nation by defusing the crisis tactfully and took India out of the
critical phase. Hence such argument looks a complete picture from untraditional
angle and concludes that Nehru was not at all at the extreme of idealism but
was a practical one in his approach in dealing with his assignment that the
nation had entrusted on him.
Indira Gandhi’s style of strategy
is widely considered as realist one due to her strong approach in 1971 war and
successful handling of the most dangerous phase of the nation when she had to
confront the most powerful triangle of Pakistan, China and USA. Her daring
instance comes into mind in this context when she suddenly arrived at Masco
airport on the verge of 1971 war without any diplomatic formalities, that too
diplomat of both India and USSR were unaware of her Soviet visit. She called Mr.
Brezhnev, the President of USSR with whom she wanted to meet on the airport.
But instead of the president, Prime Minister, Mr. Kosygin, arrived to meet her
at the airport with whom she refused to talk as he was a no. 2 boss. Finally
President Brezhnev himself came and succeeded to convince her and fully
confirmed Soviet support in context with US nuclear threat on India. No such
daring instance other than this one is available in the cotemporary world. Let
us see another instance of Chinese President Mao’s visit to Masco in 1953 at
the time of Stalin’s death. Despite staying there unusually for almost 45 days
and kept on convincing new Soviet leadership to accept him being a senior most
leader in the communist world as well as Chinese style of ideology, he failed
to do it and finally came back empty-handed. This is the difference of
leadership role between Indira Gandhi and Mao-tse-Tung. One can easily conclude
the value of leadership factor in term of strategic considerations
of India and China.
India’s present status is the
result of its own consistent efforts rather than due to any special strategic
support from imperialist nation as China got from USA in terms of economic(MFN
and heavy investment) and political (for membership of nuclear club and the
Security Council of the UNO etc.) since 1970s. Such kind of support is in fact
a very big one for a developing country. USA had given heavy economic support
to Europe, Germany and Japan during post-war period but the way political
support was given to China, it was unprecedented in the recent history of
world. It is argued that had India got even the half of such support, it would
have gone much a head of China in all aspect, although India is still not far
behind China. This is the instance of main difference in strategic approach of
China and India. India has committed and carried out in practice the moral
value in international politics unlike China. The best way of long term
strategy, according to Indian strategic culture, is to carry out ethical
value and realistic base of national power together as India has
been following the same uninterrupted
since freedom struggle and also from the beginning of independence.
China
Unlike India China adopts a
western style of realistic strategy minus ethical element of idealism. It has
been following almost all the six principles of realism propounded by
Morgenthau, having its advantage and disadvantage in the contemporary strategic
scenario, China looks as mostly gainer at least for a short term national
interest.
‘Grand strategy’ of China is widely
talked in the academic circle. Let me focus the same here to understand Chinese
strategy based on its cultural tradition in the historical perspective.
The Peoples Republic of China (PRC)
came into being in the culmination of a nearly 150 years long period of
continuous turmoil and struggle against exploitation by foreign powers,
domestic disruptions and factional fighting between different political forces.
By the beginning of 19th century, the Qing Dynasty had already
showing signs of moral decay. Historically the Chinese society has been kept
together only when a strong central power ruled the county. In the Sinic system
the emperor was seen as having the mandate of heaven to rule the so-called
‘Middle Kingdom’. However, once he had exhausted this heavenly mandate, the people
were theoretically free to search for an alternative.[viii]
The idea and concept of the Middle
Kingdom comprising what is now east-central China, surrounded by barbarians
along its vast frontiers and periphery meant that the emperor could effectively
ignore the activities in the outlying area so long as these did not directly
impinge on the security of the Middle Kingdom and consequently that of the
emperor himself. Throughout its long history, however, China was subjected to a
series of invasions mostly from the north and the northeast, which every
Chinese emperor had to fight or at least resist. Some of the emperors were
themselves invaders like the Mongols and Manchu. Resisting invasions, however,
was a costly drain on imperial resources and usually, it was the cost of these
wars that weakened the empire and made it susceptible to the next invasion.
Some of the Middle Kingdom was surrounded
by ‘barbarians’ the Sinic hierarchical order did not recognize sovereign
equality between the empire and the surrounding states or kingdom and thus only
a tributary relationship existed in which the smaller states were considered
inferior. In fact, until about 19th century barbarians were managing
foreign affairs and interaction between people and the states was often based
on Confucianism with its high ethical principles of justice, fair play and
general preference of non-violent means for conflict resolution. Despite this,
the Chinese did not desist from the use of military force but justified it as
self-defence.[ix]
The 1901 Box Rebellion staged by the
local people opposed the exploitation made by foreign powers with support of
the officialdom. Continuous internal disruptions and foreign interference, the
Qing dynasty finally collapsed in 1911 and Dr. Sun Yat Sen established a new
Republic. However, with the birth of communism in 1922, the internal turmoil
stayed which led to the 40 years long civil war under Mao. After the death of
Sun Yat Sen in 1927 and regime of Kuomintang Republic came into the hands of Chaing-
Kai- Shek who also could not check the decaying of the regime. This nationalist
regime was finally replaced by the communists under Mao in 1949. Although, the
nationalist was defeated but not eliminated as they fled to Formosa (Taiwan)
just across the Taiwan Strait and continued armed attack against mainland-PRC
with US backing. The PRC leadership, it looks, develop a xenophobia, and
remained a paranoid power ever since.[x]
In course of building up,
reorganization and reconstruction of internal and external resources, PRC
concentrated on various fronts. Keeping in view American supporting Taiwan and
the threat of war looming large on the Korean peninsula, Mao’s first major
strategic move was to find a dependable friend. He tried to build a strategic
and ideologically strengthen relations with Soviet Union and he succeeded to do
it without much effort in view of cold war between the two super powers. USSR,
with the signing of the ‘Treaty of Friendship’ on 14 Feb 1950, provided China
all the possible economic, technological, industrial, financial, military hardware
and various other assistance required for developing an underdeveloped country.
In 1937, even 12 years before his
regime was resumed in 1949, Mao had planned to incorporate Tibet, the Buddhist
dominated region and Xinjiang, the Muslim majority as autonomous provinces of
the PRC. Immediately after taking over the charge of PRC in 1950 he sent the
PLA to ‘liberate’ Xinjiang and Tibet ‘from the oppression of feudal orthodox
and blind faith’. Both the provinces had been historically the home of
anti-Chinese revolt and never accepted Chinese sovereignty. He intended to
consolidate/ensure border security by incorporating Tibet against newly
independent democratic India, and Xinjiang against the world leader of
communism, Russia, despite the fact that there was no sign of threat at all
either from Delhi or Masco at that point of time. This is an instance of Mao’s
style of strategy of realism based on the old saying of ‘no one is
permanent friend or enemy in international politics’.
Taking into account the US support
to Taiwan, Japan and its involvement on Korean issue, PRC joined Korean
conflict with Soviet support to protect it from American intention of imposing
imperialism in the region and China as well.
By the end of 1950s China started
giving indications of a possible conflict against India and the USSR in the near future on the pretext of imaginary border issue with
India and the supply of a small nuclear bomb and ideological issue after the
death of Stalin with Soviet Union. The war designed strategy of Mao came
true in 1962 against India and in 1965 against USSR when PLA directly
confronted against Indian and Soviet forces respectively. Being a true follower
of Morgenthau, Mao believed in the promotion of national interest at any cost –
even at the cost of India and Soviet Union, the most reliable friend in the
region and the world as well. This strategy was a well thought planning in
advance to shake hands with USA in the near future. PRC had already enjoyed all
the possible maximum support from India (on Tibet and recognition of PRC) and
the USSR (building up PLA, technology etc), now Mao wanted to focus on USA for
political (for UNO) and economic support irrespective of ideological issue –
capitalism vs. communism. And he achieved this goal in 1970 with Nixon – Kissinger
regime of USA. Not the end of strategic aspiration here, China now dreams of
pushing USA behind existing global status.
Chinese
strategy towards India and the strategic rivalry between the two in the given
situation are focused below:
1.
Golden period from 1949 to 1958 :
The policy of ‘China and India as brothers’ (Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai) followed
between 1949 to 1958. During this period India, being the second non –communist
country after Burma, recognized PRC against the desire of entire western
powers. Besides, Prime Ministers of both the countries visited each other and
agreed to follow the policy of Panchsheel. Moreover, India accepted Tibet as
part of Chinese sovereignty during this time. And they also attended Bandung
conference together during this period. That is why this period is known as
golden period in the modern history of China and India.
2.
Chinese policy of containment from 1959 to 78 :
China raised border issue during this phase of relationship. This new face of
China was not at all a surprise move. Border demarcation issue was taken up
between British-India and Sun-Yat-Sen regime of China in Shimla in 1914. Both
accepted Mc Mohn Line in principle only, not in practice. Communist party of
China opposed it from the very beginning of its foundation in 1922. The same
party came into power in 1949 in the name of PRC and it raised this issue
subsequently in a tactical move after 1956, by that time China had already
taken all possible support from India during the aforesaid previous phase. However,
in view of the above, it cannot be said that PRC’s policy of raising border
issue at this stage was the new one or it was a surprise move. Before India
could prepare her military muscle, China attacked India in Oct. 1962. It
resulted into the beginning of dark period almost for two decades in the
history of centuries old relationship between the two great civilizations. After 1962 war Sino-India relations were cold
and hostile. In John Garver’s view, this hostility reflected an underlying
geopolitical rivalry between the two, both nations seeking to restore their
traditional great-power status and with overlapping traditional spheres of
influence. Garver sees rivalry and mutual perceptions of military threat as
constant features of Sino-Indian relations.[xi]
China made all possible strategic efforts during this period to contain India
and prevent it from dominating the subcontinent including its support to
Pakistan during 1965 war and also supported Pakistan policy on Kashmir.
3.
Strategy of Rapprochement from 1979 to 1997: In
1976 Mao Zedong died, and in 1979 Deng Xiaoping initiated an ambitious new
policy of economic reform. Deng recognized that to concentrate on economic
modernization, china needed a peaceful and stable environment, which in turn
would require a reorientation of China’s foreign policies. For the first time
in Chinese modern history, the country developed a coherent, integrated Asia
regional policy, consisting of pragmatic relations with the two superpowers and
improved ties with all the countries on its periphery.[xii]
In 1979 and 1981, the Chinese and Indian foreign ministers exchanged visits,
though during Indian foreign minister, Atal Behari Bajpayee’s Feb. 1979 visit,
he was embarrassed by Chinese poorly timed or deliberately done invasion of
Vietnam. However, he succeeded to bring home Chinese commitment to cease
support for insurgency in northeast region of India. Between 1981 and 1987
China and India held eight rounds of negotiations on their boundary but failed
to produce a solution. Yet during 1988 visit of Indian PM, Rajeev Gandhi, Deng
told him “ Let both sides forget the unpleasant period in our past relations,
and let us treat everything with an eye on the future.”[xiii]
During Narsimha Rao’s visit to China in
1093, both the countries signed the agreement on the ‘Maintenance of Peace and
Tranquility along the line of actual control.’ Moreover, in 1996 Chinese
president Jiang Zemin visited New Delhi and signed yet another
agreement-‘Confidence Building Measures’ in the military field and along the
LAC’ to solidify the relationship between the two. In its most significant
gesture to promote rapprochement during this period, China, shifting from her
earlier approach, unilaterally declared that Kashmir is a bilateral issue
between India and Pakistan and hence both should resolve it peacefully.
4.
Strategic Setting in1998 : Chinese
senior General Fu Quanyou’s Visit to India from 27-30 April 1998, first
by a PLA chief of general staff, was scheduled, Mr. George Fernandes, then defence minister of India, publicly
alleged, ten days before General’s
visit, that China was continuing to carry out border incursions. Even during
visit of the General, Fernandes once again lambasted China publicly, accusing it
of being the number one threat to Indian security, even greater than Pakistan.
The May 11 and 13, 1998 Indian nuclear test followed, occurring even before
General returned Beijing on May 18, 1998. Was the timing of nuclear test deliberately
scheduled to humiliate China to pay back the
Chinese for embarrassment they
had caused then foreign minister
Vajpayee when they had attacked Vietnam, a friendly country of India,
during his 1979 visit to China, forcing him to cut his trip short? This is a
matter of speculation. The Chinese official response to Indian nuclear test was
reflected in People’s Daily on 15 May 1998 that “The Indian govt. has
disregarded the fundamental interest of the vast number of its people and
desperately developed nuclear weapon in defiance of world opinion. The reason
for this is nothing less than a desire to threaten neighboring countries and
dominate South Asia.”[xiv]
On 13 May, The New York Times published a letter from PM Vajpayee to president
Bill Clinton, leaked in the USA, which blamed China for India’s nuclear test,
saying that “I have been deeply concerned at the deteriorating security
environment, especially the nuclear environment, faced by India for some years
past. We have an overt nuclear weapon state on our borders, a state which
committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with
that country improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust
persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem. To add to the distrust
that country has materially helped another neighbor of ours to become a covert
nuclear weapon state. At the hands of this bitter neighbor we have suffered
three aggressions in the last 50 years.”[xv]
In reaction to this letter, the 19 May People’s Daily further condemned Indian
nuclear test more strongly, that “…nobody believe such preposterous logic and
the so-called ‘China threat’ lies.[xvi]
However, immediately after India, Pakistan’s test for nuclear weapon on 28 and
30 May 1998, might cautioned Chinese
President for toning down the tamper, who subsequently said “…no matter whether
India or Pakistan, conducting nuclear test, is against world trend,” and he
urged both countries to “keep calm, show restraint, and reopen dialogue,” and
to sign unconditionally NPT and CTBT.[xvii]
5.
Strategy of Engagement: Anyway,
only a few months after the nuclear test, China resumed its efforts to engage
India diplomatically both on political and Joint Working Group level. Initial
setback and bettering due to nuclear test could not stop China and India to
normalize relations and to proceed ahead. During Vajpayee’s visit (being the
PM) to China in June 2003 both sides finally agreed for further discussions on
border delimitation. The most important thing had happened at this occasion was
Chinese recognition to Sikkim as part of India and to reopen trade route
through Chumbi Vally. Both the countries are developing in a remarkable phase
of bilateral relationship in the area of economic, trade, information
technology etc. for the first time in last 66 years. Their mutual trade and
commerce has almost touched 70 billion dollars - India’s highest bilateral
trade with any one country - and they are targeting at 100 billion dollars by
2020.A part from it, their understanding and
co-operation in the World Trade Organization is also a matter of
appreciation.
6.
Strategic Encirclement:
However, it is argued that China’s hostile acts as well as friendly gesture,
both are unpredictable, unreliable and mysterious. India is well experienced of
Chinese such behavior in the past. It is said that China, unfortunately,
understands only the language of muscles power, nothing else. Despite a very
close economic tie with India, it is reluctant to settle border issue, the root
cause of all the problems, even after consistent efforts at the level of JWG
and political leadership since 1980. Besides, military modernization, unlawful
demand of access to sea and land towards China Sea and Island of Japan etc., continuous
incursions on LOC with India, encircling India from all directions by gaining
strategic access to Maldives, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan,
Southeast Asia, Asia Pacific, Central Asia and Middle East etc. speak the
truth. Knowing intentions of China, India is getting prepared accordingly. Now
one thing appears to clear that China cannot afford to take India for granted
as it did in 1962.
Strategic
Triangles:
The
concept of a strategic triangle has become familiar to analysts of
international affairs. It refers to a situation in which three major powers are
sufficiently important to each other that a change in the relationship between
any two of them has a significant impact on the interest of the third. The
greater that impact, actual or potential, the greater is the significant of the
triangular relationship.[xviii]
The most familiar strategic triangles in
the contemporary era have been Sino-Soviet-American during the cold war and now
China –India- America. Although, Harry Harding also includes Sino-Japan-America
during the cold war period in the list of strategic triangle, but many
other scholars argues that all the three partners in this case do not have
equal elements for being a global power or at least the capability of growing
as world power in future. Japan in particular appears to be weak element due to
its dependence for her security on USA under Japan-US treaty of 1953. As
regards Sino-Indian-American triangle is concerned, its features are appended
as under:
1.
These three partners have formed
triangle ever since India got independence, China became communist and USA
became a permanent player in Asia.
2.
India despite gaining all essential
elements of a world power, it is taken as a weaker partner, hence both China
and USA attempt to use India to contain each other. In view of standing in the
centre, India is taking advantage from both of them. Indo-US Civil Nuclear Deal
of 2008 and having a highest trade relation with China in the world are
obviously the instances of India’s strategic advantage of being a partner of
this triangle.
3.
Although, India is also in the
triangle like group comprising Sino-Russia-India that is called as nexus. But
it cannot be conceptualized as triangle like that of Sino-India-America,
because Russia is no longer an active player in world. However, Russian
position in this case of nexus is strategically better due to its military arms
and equipments required for both India and China and in this situation Russians
are gainer in term of bargaining with both of them on its supply.
Assessment
In view of
the above the assessment in nutshell are as under:
1.
Both China and India are growing as
active players in the multi-polar global strategic scenario in future.
2.
Whether China likes or not, India is
presently a joint regional power in Asia along with China. Japan is not in the
race due to its dependence on USA for national security.
3.
Both China and India produce such a
heavy share of global GDP that rest of the world cannot afford to ignore them
particularly in the WTO.
4.
Instead of merely accusing China on
border issue, India thinks positively and taking advantage of China’s fast
economic growth it has developed tremendous bilateral trade relations which is
at present is of 42 bn dollars, that is even higher than Indo - US bilateral
trade.
5.
Chinese use of Pakistan to contain
India has not produced any substantive strategic gain for China, despite
Chinese unlawful supply of missiles and nuclear material to it for which China
has been condemned worldwide. Sooner or later, China would prefer to alter this
policy in view of growing Indian strategic statures as well as growing terror
act in China for which Indian co-operation would be required for joint strategy
against terrorism.
6.
Unsettled border dispute is a long
term part of Chinese strategy against India. It serves two vital Chinese
strategic interests – 1. India’s limited resources are diverted to defence
budget for keeping a big army for caring a long boundary and 2. The development
suffers due to this unproductive expenditure. It helps China as it prevents
India to counter China in term of economic growth. Hence China would prefer
unsettled border in future too. To counter such Chinese strategy India is
taking Japan and other countries of Asia Pacific and South East Asia with its
side and encircles China, so as to keep
it under limit.
7.
India is fully aware that both China
and USA are most unreliable and hence as far as possible it would take advantage
of being a partner of the strategic triangle and in the meanwhile it would
strengthen her status.
8.
Strategic pressure on China from all
sides in the region and India/ USA as well, might force it to collapse like
USSR.
Conclusion
Prime
Minister Jawahar Lal Nehu said in Lok Sabha on Nov. 25, 1959 that “From fairly
early in history, they (China) have had a sensation of greatness. They call
themselves the ‘Middle Kingdom’, and it seemed natural to them that other
countries should pay tribute to them. Their thinking was that the rest of the
world occupied a lower grade. That has made it difficult for us to understand
the working of their mind, and what is more to the point, for them to
understand the working of our mind.”[xix]
This statement of Pt. Nehru is still relevant even after four decades. His
statement is a suitable conclusion of Indo-China strategic rivalry.
Reference
[i] Phadke Ramesh, China‘s Power Projection, Manas
Pub. New Delhi, 2005, p.186.
[ii] Menon Narayan, India –China Border
Isses:Strategic Implications and Impact of Air Power, presented in YC-NISDA,
University of Pune in 1911.
[iii] Indian Strategic Culture, The
Washington Quarterly, Winter 1992, P. 129.
[iv] Ibid, p. 130.
[v] Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging
Power, Washington CD, Brookings Institution Press, 2001, p.126.
[vi] Susan L. Shirk, One side Rivalry:
China’s Perceptions and Policies toward
India, The India – China Relationship, Rivalry and Engagement, Oxford
University Press, 2004, p. 75
[vii] Phadke Ramesh, p. 141
[viii]
Phadke Ramesh, p. 19-21.
[ix] Ibid.
[x] Ibid., p. 22
[xi] Susan L.Shirk, P. 77
[xii] Ibid, p.80
[xiii]
Ibid, p.81
[xiv] Ibid, p. 86
[xv] Ibid,.p. 83
[xvi] Ibid,p. 87
[xvii]
Ibit, p.84
[xviii]
Hardug Harry,The evolution of
the strategic triangle: China , India
and the United States, The India –China Relationship: Rivalry and
Engagement, Oxford University Press,
2001, p. 321.
[xix]
Menon Narayan, India-China Border Issues Strategic Implications and Impact of Air
Power, the Paper presented in YC-NISDA, University of Pune in 1991
